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ABSTRACT
RELIGION AND REGIONALISM: CONGREGANTS, CULTURE, AND CITYCOUNTY CONSOLIDATION IN LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY
Joshua D. Ambrosius
May 8, 2010
Literature on religious involvement in public affairs typically examines the
national scene, particularly public opinion and political behavior in presidential elections.
Few scholars examine religious actors in urban politics and policymaking. Those who do
study local politics emphasize morality policy and ignore issues of metropolitan
governance and institutional design, central concerns of the urban politics field. This
dissertation fills that gap by studying Louisville, Kentucky, site of the first large-scale
city-county consolidation since 1969. I ask: does religion affect how people vote in a
consolidation referendum and shape their opinions about merged government?
I employ a survey instrument (N=807), collected randomly across Louisville
Metro in 2006, and use multiple linear and binary logistic regression to predict religiosity,
“culture war” stances, and consolidation referendum participation and support. I control
for socio-economic status, demographics, residence, and political ideology. I
operationalize religion as a variable in two ways: as a factor score index measuring level
of religiosity, combining behavior, belief, and salience items; and as religious affiliation,
predominately Roman Catholic and Southern Baptist in Louisville. I also employ the
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2006 General Social Survey for comparison with the nation and several additional
religion databases to better understand Louisville’s religious ecology.
I find that religiosity did not significantly affect one’s turnout or vote but is
positively related to opinions of the merged government. Religious affiliation did not
significantly affect turnout but significantly affected one’s vote and opinions. Regression
results show that Catholics were 37 percent more likely to support consolidation than
Southern Baptists. I downplay theories that differences over redistribution to central
cities and political trust may be driving differences over consolidation.
I posit a theory labeled “polity replication” based in the institutional and
organizational theory and sociology of religion literatures. I argue that participation in a
religious denomination’s organizational structure conditions members to prefer similar
structures in other societal institutions. Two forms of metropolitan governance,
monocentrism and polycentrism, parallel the poles of church polity (i.e., denominational
governance): episcopal/centralized (Catholic) and congregational/decentralized (Baptist).
In conclusion, I present recommendations and implications for research, religious
practice, and politics/policymaking.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Introduction: Religion, Social Science, and Urban Studies
Religious institutions and organizations have always been important components
of human settlement and civilization. Kotkin’s (2005) treatise on ancient urban history
goes so far as to list the city’s sacred role on par with its more-emphasized political and
economic functions. The social sciences’ founders, including early economists,
psychologists, historians, and sociologists, understood the importance of religion and
integrated its study into their most-celebrated works (Smith, 1776; James, 1902; Maslow,
1964; Tawney, 1926; Durkheim, 1897; Weber, 1930). By the mid-to-late twentieth
century, however, work on the social scientific study of religion faded into obscurity as
the secularization thesis won acceptance. With roots in Marx, Freud, Weber, and
Durkheim, the secularization thesis—in its most basic form—holds that societal
modernization, including urbanization, correlates with declining levels of religiosity. The
theory predicted that the power and influence of religious organizations would fade,
ultimately undermining the church as a major institution of human society.
This rejection of religion’s importance was engrained in urban studies, perhaps
most of all, as the field embraced structural Marxism and Kotkin’s other urban
functions—known collectively as political economy (Swanstrom, 1993; Sapotichne,
Jones, and Wolfe, 2007). Even theologians began to speak of the “secular city” (Cox,
1965). As cities grew, religion waned—or so it was thought. Religion was simply
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incompatible with modern, industrial, urbanized society. Sociology’s founding fathers—
who spoke a great deal about religion—inspired later generations to discontinue further
scientific investigation into religion’s role in society.
At the advent of the twenty-first century we now recognize the secularization
thesis largely as an ideologically-tinged byproduct of Enlightenment-era rationality. If
true at all, secularization is largely a European phenomenon; but even this “fact” has been
challenged (Stark and Iannaccone, 1994). Worldwide, including the United States (U.S.),
just the opposite may be true. A recent United Nations Population Fund (2007, 26) report
on global urbanization states it well:
The revival of religious adherence in its varied forms is one of the more
noticeable cultural transformations accompanying urbanization. Rapid
urbanization was expected to mean the triumph of rationality, secular
values and the demystification of the world, as well as the relegation of
religion to a secondary role. Instead, there has been a renewal in religious
interest in many countries.
Religion is being rediscovered in all branches of the social sciences—from
sociology to political science, and even economics and New Institutional/organizational
theory (Ebaugh, 2002; Wald and Wilcox, 2006; Iannaccone, 1998; Demerath, et al.,
1998; McMullen, 1994; Scheitle and Dougherty, 2008). Urban studies—particularly the
urban politics subfield of political science—appears to be an exception (Sharp, 2007).
Urbanists rank the lowest in religious interest when compared with political science’s
other Americanist and Comparativist branches (Ambrosius, 2008a; 2009a). While
sociologists of religion, for example, employ urban theory to explain the distribution of
religion across neighborhoods and the metropolitan region—a concept known as religious
ecology—urbanists largely tend to ignore other bodies of work outside the limited urban
field (Form and Dubrow, 2005, 2008; Eiesland, 2000; McRoberts, 2003; Sapotichne, et
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al., 2007). This includes work on religion and politics by scholars of American national
politics (Sharp, 2007).
Many studies find that religion affects partisan identification, electoral
participation/decisions, and personal opinions on social and political issues in the U.S.
(Campbell, 2007; Denton, 2005; Gilderbloom and Markham, 1995; Green, Rozell, and
Wilcox, 2003; Guth, et al., 2006; Kohut, et al., 2000; Langer and Cohen, 2005; Layman,
2001; Leege and Kellstedt, 1993; Smidt, Kellstedt, and Guth, 2009a; Wilcox, 1996).
Much of this work relies on large samples of the mass public—drawing on publically
available datasets (particularly the General Social Survey and American National
Election Study) or survey data collected specifically to gauge the relationship between
religion and politics (e.g., the National Survey of Religion and Politics; see Guth, et al.,
2006).
Recent media accounts confirm that religious institutions and organizations are
playing central roles in the fundamental issues and concerns of our time—including
exurban growth, the housing boom and economic collapse, globalization, climate change,
healthcare reform, urban planning and revitalization, and community economic
development (Mahler, 2005; Rosin, 2009; Wright, 2009; Winter, 2009; Wisdom, 2009;
Reep, 2009; Henriques and Lehren, 2007). In the cases of globalization and the housing
crisis, some are even attributing a causal link to religious forces (Wright, 2009; Rosin,
2009).
Despite this apparent “revival” of religion, little research has examined religion’s
effect on local political allegiance, behavior, or beliefs. Those limited studies that have
explored local “culture war” divisions tend to rely on qualitative case studies rather than
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quantitative analysis of random-sample survey data (e.g., Sharp, 1999). Only one study
thoroughly examines the relationship between religion and politics in a U.S. city
(Demerath and Williams, 1992). Two recent multi-author volumes engage moral and
religious influences on local politics using multi-city samples (Djupe and Olson, 2007;
Sharp, 2005). Sharp (2005) and her colleagues concentrate on morality policy while
Djupe and Olson (2007) extend their analyses, conducted by contributors, to issues
“beyond the culture wars” like social justice and race relations.
No contemporary authors emphasize potential religious influences on several key
theoretical and empirical issues central to the urban politics field—including metropolitan
governance, governmental fragmentation, and city-county consolidation. At the heart of
these issues is the question of institutional design: what set of institutions and
organizational structures is best-suited for governance of the metropolitan region in the
contemporary U.S.? Given that governance structures “are the work of civil society and
therefore…based on a rule of willing consent,” religion likely plays a role in shaping
individual preferences for institutional design (Oakerson, 2004, 20). Religious
institutions dominate American civil society and are influential in shaping personal moral
and political commitments (Putnam, 2000; see above citations). Nonetheless, the direct
effect of religion on preferences for differing forms of metropolitan structure has not
been explored previously in the urban politics literature or elsewhere.

Religion and Consolidation in Louisville, Kentucky
Louisville, Kentucky is an interesting locale for exploration of religious ecology
and its implications for local institutional design due to both its rich religious history and
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recent political innovation. Louisville is a mid-sized, middle American city bordering the
southern and Midwestern regions, long labeled the “gateway from the North to the
South” (McMeekin, 1946, 256). The city is historically Democratic and Roman Catholic
but located in a politically “red state” within the contemporary “Bible belt.” Louisville
has sizable populations of Roman Catholics, black Protestants, and white evangelical
Protestants, particularly Southern Baptists, as well as several large megachurches, two
prominent seminaries, and a denominational headquarters (Jones, et al., 2002; Hartford
Institute, 2009; Barlow, 2004; Gaustad and Schmidt, 2004). Louisville is home to over
500 individual religious congregations (Jones, et al., 2002). Southeast Christian Church,
located in Louisville’s suburban east-end, is frequented each weekend by over 18,000
worshippers (Hartford Institute, 2009). The city itself boasts another six churches over
2,000 average weekly attendees—the accepted cutoff for “megachurch” status (Hartford
Institute, 2009; Thumma and Travis, 2007). Louisville’s largest predominately black
church, St. Stephen Church, has an average attendance of approximately 8,000 (Hartford
Institute, 2009).
Louisville’s medium size and relative geographic isolation make it a more
manageable case study than oft-studied “megacities” and other mid-sized cities located
within megalopolis regions (Ambrosius, Gilderbloom, and Hanka, 2010). Barlow (2004)
argues that the Midwest region is the most-representative of the U.S. as a whole of any of
the country’s regions, demographically and in terms of religious affiliation. Louisville
lies on the Midwestern frontier, an area referred to as “Kentuckiana” due to its border
with Indiana (Barlow, 2004, 31). Louisville shares many characteristics, including ethnic
and cultural diversity, with nearby Midwestern cities like its “Ohio River sister city,”
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Cincinnati, Ohio (Williams, 2004, 217). On the other hand, the U.S. Census Bureau
places Louisville in the southern region, which has long been said to possess a distinct
regional subculture (Salisbury, 1962; Ellison and Musick, 1993). Thus, Louisville could
be termed the Upper South or the Lower Midwest (Ownby, 2005). While research
findings from Louisville are not representative of the nation as a whole, or even all other
cities (see Stein, 1960), a case study conducted in Louisville likely will uncover
conditions more reflective of “typical” American communities than studies of cultural
and social outliers like New York City or Los Angeles (also see Feagin, Orum, and
Sjoberg, 1991). A previous study with similar goals used a southern community (Atlanta,
Georgia) to test general hypotheses without reference to the study’s regional context
(McMullen, 1994).
While interesting for religious and geographic reasons, Louisville has also drawn
attention for its recent political reforms. Residents of the City of Louisville and
surrounding Jefferson County voted to consolidate their governments in a 2000
referendum, with the merger of city and county completed by 2003 (Savitch and Vogel,
2004). This was the first large-scale consolidation in a U.S. city since Indianapolis and
Marion County, Indiana, merged in 1969 (Morgan, England, and Pelissero, 2007). Since
consolidation, Louisville has become a magnet for scholars of urban studies, regional
planning, and public administration. The local elite, national experts on urban policy,
and adherents of the “New Regionalism” hail Louisville’s successes in overcoming
regional competition and planning for a better future (Brookings Institution, 2002;
Greater Louisville Project, 2005, 2007, 2008; Rusk, 2003; Dreier, Mollenkopf, and
Swanstrom, 2004). Critical local academics, on the other hand, lament its downsides,
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focusing on consolidation’s power dimension, dilution of minority influence, and
inability to live up to its lofty goals—enhancement of economic development and fair
share housing in particular (Ambrosius, 2009b; Imbroscio, 2006; Savitch and Vogel,
2000, 2004; Savitch, Vogel, and Ye, 2009).
Like most communities, Louisville faces a host of local political issues where
religion is certain to play a role. These include arguments over homosexuality and gay
rights, pornography and adult entertainment, and sex education in public schools. While
these issues may or may not have developed to full-fledged local culture “wars” in
Louisville, divisions in public opinion exist in any urban environment where forms of
conventional and unconventional culture butt heads.

Research Questions
Savitch and colleagues’ (2008) account of Louisville’s political culture
demonstrates that religious congregations and believers, particularly evangelicals, are
inclined to take political action on important local moral matters. While personal moral
issues may make up the bulk of the bickering at the national level, religious differences
are thought to extend beyond sexuality and abortion to economics, diplomacy, and other
policy arenas (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2003; Guth, et al., 1996; Wilson, 2009). In
Peterson’s (1981) famous terms, local governments are “limited” by the federalist
structure and thus cannot make war or peace, close their borders to outsiders, or take
action in a host of other policy fields. Nonetheless, the realm of local politics certainly
encompasses the distribution of local power and decision-making and concerns over
“who gets what”—the natural stuff of politics. Do religious differences influence
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personal political stances on these more-lofty issues of urban political economy and
institutional design? Some evidence indicates that local churches may have played a role
in influencing public opinion about consolidation in Louisville (Savitch and Vogel,
2004).
Sharp (2007, 59) admits that, “To many analysts, the notion that cultural
cleavages would shape urban electoral outcomes may at first blush appear absurd.” She
then acknowledges that in fact “it may not be the case that differences in religiosity…are
directly implicated in voter mobilization and vote choice in local elections, except
perhaps in referenda involving morality issues” such as Brown, Knopp, and Morrill’s
(2005) study of gay rights in Tacoma, Washington (Sharp, 2007, 59). Sharp believes that
the possibility is still open that religion and other cultural factors may be “linked to
differences in participation levels, thus shaping the effective electorate and hence
electoral outcomes. And…culture might serve as an important contextual or mediating
variable” (Sharp, 2007, 59).
Sharp’s willingness to ask questions of religion’s value and her lingering doubts
about religious differences on substantial, non-morality issues beg for future exploration
of religion’s effect on local government and politics. Does religion influence urban
government and politics beyond the typical culture war issues? What is the mechanism,
or theoretical connection, spurring any demonstrated religious effect? Why might
churches or religious believers approach a seemingly non-moral issue like city-county
consolidation with unusual passion? The central question of this study, operationalized,
is: does religion (religiosity and/or religious affiliation) influence individuals’ preferences
for institutional design, manifested by participation in a city-county consolidation
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referendum, vote choice in favor of consolidation, and approval of a merged city-county
government?
Since I must test this question in a given locale, it becomes pertinent first to ask:
to what extent does the county under study reflect the religion, politics, and culture of the
general population? Empirical, contextual questions take the following forms: What is
the geographic distribution of Christian edifices, religious identification, and individual
religiosity across the urban continuum of Louisville-Jefferson County Metro? What
variables contribute to the formation of Louisville’s religious ecology? What variables
predict individual religious identification and religiosity in Louisville? How do these
findings compare with the nation? How does Louisville compare with the nation on
religious differences on political ideology, partisan identification (support for President
George W. Bush), and attitudes on the divisive culture war issues of homosexuality and
sex education in public schools? By religious differences, I mean differences in both
religious affiliation and religiosity.
Furthermore, to test whether preferences for city-county consolidation are
possibly masking preferences for something else, I ask: do religiosity and/or religious
affiliation influence, in the same or similar way, individuals’ (a) attitudes on
redistribution to central cities, (b) penchants for political trust, and (c) approval of the
primary consolidation entrepreneur (Louisville’s mayor)?
I theorize two connections between religion and urban institutional design,
represented by two key independent variables: religiosity and religious identification/
preference (a proxy for religious affiliation). Because religions are divided on some
issues of social justice and redistribution, and consolidation is supported by a diverse
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coalition of interests, the direction of effect (positive or negative) on religiosity is
somewhat ambiguous. On one hand, consolidation and other regional initiatives are
thought to harness suburban resources for the betterment of the typically-decaying urban
core (Rusk, 2003; Dreier, et al., 2004). Many churches take part in similar urbansuburban partnerships that could reinforce pro-regionalism attitudes and behaviors (Sider,
et al., 2008; Owens, 2006). However, this understanding is complicated by the recent
rise of politically conservative religion which views any form of government-imposed
redistribution as suspect. In this sense, religiosity may be a proxy for conservatism and
NIMBY (“not in my back yard”) attitudes. On the other hand, consolidation can be seen
as furthering the interests of the powerful—economic growth and development (Savitch
and Vogel, 2004). In this context, conservative religionists may favor consolidation
while liberal, urban parishioners—particularly black Protestants, who fear dissolution of
influence—may view consolidation and its supporters with suspicion.
I propose an original theory as to why different religious denominations may have
differing views on city-county consolidation and, more broadly, questions of institutional
design in society at large. It is known that religious denominations possess divergent
organizational structures (Allen, 1995; Zech, 2003). For example, the Southern Baptist
Convention is a loose alliance of Baptist churches that prides itself on maintaining
relative congregational autonomy (Mao and Zech, 2002). On the other hand, the Roman
Catholic Church is an international conglomerate with many levels of administration
(Mao and Zech, 2002). Local Catholic Church officials and their congregations are
beholden to the leadership at the regional (diocese), national, or Vatican levels. These
two church structures—inspired by their distinctive theologies—correspond fairly well
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with two models of urban structure: polycentrism and monocentrism (Oakerson, 2004).
Past research has found that culture does influence societies’ institutional structures and
policy preferences (Greif, 1994; Koven, 1999). Differences in local culture are thought
to influence the pursuit (or lack thereof) of regionalism—with certain areas preferring
individualized, localized control and others more collective, regional government (Burns,
1994; Dreier, et al., 2004; Miller, 2002; Rusk, 2003).
Catholics and Southern Baptists are the two largest religious denominations in
Louisville and, in many ways, represent the two poles of Christian polity (see McMullen,
1994 for similar examples). It seems likely that Southern Baptists will view
consolidation with more skepticism, while Catholics will view it more favorably. Black
Protestants will likely view both consolidation and the regime with skepticism. It is
documented that much of consolidation’s opposition came from within the black
community (Porter, 2008; Savitch and Vogel, 2004). The religiously unaffiliated often
align with the liberal end of the political spectrum and the Democratic Party in U.S.
politics (Leege and Kellstedt, 1993). Their views of consolidation could go either way—
in support of far-left critics or in alliance with the local Democratic establishment. Other
Protestants and Christians’ opinions are likely largely divided, perhaps reflective of, or
cutting across, other political divisions. Non-Christian religions compose such a small
proportion of Louisville’s population that an attempt to understand particular traditions’
positions is particularly difficult; and any collective effect is nonsensical because of the
inclusion of vastly different traditions (Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, etc.).

11

Data Sources
This study analyzes data on local public opinion in Louisville, Kentucky from the
2006 Louisville Metropolitan Survey (LMS; Department of Sociology, 2006). The 2006
LMS asks a host of questions on religion and religiosity, morality, and local politics
including participation and vote in the consolidation referendum and opinions of the
consolidated Louisville Metro government. This study also employs the General Social
Survey for comparison with the nation as a whole and as a means to test locally-derived
theory (GSS; Davis and Smith, 2006). In addition, I explore several other data sources on
Louisville’s religious ecology and history to provide context as needed.

Overview
Following a literature review and methodology description, findings are divided
into three chapters (IV) “Louisville’s Religious Landscape”; (V) “Culture War in
Louisville and the Nation”; and (VI) “Religion and City-County Consolidation in
Louisville.” Each of the three includes review of historical or contextual information,
analysis of descriptive statistics and inferential methods, and discussion of the findings.
The final chapter (VII) titled “Discussion and Implications” summarizes the findings and
discusses implications for research and practice.

Contributions
This dissertation contributes to the social scientific literature in several ways. At
a basic level, it reconnects urban politics with political science through analysis of
religion, political behavior, and institutional design (Feiock, 2004b). Ramsay (1998),
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Swanstrom (1993), and Sharp (2007) have all argued that the urban politics field has
ignored cultural factors (including religion) in favor of an unhealthy reliance on what
Swanstrom calls “economism.” When religion appears in the urban literature, it is often
in the form of a religious metaphor with little substantive reference to religious
phenomena (see Judd, 2005 for numerous examples). Henig (2008), writing in a special
issue of Urban News devoted to the status of the Urban Politics Field (UPF), argues that
UPF scholars should test hypotheses from the national level at the urban level to
stimulate the subfield and dialogue across American political science. Liu (2008, 2)
summarizes Henig’s argument:
Henig offer[s] suggestions regarding how the UPF can reinvigorate itself
to be more influential in [mainstream political science]. His main
suggestion is “to self-consciously use city settings as sites to test
hypotheses generated at the national level under differing economic,
political, and cultural contexts.” For Henig, using the city as the unit of
analysis paid research dividends in the past, and it could do so once again
in the future.
This sentiment is the foundation for this present study. This dissertation seeks to
fill the “God-shaped hole” in urban politics, to borrow King’s (2005, 531, n1) apt phrase;
to move beyond the racial and economic divisions dominating the urban literature to the
cultural and religious cleavages that have so polarized the U.S. electorate in recent
presidential elections. This research connects the scientific study of religion—by
sociologists, economists, and political scientists—with theory on urban ecology, urban
political economy, regionalism, institutional design, and political behavior. The
identification of religious influences on urban public opinion and electoral outcomes will
hopefully open the eyes (and hearts) of urbanists to a new vein of urban research.
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This study introduces a unique causal mechanism, termed “polity replication.”
This theory opens up a new strain of research in public administration, organizational and
institutional theory, urban politics, and other subfields of contemporary political
science—including national, comparative, and international politics. For example,
Roman Catholics may be more likely than Baptists (to use the two key traditions of this
study) and other Protestants to view international organization and nation-state
cooperation with favor (see Nelsen, Guth, and Fraser, 2001). Furthermore, if participants
in religious denominations are in fact structured to prefer particular institutional forms
outside the church, perhaps other private associations—from hierarchical corporations to
community-based nonprofit organizations—similarly encourage institutional preferences.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
This review summarizes several bodies of literature which relate to the present
research questions. I first discuss explorations of religious ecology and past findings on
the distribution of religion across metropolitan regions. Secondly, I explore the literature
on individual religiosity, grouped by findings on several key demographic characteristics.
Thirdly, I summarize theories on religion and politics at the national level and beyond,
including evidence for a “culture war” and studies of the “faith factor” in national
elections and public opinion. Fourthly, I discuss religion’s place in the study of urban
politics and the limited work done in this area. Finally, over three sections, I turn to
institutional theory and institutional design in church and state, including literature on
city-county consolidation and religious influences. Hypotheses are suggested throughout,
culminating in the primary hypotheses in the final section and accompanying table.

Religious and Urban Ecology
A hot topic in the sociological study of religion has been the study of “religious
ecology,” either of an entire city or metropolitan region (Form and Dubrow, 2008;
Livezey, 2000), a single subsection of the metropolis (Ebaugh, O’Brien, and Chafetz,
2000; Form and Dubrow, 2005; Eiesland, 2000; McRoberts, 2003), or communities
across several cities or regions (Ammerman, 1997; Blanchard, 2007; Blanchard, et al.,
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2008). This sometimes involves a census of religious congregations and a geographic
analysis of their locations or an analysis of where religious followers/members reside
within a community (Sinha, et al., 2007; Ebaugh, O’Brien, and Chafetz, 2000). The term
“religious ecology” is rarely defined explicitly in these works; and if it is anything like its
cousins urban or human ecology, it could mean many things—particularly with the
newfound emphasis on environmental (or “ecological”) research.
“Ecology” (or “ecological”) typically implies two distinct connotations in the
social scientific literature that are often intertwined. First, it can simply refer to the use of
aggregate (or community-level) data. In this sense, ecological study can represent either
(a) the sum of individual characteristics or preferences (and is thus subject to the
ecological fallacy, which limits the application of aggregate conclusions to individual
actors; Robinson, 1950) or (b) structural conditions. Second, ecology can simply refer to
environment—surroundings or context—and the environmental conditions (Eiesland and
Warner, 1998). This is also a structural conceptualization (Blanchard, et al., 2008).
McRoberts (2003, 9) attempts to define religious ecology by simply stating that
“urban forms give rise to religious forms.” McRoberts (2003, 9) traces the study of
religious ecology back to the Chicago School of Sociology’s urban ecology, which
“treats the city as a system analogous to a natural ecology.” According to McRoberts,
religious ecology is rooted in the Chicago Schools’ understanding of neighborhood
transition (“invasion” and “succession”) applied to religious organizations’ patterns of
land use. Eiesland (2000, xi) employs a slightly more-specific understanding of religious
ecology, which she defines as “the patterns of relations, status, and interaction among
religious organizations within a locality.” This builds on her understanding of the
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“ecological frame” or perspective—which is the “theoretical and practical response to
increased religious pluralism and the restructuring of religious life” (Eiesland and
Warner, 1998, 41). Eiesland and Warner (1998) also use the metaphor of the natural
world to describe communities.
Livezey (2000) further discusses the Chicago School roots of religious ecology.
Citing Sennett (1969), Livezey (2000, 15) argues that Robert Park (1968) and his
Chicago School colleagues (Park and Burgess, 1925) diverged from their German
teachers by seeking to “discern the urban culture…in the ways in which it was internally
divided” (i.e., the city’s own “ecology”). Simmel, Weber, and Spendler, on the other
hand, contrasted city life with rural life, that of “farm and village,” assuming that cities
exhibit a singular form of urban culture (Livezey, 2000, 15). This may have been truer of
European cities which at the time housed a single ethnicity and largely a sole religious
tradition. U.S. cities like Chicago instead embodied the “melting pot” metaphor of
America composed of immigrants from various world regions and, increasingly, various
world religions who immigrated to its neighborhoods—which took the form of ethnic
enclaves. Religious scholars in the U.S. thus applied Chicago School methods to study
the diversity of religious congregations within cities—particularly Chicago (e.g.,
Kincheloe, 1989; Drake, 1940). In one such example, Douglas (1926) surveyed over one
thousand churches located in large cities across the U.S. and compared various phases of
“adaptation” to changing urban environments.
Implicit in Chicago-style religious ecology is the notion that individuals attend
churches near their residence; and the inverse, that churches locate nearby the homes of
their target population. Related to religious ecology is what McRoberts (2003, 11-12)
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calls the “religious voluntarism” literature, which is rooted in Rational Choice-inspired
conceptions of religious consumers, church competition, and religious market share.
Following Warner (1993), McRoberts criticizes the ecological perspective for ignoring
the fact that individuals decide which churches to attend; and many people decide to
attend churches in neighborhoods where they do not live. McRoberts (2003, 12) also
derides the voluntarism perspective for ignoring the “ways localities present opportunities
for and place constraints on the flowering of religious markets.” There is an apparent
tension between the application of urban ecology and organizational ecology to the study
of religious ecology. McRoberts (2003, 12) concludes that the two perspectives should
share insights:
It seems that the ecological and voluntarism perspectives can benefit from
cross-pollination. Sensitivity to the voluntary aspects of participation can
extend the explanatory power of religious ecology. Meanwhile, the placeoriented insights of religious ecology can make voluntarism theory more
applicable to local contexts.
Sociologists identify two types of congregations—parish and niche—that, to an
extent, parallel the divisions between urban and organizational ecology (Ebaugh and
Chafetz, 2000; McKinney, 1998; Ammerman, 1997; McRoberts, 2003). Ammerman
(1997, 36) nicely summarizes the two types in the following passage:
Congregations, then, are related to their immediate contexts in a variety of
ways. Some are strongly identified with the people who inhabit a given
locale and are therefore tied into the dense network of affiliation that is the
local community. They approximate the parish image. Others occupy a
specialized niche, serving a culturally or theologically defined
constituency. Urban congregations probably always lie somewhere
between the two poles of parish and niche…
Guest and Lee (1987) document the parish model, arguing that more-established
churches with members most like their surrounding neighborhoods are the most-involved
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in community affairs. Roman Catholic congregations are thought to typify the parish
model because they still delineate congregational territories, although this changes as
young members move from the neighborhood but still return for Sunday mass (Ebaugh,
O’Brien, and Chafetz, 2000). On the other hand, Ebaugh, O’Brien, and Chafetz (2000)
describe immigrant churches that carve out a niche by catering to a specific ethnicity and
drawing members from throughout the metropolitan area. Another example of niche
churches are the numerous predominately gay congregations forming in cities around the
country, such as those affiliated with the Metropolitan Community Church, groups of
gays within traditional denominations, or even independent gatherings in gay bars
(Warner, 1995; Davidson, 1987; Thumma, 2006). Ebaugh, O’Brien, and Chafetz (2000)
confirm Ammerman’s (1997) suggestion that many churches lie along a spectrum
between the two types.
Ammerman cautions that “niche” is used differently in this sense than in
organizational theory/analysis (also see McRoberts, 2003, 12). Organizational theorists,
like Baum and Singh (1994), see every organization as possessing a niche, in that it must
carve out its own position within a particular market for a product or service. In
Ammerman’s (1997, 384, n58) sense, niche congregations are ones that “successfully
garner enough resources from a large institutional environment to be able to offer a
distinctive array of services with little competitive overlap.” Wuthnow (1994a) sees
niche congregations as small churches with few ties to their immediate contexts while
categorizing megachurches, which serve a larger region, as a distinct type of relationship
between congregation and community. Form and Dubrow (2005) similarly define the
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downtown “first church” because it largely serves the entire metropolitan area rather than
only the few residents of the downtown business district.
Cities have changed quite a bit since Park and Burgess (1925) first attempted to
simplify the urban form as several concentric zones emanating from the city center.
Almost immediately, other scholars attacked the Chicago School’s model and proposed
their own revisions (Hoyt, 1939; Harris and Ullman, 1945). Hoyt (1939) saw various
sectors, or wedges, radiating from the center and demarcated by major transportation
routes, often of the “spoke and wheel” design that would later become highways and
expressways. Harris and Ullman (1945) proposed that the city is instead made up of
“multiple nuclei”—including suburban areas functioning as smaller business districts.
This theory foreshadowed later literature documenting polycentric urban regions and
“edge cities” (Garreau, 1991). Consequently, the simple Chicago School model has
fallen out of favor in urban studies and, for some, has been replaced by a “postmodern”
Los Angeles School (Dear and Flusty, 1998; Dear, 2002). Dear (2002, 5) believes that
American cities are patterning after the post-industrial Los Angeles (LA) area of southern
California (rather than old, industrial Chicago); that LA is the “prototype of our urban
future.” Dear (2002, 20) distinguishes the LA School from its Chicago precursor by the
ideas that the “urban peripheries are [now] organizing what remains of the center” and
urban development has become a chaotic, non-linear process.
While the urban studies field has, to an extent, left Chicago behind, scholars of
religious ecology continue to employ a Chicago-style conception of the urban form.
While early religious ecologists did link their theories to Chicago School methods,
today’s religious ecologists do so implicitly without citations of Park and Burgess’ work.
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Only one religious scholar has attempted to apply the new vision of the LA School to
urban religion (Miller, 2001). In a volume edited by Dear, Miller (2001) recounts the
continued importance of religion in the U.S., even in LA despite California’s high rates
of secularism. Los Angeles appears to pattern after the nation—or maybe the nation after
LA, in the LA School’s eyes—with the rise of Latino Catholicism, Black Protestantism,
and evangelicalism and the decline of mainline Protestantism. Miller also documents the
growth and presence of numerous megachurches. He does little, however, to connect the
religious ecology to urban theory.

Religiosity and its Determinants
National research on the U.S. population has often found that certain individuals
are more religiously-inclined than others. Since the mid-twentieth century, social
scientists—especially sociologists of religion—have sought to explain variations in
religious observance across demographic lines (age, race, gender, etc.), socioeconomic
statuses, regional differences, and daily, competing time constraints. These broad
categories compose much of the explanatory literature on religiosity. This literature
mostly confirms common perceptions of the independent variables’ impacts on church
attendance/participation and overall religiosity. This section briefly summarizes the
existing body of work on determinants of religiosity.
Race. Many studies have found that blacks in the U.S. participate in religious
activities more than whites when controlling for other individual socio-demographic and
economic factors (Johnson, Matre, and Armbrecht, 1991; Nelson, Yokley, and Nelson,
1971; Sasaki, 1979; Taylor, et al., 1996; Taylor, Mattis, and Chatters, 1999). Some argue
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that much of the difference is due instead to regional and urban-rural differences (Hunt
and Hunt, 2001). Taylor, Mattis, and Chatters (1999) find that religious involvement for
blacks varies systematically by age, sex, marital status, and region. Claims of a religious
resurgence among Hispanics warrants further investigation and a thorough comparison
with blacks, whites and others (Stevens-Arroyo, 1998).
Sex. It has been shown repeatedly that women in the modern West are generally
more religious than men in terms of belief in God and participation in religious services
and activities (Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi, 1975; Beit-Hallahmi and Argyle, 1996;
Brierley, 1991; Schobie, 1975; Yinger, 1970). For example, Jacobs and Worcester
(1990) found that 84 percent of British females believe in God compared with only 67
percent of males. This consistent difference has been attributed to gender differences in
“structural location” in society, including such items as labor force participation and
child-rearing (de Vaus and McAllister, 1987; Gee, 1991; Luckmann, 1967; Nelsen and
Potvin, 1981); levels of guilt (Gray, 1971; Suziedelis and Potvin, 1981); overall
socialization (Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi, 1975; D’Andrade, 1967; Suziedelis and Potvin,
1981; Mol, 1985); and even risk preferences, a theory based on an inventive discussion of
Pascal’s wager argument (Miller and Hoffmann, 1995).
Age and Marital Status. Older individuals tend to be more religious and attend
church more regularly than younger people, although scholars debate how much of this is
simply due to progression through “life courses” and if period effects exist (Argue,
Johnson, and White, 1999). As men and women age, marriage and family formation—
the addition of children—tend to increase the desire for religious community (Carroll and
Roozen, 1975; Mueller and Cooper, 1986; Roozen, McKinney, and Thompson, 1990;
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Stolzenberg, Blair-Loy, and Waite 1995). While religiosity and family formation are
certainly correlated, the effect may be reversed, considering that most religious traditions
place an emphasis on marriage as the sole expression of sexuality and encourage forming
families to “replenish the earth” (Aldous, 1983; D’Antonio, 1983, 1985; Thornton, 1985).
Socio-economic Status. Individuals with higher education, income, and overall
socio-economic status tend to be less religious than others. Nationally, the most educated
Americans are the least religious (Albrecht and Heaton, 1984; Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi,
1975; Caplovitz and Sherrow, 1977), although education’s effect may not hold if one
examines particular religious denominations (Albrecht and Heaton, 1984). Also, moreeducated persons may exhibit less religious devotion but accumulate more religious
knowledge (King and Hunt, 1975). The relationship with wealth is often found to be
weaker, with some researchers finding a positive or “backward bending” relationship,
meaning that participation is highest for middle-income groups (Azzi and Ehrenberg,
1975). The wealthiest individuals, who also tend to be very educated, may not feel the
need for religion—or perhaps manipulate it to their advantage, as in Marx’s famous
account. One study on the effect of religion on wealth accumulation finds that
conservative Protestants accumulate very little wealth compared with the general
population and followers of other religious traditions, especially Judaism (Keister, 2003).
Geography: Regionalism and Urbanism. Geography, including region of
residency, influences religiosity. For example, it has been demonstrated repeatedly that
Southerners possess a distinct culture that places a strong emphasis on religious
observance, particularly of the “fundamentalist” type (Ellison and Sherkat, 1995; Fichter
and Maddox, 1965; George, 1988; Hunt and Hunt, 2001; Levin, Taylor, and Chatters,
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1995; Taylor, 1988; Taylor, Thornton, and Chatters, 1987; Wuthnow and Christano,
1979). Fundamentalism may lead to intolerance and thus limit the building of “bridging”
social capital across religious and racial lines, although more research is needed to
differentiate the effects of region and religion (Ellison and Musick, 1993).
In addition, rural inhabitants tend to be more religious than city-dwellers and even
suburbanites (Hunt and Hunt, 2001; Miller, 2001). Church attendance increases when
one moves out to the periphery from the central city (Carlos, 1970). This may be due to
urbanism’s association with nontraditional behavior and values (Fischer, 1975a, 1975b).
Urbanization has been thought to lead to a reduction in church attendance in the West.
Landis (1959, 342) wrote that the National Council of Churches found that in the U.S.
“the per cent of urbanization of a county was the most important statistic to analyze in
connection with the churches located in that county and their membership.” Furthermore,
rural dwellers have fewer options for participating in local community. At least one
study found that regional differences matter more than rural versus urban residence in
predicting religiosity (Chalfant and Heller, 1991).
Time Constraints: Employment and Commuting. Economists have begun to
analyze household religious participation as they do other nonmarket activities—using a
“household-allocation-of-time framework” (Azzi and Ehrenberg, 1975). Azzi and
Ehrenberg (1975, 43) find evidence for “the existence of income and substitution effects
on religious participation.” Drawing on Putnam (1995, 2000), many scholars have
identified an overall decline in Americans’ community engagement. Time constraints
such as long hours spent working, commuting, and viewing television tend to exert a
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downward influence on religious participation and other types of social capital-building
activities (Putnam, 2000).
Type of Residence. While a thorough comparison of religiosity by residential
structure—single-family home versus apartment/condominium—has not been conducted,
some research is suggestive of a link between housing type and religiosity. While
employment status may capture competing time constraints, housing type may capture
competing social constraints. Glaeser and Sacerdote (2000, 17) find that apartment
dwellers socialize more with their immediate neighbors and that these “increases in
sociability appear to drive out other forms of social interaction such as churchgoing…”
Indeed, they find that apartment dwellers attend church and frequent other social outlets
less than home dwellers (Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2000). Home dwellers are also more
likely to own their place of residence. This leads to greater stability within the
community and more active participation in community life, including church and
politics (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999; Gilderbloom and Markham, 1995).

Religion and Politics in the Nation
According to Smidt, Kellstedt, and Guth (2009b), there are two dominant theories
on the role of religion in the American public square. They call these the ethnoreligious
and theological restructuring perspectives. The ethnoreligious perspective believes that
differences in political culture exist across religious traditions, which are confounded by
racial, ethnic, and regional differences. From this perspective, Roman Catholics—
particularly Latino Catholics—are expected to differ from white Protestants in their
political views. This theory held well when immigration from various parts of Europe
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was at its height; and was very descriptive of local politics in the U.S. (Freeman, 1958).
This perspective still largely describes Black Protestant and Latino Catholic/Protestant
politics (Smidt, et al., 2009b).
The more-contemporary restructuring perspective makes use of Hunter’s (1991,
1994) “culture war” language. As Wuthnow (1988) famously argued, religious traditions
themselves are becoming polarized between traditional/orthodox/conservative and
modern/progressive/liberal factions. Thus, at least for the three large white American
traditions—Roman Catholicism, Mainline Protestantism, and Evangelical
Protestantism—greater differences exist within rather than across traditions. According
to this perspective, for example, conservative Roman Catholics may have more politics in
common with conservative Mainline and Evangelical Protestants than they do with
liberal Catholics.
Roman Catholics have approached public life in three manners. O’Brien (2008)
labels these the republican, interest group, and evangelical approaches. The republican
approach emphasizes “shared responsibility as American citizens” in a pluralistic society,
while the interest group model is “grounded in the immigrant working class experience,
also serv[ing] as a form of identity politics, allowing civic action which was clearly
Catholic” (O’Brien, 2008, 22-23). The third, more-recent approach—termed evangelical
by O’Brien—is the “Catholic version of the social Gospel.” Rather than denoting
conservative social positions like those held by contemporary evangelical Protestants,
O’Brien’s (23) use of evangelical indicates “style,” which is a commitment placing
Christian discipleship “beyond the claims of citizenship and group self-interest” which
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often results in progressive positions favoring social justice. In sum, this evangelical
position:
…involves a direct move from religious judgment to political prescription;
it is the sharp end of identity politics, demanding discipleship, devaluing
citizenship, and practicing, at least in language, what Max Weber called a
“politics of ultimate ends.” It challenges the domination of republican
categories and calls into question the acceptability of interest group
negotiations (O’Brien, 2008, 23).
O’Brien’s categories reflect similar reasoning as the ethnoreligious and
restructuring perspectives. His interest group model is clearly an example of
ethnoreligious theory, while the evangelical style is a component of religious
restructuring. Catholics following this evangelical approach transcend religious divisions
and take public action to achieve the common goals of other, socially-minded Christians.
The republican model is an alternative group that places citizenship ahead of ethnicity
and religious culture; and is thus not represented by ethnoreligious nor restructuring
theories. All three are potentially relevant to the experiences of urban Catholics.
Recent presidential and congressional elections have brought cultural
restructuring to the fore and spawned allegations of an extremely polarized public,
particularly the 2000 and 2004 elections (Jacobson, 2005). These recent elections not
only pitted Republican versus Democrat and conservative vs. liberal, but also religious
vs. secular and red state vs. blue state—perhaps even suburban/rural vs. urban
(Abramowitz and Saunders, 2005, 2008; Gimpel and Karnes, 2006; Sperling, et al.,
2004). Some scholars debate this perspective arguing that the culture war is a myth and
most Americans reside somewhere in the tolerant middle (Fiorina, 2005; Ansolabehere,
Rodden, and Snyder, 2006; Wolfe, 1999). Others find that views on morality issues are
more complex and less “bipolar” than commonly perceived (Craig, et al., 2005). Despite
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claims that the “God gap” had subsided by the 2008 presidential contest that witnessed
the election of the first African American President, Barack Obama, evidence suggests
that similar religious voting patterns have persisted (Smidt, et al., 2010).
Whether or not the public is as polarized as media accounts suggest, clear
differences do exist between traditionalists and modernists on culture war issues
(Abramowitz and Saunders, 2005, 2008; Hunter, 1991, 1994). These include the
morality/legality of abortion, the morality of homosexual activity and legality of samesex marriage, the appropriateness of premarital sex and sex education in public schools,
and the availability of pornography and other forms of adult entertainment. Even Wolfe
(1999), who purports to debunk the culture war, cites the nature and morality of
homosexuality as the sole, major moral issue dividing American political culture.
Religion is a powerful predictor of individuals’ stances on these issues
(Abramowitz and Saunders, 2005, 2008). Members of traditionalist religious
denominations and those in most denominations who attend church regularly tend to
align themselves with conservative positions against abortion, homosexual activity and
same-sex marriage, sex education, and pornography (Adamczyk and Pitt, 2009;
Hardinge, 2004; Jelen, 1986; McIntosh, Alston, and Alston, 1979). Furthermore, those in
the U.S. who participate in religious services more often have found a comfortable home
on the conservative end of the political spectrum and within the Republican Party
(Abramowitz and Saunders, 2005, 2008).
In addition to culture war issues, religious affiliation and religiosity influence
opinions on a variety of public policies. For example, it has long been theorized that
religion affects economic structures and individuals’ attitudes about economics (Tawney,
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1926; Weber, 1930; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2003; Barker and Carman, 2000;
Wilson, 2009). Classically, Tawney (1926) and Weber (1930) both attribute the rise of
capitalism to Protestant beliefs and ethics. In today’s global economy, Guiso, et al.
(2003) find that following a Christian religion is correlated positively with attitudes
favoring economic growth, even more so than for adherents of other non-Christian faiths.
In other words, Christian theology and culture seem to endorse “good” economic
development policies—those “conducive to higher per capita income and growth”
(Guiso, et al., 2003, 225). Attitudes on social welfare policy are discussed in the later
section on redistribution.

Religion and Urban Politics
While religion is increasingly seen as playing a role in American politics, scholars
have largely ignored its effects on local or urban politics. Pratt (2004, 170) asks, “Is the
urban politics literature…correct in implying that churches are no longer significantly
involved in the governance of the nation’s largest cities?” This question implies that
religious organizations were once greatly involved in urban governance and that
something recently changed indicating that this may no longer be the case. To test Pratt’s
implications, I examined the founding fathers and dominant voices of the urban politics
literature. Does religion “show up” in the key debates and theories in urban politics,
community power, and, more recently, urban political economy?
The “community power” debates of the 1950s and 60s launched urban politics “as
a focus for study in its own right” (Harding, 2009, 27). This debate pitted elite theorists
(Hunter, 1953) against pluralists (Dahl, 1961/2005), both sides arguing that they
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understood who held power in cities. Hunter (1953), in his landmark “reputational”
study of “Regional City” (revealed to be Atlanta, Georgia), found that all place-shaping
policy was made by a small group of “unelected” economic elites and the elected mayor.
Dahl (1961/2005) countered with findings from his analysis of New Haven, Connecticut,
arguing that no single group held sway over all policy. Rather, a plurality of groups with
distinct but overlapping memberships—each headed by “mini-elites”—was responsible
for crafting education and developmental policies, to use his two examples.
This debate contributed little to understanding religion’s role in the city. Hunter
(1953, 83) does mention religious leaders, but dismisses any notion that religion matters:
It may be noted here that none of the ministers of churches in Regional
City were chosen as top leaders by the persons interviewed in the study.
The idea was expressed several times by interviewees that some minister
ought to be on the listing, but under the terms of power definitions used in
the study they did not make “top billing.” It is understood, however, that
in order to get a project well under way it would be important to bring the
churches in, but they are not, as institutions, considered crucial in the
decision-making process. Their influence is crucial in restating settled
policies from time to time and in interpreting new policies which have
been formed or are in the process of formulation. Church leaders,
however, whether they be prominent laymen or professional ministers,
have relatively little influence with the larger economic interests.
In other words, ministers may play a role in implementing or supporting policy
but not in the actual policymaking process. Hunter (1953, 82) concludes that, “Within
the policy-forming groups the economic interests are dominant.” He does state that the
Jewish “sub-community” includes representation in the top group of policy leaders, due
to their economic power; and that several ministers are considered powerful within the
black “sub-community,” although black leaders are much more isolated.
Dahl’s (1961/2005) analysis responds with a passage on the Catholic Church’s
influence over education policy. While ministers may have little impact on urban
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redevelopment, they are reported by several informants to influence public education.
Dahl, however, finds little evidence of any direct influence. Instead, any Church
influence is indirect and divided—some Catholic elements within the community favor
parochial schools and siphon the best students from the wealthiest families; meanwhile,
because the city is two-thirds Catholic, many moderate-income Catholics rely on the
public school system for their livelihood and the education of their children. Thus,
Dahl’s study essentially confirms Hunter’s finding that church leaders do not influence
local policy—except for powerful individuals who incidentally belong to a particular
faith.
Later books on urban political economy confirm these early findings. Logan and
Molotch’s (1987) “growth machine” thesis—the idea that a coalition of powerful local
interests, dominated by “place-based” capital, works to intensify urban development—
“returned to Hunter’s main theme” by establishing a neo-elitism with elements borrowed
from Marxism (Harding, 2009, 35; see also Molotch, 1976, 1993). Logan and Molotch’s
(1987) book includes no religious terms in the index and no substantive discussion of
religion’s role in the city. They do, however, mention the church in passing while
commenting on the social organization of the ghetto:
Even the black churches, an important part of black neighborhood life,
cannot make up for the absence of an indigenous exchange value engine.
No church organization is ever of crucial importance in metropolitan
dynamics (except occasionally as a tourist site). And the black church,
unlike the Catholic or Protestant churches of the immigrants, is not itself
closely tied to the religious organizations of the dominant white groups.
Not only are black ministers not considered important to growth goals,
they are also irrelevant to the personal salvation of white leaders (Logan
and Molotch, 1987, 131-132).
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Logan and Molotch make clear that the church, particularly the black church, is
unconnected to economic interests and is thus extraneous to policymaking. If Logan and
Molotch represent a neo-elitist view, what of neo-pluralism? Urban regime theory, the
dominant contemporary urban analysis originally formulated by Stone (1989) and Elkin
(1987), has its roots in pluralist thinking (Harding, 2009). Regime theory describes
“formal and informal modes of collaboration between public and private sectors, arguing
that the fragmentation of power between a market economy and popularly elected
political institutions makes such cooperation necessary in order to realize important local
policy goals” (Mossberger, 2009, 40). Does Stone’s (1989) influential study of Atlanta
address the impact of religion on local policymaking?
Stone (1987) does cite an example of a white minister allying with larger business
interests to combat the construction of new public housing. However, the minister does
so largely because of other ties—he once edited the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce news
magazine and chairs the commission of the hospital located next to the planned public
housing. The minister “feared that the hospital”—not his church, apparently—“was
being encircled by a spreading ghetto” (Stone, 1987, 42).
In another passage, Stone speaks of a community group known as U-Rescue
founded by black ministers (one is also a state legislator) to oppose “urban renewal,” the
displacement of residents and churches by new development. “City officials concluded
that U-Rescue was indeed a formidable grass-roots organization, capable of wielding
significant electoral power and of bringing an effective legal challenge” (Stone, 1987,
68). The election of a black minister—“a particularly savvy negotiator”—as a state
legislator from the neighborhood displays the power of the church in the black
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community (Stone, 1987, 68). The organization did not last, however, partially due to the
minister’s transfer to another area by the hierarchy of his religious denomination. Stone
also discusses the election of Andrew Young, “a minister by training,” as Atlanta’s
mayor—although his election was primarily due, one assumes, to his secular
accomplishments as a member of Congress and as the United Nations ambassador under
President Carter (Stone, 1987, 109).
In later work, Stone (2005) connects the church to his idea of “selective
incentives”—side payments necessary to gain acquiescence from particular publics
(Stone, 1987, 175). He writes that “to head off potential opposition, especially from
someone like a pastor with established connections and a ready-made audience,” some
form of “extragenerous compensation” is due (Stone, 2005, 317). This suggests that the
power of churches, if any, lies in the large body of weekly attendees that can be churned,
perhaps by religious fervor, into political action. In his discussion of megachurches,
Chaves (2006, 337) states that “the pastor of one 2,000-person church probably gets an
appointment with the mayor more easily than the pastors of ten 200-person churches.”
McCann’s (2002) account of Louisville’s neighbor, Lexington, Kentucky, found that one
megachurch joined a coalition of developers in their effort to develop a parcel of land at
the city’s fringe. The pastor spoke at a city council meeting with support from two
hundred parishioners, all wearing buttons in favor of growth and development (McCann,
2002, 385).
Few scholars have seriously applied any of these theories of urban politics and
political economy to studies with religion as the centerpiece. A lone scholar, Newman
(1991; 1994), has directly applied both growth machine and regime theory to urban

33

religious institutions. While admitting that the growth machine’s architects ignore
religious institutions, Newman (1991) borrows Logan and Molotch’s dichotomy of
exchange vs. use value in his study of televangelist Charles Stanley’s First [Southern]
Baptist megachurch in Atlanta, Georgia. According to Newman, some churches do prize
their real estate holdings—in this case, prime downtown real estate—for the exchange
value (to the tune of $62 million) rather than simply its use value. As Pastor Stanley
expressed to his congregation, “God is for growth and anyone opposed is under Satan’s
influence” (Newman, 1991, 241). This article views Logan and Molotch’s work as a new
theory of land use, in the tradition of Burgess and Hoyt, rather than its implications for
community power. Essentially, Newman wishes to explain the existence of downtown
“superchurches,” “misfits” which defy past classifications based in Chicago School
theories of the urban form. When Newman (1991, 240) does address power, churches are
seen as subservient to growth machine interests:
An increase in the local population may help sustain these institutions
[churches] by increasing the number of clients and support groups. More
important, perhaps, is that such institutions often need the favor of those
who are at the heart of the local growth machines—the entrepreneurs,
media owners, and politicians—who can make or break their institutional
goals.
However, Newman does ask whether the pastor of such a large church participates in the
elite machinery of growth. He states that many church members are middle-to-upper
income and employed in industries that benefit directly from growth (Newman, 1991).
Newman’s (1994, 23) other study, which jumps ship to Stone’s regime theory,
argues that the members of the Concerned Black Clergy (CBC) organization in Atlanta
have recently “become active regime participants helping to influence policy decisions on
behalf of the city’s poorer citizens.” According to Newman, this has not always been the

34

case. Newman cites Stone’s (1989, 167) critical view that, “Black ministers, who are key
links between black officeholders and the black public, have indicated that any
impairment to an incumbent mayor is perceived as a weakening of black solidarity and a
threat to black political power.” This “black solidarity” led the clergy to support urban
development and regressive tax schemes that favored the rich and, to some extent, hurt
the poor, simply because the mayoral office-holder was African American. More
recently, with the creation of the CBC in 1983, the group has lobbied on behalf of poor,
black neighborhoods on issues like rapid transit development. Newman concludes that
black ministers serve as gatekeepers in times of regime instability; but once African
Americans irreversibly dominate the regime, they are free to mobilize against regime
policies. According to Google Scholar, both of these papers together account for a mere
four citations in others’ work (August, 2009). To say that their contributions have been
ignored is an understatement.
In a similar vein, Pratt’s (2004) analysis of religion and urban government in
Detroit and New York City makes use of regime theory as well as its intellectual
ancestor, Dahl’s pluralism, to interpret metropolitan religious organizations’ involvement
in urban governance. This book only receives one citation on Google Scholar (August,
2009). This compares to nearly 800 for Stone (1989), nearly 1,500 for Logan and
Molotch (1987), and over 1,000 for Peterson (1981). Granted, these classics have
circulated for over two decades—but they each average well over 40 citations per year.
What of Peterson’s (1981) City Limits, a book inspired by Tiebout’s (1956) public
choice model that strikes fear in the hearts of urbanists (Sapotichne, et al., 2007)?
Peterson mentions little about religion, except to highlight historical, ethno-religious

35

conflicts between established Protestants and new-comer Catholics. Peterson does,
however, contribute to this discussion in another way—by discounting local politics. He
writes that “local politics is groupless politics”—in that “formally organized groups play
a much less prominent role in [local] policy formation” (Peterson, 1981, 116-117). In
other words, community associations such as churches are unlikely to affect local
policymaking because it is shaped, to a large extent, by the federalist and economic
structures.
Pratt (2004, 170) inquires:
…is it the case, as some would contend, that churches have irreversibly
declined as a political force in urban America? Is the urban politics
literature—as summarized in leading textbooks on the topic—correct in
implying that churches are no longer significantly involved in the
governance of the nation’s largest cities?
Pratt cites Djupe’s (1996) conference paper on the decline in importance of
religious leaders in local politics as evidence. Pratt earlier lists the “textbooks” to which
he refers, including: Jones (1983), Judd (1979), Peterson (1981), and Stone (1986). My
review of the key works in urban politics has shown that, at least since the mid-twentieth
century, urban politics scholars have not held a high view of religious actors in cities.
But, according to Pratt, one does not have to dip into the historical record of medieval
Europe or pre-industrial America to find examples of religious influence in Western
cities. Pratt cites several texts from the 1930s to the 60s that treat religion as a more
important component of urban governance and politics. However, his case is
unconvincing because he cites works that only devote a few pages to discussion of
religion—including Dahl’s three-page account of “the church” cited above.
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Following the fields’ dominant voices, urban politics scholars as a whole have
expressed minimal interest in religion as a political variable. Based upon empirical
evidence on American Political Science Association (APSA) organized section crossmemberships and journal citations of religious search terms, contemporary urbanists rank
the lowest in religious interest when compared with Americanists and comparativists
(Ambrosius, 2008a; 2009). Table 2.1, reprinted from Ambrosius (2009a) shows that only
4.3 percent of the membership of the APSA Urban Politics section are also members of
the Religion and Politics section. This is the second lowest of the nine subfields
examined—only Political Economy has a lower percent of cross-membership with
Religion and Politics. Table 2.2, also from Ambrosius (2009a), shows that the urbanist
journals—Urban Affairs Review (UAR) and Journal of Urban Affairs (JUA)—rank at or
near the bottom in terms of citations of religious search terms in their titles and abstracts
when compared with other subfields’ top-ranking journals (rankings from Garand and
Giles, 2003). UAR, the official journal of the Urban Politics section, ranks dead last in
religious references with only 0.02 annual cites in article titles and 0.19 annual cites in
article abstracts over its 43-year existence.
Pratt (2004) takes the lack of religious references in the major texts of urban
politics as a possible sign that religious influence has waned in American cities (citing
Djupe, 1996), a conclusion he himself finds surprising given the increasing evidence of
religious influence at the national level. Other scholars have attributed, directly or
indirectly, the lack of religious and other cultural research among urbanists to
peculiarities of the field: the influence of structural Marxism, an overreliance on political
economy, or even a pronounced academic prejudice in the subfield (Ambrosius, 2008a,
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2009; Sapotichne, et al., 2007; Sharp, 2007; Swanstrom, 1993). Another possibility is
that urbanists’ neglect of the social scientific study of religion is due to urban politics’
isolation from mainstream political science (MPS); and both MPS and sociology of
religion’s reliance on a rival theoretical framework, Rational Choice, which is labeled
“pathological” by urbanists (Ambrosius, 2008a; Imbroscio, 2007; McKinnon, 2005;
Sapotichne, et al., 2007).

Table 2.1: APSA Section Members also in Religion & Politics Section
Section

Total Members

Percent in R&P

Political Parties

624

8.17%

Presidency

447

7.16%

Foreign Policy

643

7.00%

Legislative Studies

636

5.66%

Public Policy

894

5.59%

Comparative Politics

1622

5.36%

Public Administration

568

4.93%

Urban Politics

417

4.32%

Political Economy

688

3.49%

Source: APSA website (2004).
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Table 2.2: Ranking of Subfield Journals by Annual Rates of Religious Terms

Rank

Journal

Annual
Title Rate

Journal

Annual
Abstract Rate

1

PSQ

0.89

PP

1.54

2

PP

0.77

JPAM

1.41

3

CP

0.29

PSQ

1.22

4

APSR

0.26

PAR

1.05

5

JPAM

0.19

APSR

0.38

6

PAR

0.16

WP

0.31

7

JPE

0.13

JUA

0.25

8

JUA

0.08

LSQ

0.23

9

WP

0.07

CP

0.21

10

LSQ

0.04

UAR

0.19

11
UAR
0.02
NOTE: Eleven total journals were searched, including the top ranked journal from each
subfield in Table 1 along with APSR and two journals representing UP. JPE does not
have abstracts. JPAM abstract searches include full-text results. Searches are
current through 2007 unless recent issues are excluded from a database.
Search terms: Catholic; charitable choice; Christ; Christian; church; congregation;
evangelical; faith-based; God; Protestant; religion; religious; spiritual.

Ramsay (1998, 597) argues that the reliance on scientific positivism is waning
and giving way to a “growing appreciation for the importance of culture,” including
religion, among urbanists. Pratt (2004, 173), too, ultimately concludes that the underemphasis is unwarranted:
In the case of New York and Detroit, at least, the evidence presented
indicates that throughout the century-long period surveyed [1895-1994]
the churches significantly impacted government and vice versa. It is
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reasonable to expect that subsequent research, focused on these or other
large American cities, would provide additional support for the view that
religious bodies remain a significant, ongoing aspect of present-day urban
governance.
Much of the contemporary work at the national level examines the impact of
religion on elections and public opinion. What about the importance of religion to urban
electoral outcomes? Pratt (2004, 8) writes that several early writings on city politics treat
“the importance of religious voting in city elections” (Reed, 1934; Gosnell, 1937; Kneier,
1947). Stone (1987) seems to suggest that religious affiliation may affect electoral
decisions at the local level. This could occur through several mechanisms. For example,
a church leader may encourage parishioners to support or oppose a particular policy
initiative or agenda given his/her church’s receipt or lack of receipt of incentives from
policy leaders/entrepreneurs (Stone, 2005). Churches may also need a “favor” from the
local leadership that pushes congregants into political advocacy (McCann, 2002). Or,
from an ethno-religious perspective, religious affiliates may support or oppose a policy
because its proponents are of the same or different religious persuasion, respectively.
While past scholars certainly studied conflicts between Protestants and Catholics, as
Peterson (1987) alludes to, it is unlikely that modern voters in urban elections continue to
oppose rival faiths en masse.
This leaves the first explanation—that of church support or opposition. While
suggestions of this nature conjure images of a fiery pastor at the pulpit, this may also
occur through indirect means, as Dahl (1961/2005) suggests. For example, church
culture may condition members to favor certain institutional forms over others.
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Little scholarship of urban electoral politics has centered on religion, or even
included it as a potential variable. Sharp (2007, 58-59), alluding to the religious
restructuring hypothesis, writes that,
…urban scholarship has very little to offer about the extent to which
culture war divisions do or do not shape election outcomes within
cities…Matters of religiosity and the broader cultural divisions outlined
earlier are largely ignored. It is as though cities are somehow immune to
the postindustrial cultural division that some analysts claim is central to
understanding elections in America…Is there a parallel body of
contemporary urban scholarship addressing these important matters of the
role of religion [and] cultural polarization…but in the urban electoral
sphere? The answer is by and large no.
The largest body of work on religion and urban politics focuses on the black
church and its political/community activities (Day, 2001; Owens, 2007; Sawyer, 2001;
Smith, 2003; Smith and Harris, 2005; Wallace, 2003). Some scholarship has examined
clergy activism in urban settings (Crawford and Olson, 2001). A few studies have
examined local culture war divisions over issues like sex education, evolution, abortion,
and homosexuality, hot issues in both the church and public at large (Brown, Knopp, and
Morrill, 2005; Deckman, 2004; Sharp, 1999). Few, if any, of these studies rely on
polling random samples of the urban public.
One reason why few scholars have examined public opinion in cities is the lack of
polling data collected and available at the local level (Peterson, 1981). As Peterson
(1981, 127) states,
Polling public opinion is almost as expensive among a relatively small
population confined within one city as it is for the United States as a
whole. But whereas the cost of a national poll can be borne by national
polling organizations with a national audience or by national candidates
with national constituencies, the cost of local polling is often prohibitive.
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This may be one reason why scholars of religion and politics typically rely on
polls of the mass public—the costs are comparable and the payoff looms larger. Urban
politics scholars do not poll local populations about religion because of these scholars’
lack of interest in the topic. If they do conduct a poll—many simply rely on secondary
data, if public opinion is even a matter of interest—question space is limited and must be
devoted to more pressing matters of politics and economics.
There is a single study that examines a topic similar to this dissertation within a
single city using similar methods—Demerath and Williams’ (1992) study of Springfield,
Massachusetts. Demerath and Williams recount a religious and political history of
Springfield with emphasis on the city’s recent conversion from Protestant
Congregationalist domination to Roman Catholic majority. They conduct a thorough
case study of three issues of “community controversy” which together range from social
policy to public morality: (1) publicly-provided homeless care; (2) economic
development of a black neighborhood (Winchester Square); and (3) sexuality, including
abortion and sex education. They survey, via a mail questionnaire, 256 members of the
public and small “elite” samples of political-economic, religious, and educational
insiders. While they collect this quantitative data, they rely more on qualitative and
historical analysis to answer questions of religious change, community power, and
church-state interaction.
Given Springfield’s Catholic majority, questions of religious hegemony that may
defy church-state divisions naturally arise. Demerath and Williams find less “bridging”
of church and state than they predicted. Nonetheless they find that, “Religionists of
varying stripes…have exerted considerable political influence on selected issues, indeed
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more influence than many social scientists might have expected” (Demerath and
Williams, 1992, 255). The authors nicely summarize the state of religion (and religious
research) in America’s communities:
Religion in Springfield may be in decline, but is hardly in demise. Any
attempt to understand civic power and politics without it is sadly myopic.
Issues of homelessness, black-neighborhood development, and sexuality
have all evoked major religious responses. Religious protagonists have
had their say, if not always their way. In the process, they reveal a
dimension of urban power that is frequently neglected (Demerath and
Williams, 1992, 140).
Urban politics scholars also have a hearty interest in urban policy, particularly the
extent to which the U.S. national government intervenes in urban affairs. Studies of
urban policy emphasize several stages of development beginning with the Progressive
Era’s calls for reform and culminating in the post-Great Society decline in federal
involvement in cities’ problems (see Mohl, 1993). While religious actors—clergy and
other religiously-motivated reformers—are identified as key players in the early twentieth
century progressive age, they are notably absent from later stages (Ibid). Advocacy for
assistance to central cities—whether genuine or for the purposes of “renewal”—shifted to
the new urban lobby (e.g., U.S. Conference of Mayors) and the downtown business
community (e.g., Urban Land Institute) during the depression/New Deal and post-war
periods, respectively (Ibid). Private involvement in urban communities largely shifted to
leftist radicals until the late twentieth century when the church reemerged as a key player
identified by urbanist academics (Ramsay, 1998). This is partially a response to the
worldwide rebuff of socialism but also a result of the “new federalism,” which forced
communities to fend for themselves with less support from above. Privatization
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advocates now call for increased involvement of faith-based institutions in social service
delivery at the neighborhood level (Savas, 2005).

Institutional Theory and Design
Since the mid-twentieth century, political science—and much of social science in
general—has left behind the (typically “naïve”) study of institutions for the study of
individual actors, encouraged by the dominant approaches of behavioralism and Rational
Choice (Peters, 1999). This shift is even reflected in the discipline’s change of name
from Government to Political “Science” (Goodin, 1996). Beginning in the 1980s, a
“counter-reformation” under the banner of New Institutionalism has returned to
examining the importance of formal and informal institutions in constraining individual
action (Peters, 1999). Goodin (1996) notes that institutionalism has recently reemerged
in nearly every branch of the social sciences in distinct yet comparable forms—in history,
sociology, economics, political science, and social/political theory.
Of all the social sciences, sociology has been the most consistent in emphasizing
the importance of institutional effects on individual agency. Goodin (1996, 7) writes of
sociological institutional theory:
The old institutionalism within sociology focused upon ways in which
collective entities—the family, the profession, the church, the school, the
state—create and constitute institutions which shape individuals, in turn.
The new institutionalism focuses, more modestly perhaps, upon ways in
which being embedded in such collectivities alters individuals’
preferences and possibilities. But it is the hallmark of sociological
institutionalism, whether old or new, to emphasize how individual
behavior is shaped by (as well, perhaps, as shaping) the larger group
setting (emphasis added).
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It appears that sociological institutional theory is more helpful for the purposes of
this present investigation because I examine the role of the church(es) in shaping
individual preferences for political institutions; rather than political institutions
constraining individual actions, as emphasized by political science-based institutionalists.
While often turning first to political institutions and organizations, the general approach
of institutional theory in political science is nonetheless applicable:
…there are important respects in which institutions matter to behavior,
and it is those to which the “new institutionalist” resurrection of that older
institutionalist tradition within public administration points. The
behavioralist focus usefully serves to fix attention upon agency, upon
individuals and groupings of individuals whose behavior it is. But those
individuals are shaped by, and in their collective enterprises act through,
structures and organizations and institutions (Goodin, 1996, 13; emphasis
added).
Even political scientists within the aforementioned behavioral and Rational Choice camps
are rediscovering institutions: “Behavioralists find they need to bring the state back in,
game theorists find it emerging from within their models. Either way, institutions
(political and otherwise) have once again come to the fore in political studies” (Ibid, 15).
Scholars are divided over the definition of “institution.” Nobel laureate Elinor
Ostrom (1999, 37) writes that some refer to institutions simply as organizational entities,
such as legislatures, corporations, or family units; others, including herself, define
institutions as “rules, norms, and strategies adopted by individuals operating within or
across organizations.” In simple terms, institutions are ideas about how something
should be done, structured, or otherwise constituted. Ostrom’s view is representative of
the most-widely accepted definition in institutional theory, including her own subfield of
institutional rational choice or, more specifically, “institutional analysis and
development” (IAD). Institutional design, then, is “the process of crafting a
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configuration of rules…aimed at reducing the severity of the trade-offs among multiple
values by shaping incentives in ways that encourage desirable behaviors” (Oakerson,
2004).
Meyer, Boli, and Thomas (1987, 36-37) hold a similar conception but go into
greater detail of the process of “institutionalization”:
By institution, we mean a set of cultural rules that give generalized
meaning to social activity and regulate it in a patterned way.
Institutionalization, then, involves processes that make such sets of rules
seem natural and taken for granted while eliminating alternative
interpretations and regulations. In the Western tradition, rules become
institutionalized as they are linked more closely to moral authority and
lawful order in nature.
In an earlier echo of this same claim, Zucker (1983, 2) writes that institutions
represent a “phenomenological process by which certain social relationships and actions
come to be taken for granted.” In this light, McMullen (1994) links neoinstitutionalism
to Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) influential ideas about the “social construction of
reality”—meaning that individuals and organizations interact to form socially-approved
representations of each other's actions which, through habitualization, become
institutionalized and thus understood as objective reality. New Institutionalists
emphasize how individuals “learn…taken-for-granted scripts, habits, routines, rules, and
conventional menus and categories of action” (McMullen, 1994, 710). In other words,
“The views, interests, and beliefs of individuals themselves are constituted by
institutions” (Ibid, 710-711).
While institutions extend beyond organizational entities, organizations and their
structures, as Ostrom (1999) suggests, are typically important components of institutional
arrangements. Organizations, concisely defined, are “social unit[s] with some particular
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purposes” (Shafritz and Ott, 1996, 1). In considering the differences between
organizations and institutions, Powelson (2003) writes that, “An organization is an
administrative and functional structure, clearly bounded, while an institution is a
significant practice within a culture, such as the institution of marriage.” In this sense,
American religion and metropolitan governance are both institutions; individual
denominations and congregations are organizations with administrative and functional
structures. Metropolitan governments are organizations which reflect preferences for
how an institution should be structured or organized. Institutional environments shape
organizational structures and culture. According to Rainey (1997, 15-18), organizational
structures “are the relatively stable, observable assignments and divisions of
responsibility within [an] organization, achieved through such means as hierarchies of
authority, rules and regulations, and specialization of individuals, groups, and subunits.”
Ostrom (1999) states that in the absence of empirical research based on an
appropriate framework, “recommendations of [institutional] reform may be based on
naïve ideas about which kinds of institutions are ‘good’ or ‘bad’ and not on an analysis of
performance.” This may affect non-experts choices or preferences for institutional
design. Ostrom challenges the Homo economicus view of man dominate in neoclassical
economics and substitutes an understanding of “bounded rationality.” From this view,
information gathering is costly, processing capabilities are limited, and decisions are thus
made based on “incomplete knowledge of all possible alternatives and their likely
outcomes” (Ostrom, 1999, 46). People can make mistakes (see V. Ostrom, 1986)—for
example, they can errantly vote in favor of city-county consolidation and later recognize
(perhaps) that such a vote was not indeed in their individual interests (or vice versa).
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Culture—political, religious, organizational, or in general—affects institutional
and organizational structures. Ostrom (1999, 57) defines culture as “attributes of a
community” including “the level of common understanding that potential participants
share about the structure of particular types of action arenas.” Processes of institutional
change are key to the practice of institutional design because institutions build on
preexisting institutional and cultural frameworks and rarely construct institutions “from
scratch.” Goodin (1996) identifies three major models of institutional change by means
of accident, evolution, or intention. While institutions do arise at times by accident and
do adapt to their environments, most efforts at institutional design and change are
intentional—that is, based on the efforts of entrepreneurs and their followers.
A similar debate paralleling differences between individualist and institutionalist
camps is waged between the competing positions on the “agent-structure problem”
(Wendt, 1987; Imbroscio, 1999). This debate pits structuralist accounts of social and
political action versus those who believe individual, human agency plays a role in
determining outcomes. In response to structuralist works, such as Peterson’s (1981)
aforementioned study, some scholars rejected both extreme perspectives in favor of a
“dual” notion of structure. Scholars like Giddens (1979) and Abrams (1982) spoke of
“structuring” and “structuration”—arguing that structure does shape human action, but
individuals can in turn reshape societal structures. Thus, individuals are not completely
handicapped by social forces. Imbroscio (1999) posits that social science is coalescing
around this dual view of structure. Some prominent urbanists, most notably Stone
(1989), explicitly embrace the views of Giddens and Abrams. While the structuralist
view may be akin to the old institutionalism, the duality perspective reflects the
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contemporary emphasis on “new” institutionalism—a sort of synthesis between
institutional and behavioral poles. Imbroscio (1999) argues that this debate is important
because it dictates our views of democracy and political responsiveness—thus if elected
leaders are beholden to existing institutions, then they cannot be held responsible for
neglecting social justice in favor of economic development, for example.

Institutional Design in Church and State
One possible connection between urban government and politics and religion is
the study of institutional design. No work has directly linked internal denominational
structures to preferences for similar structures in society, such as monocentric or
polycentric urban governance.
All Christian denominations accept some form of religious authority. Typically,
authority can take the forms of Pope, Bishop, Priest/Minister, Pastor, or Deacon/Elder.
These offices are situated at various levels and roughly correspond with equivalent levels
of secular, political authority at the international, national, regional, and local ranks. One
could term this “religious federalism.” This term is used differently in this sense than its
use by other scholars. Some speak of religious federalism as “institutionalizing
majoritarian tyranny in a religious federal state” (El-Gaili, 2004). Instead, the term can
refer to a federal, or multi-tiered, structure within a single church, denomination, or other
religious body (see Takayama, 1974).
While most religious bodies have varying levels of authority, one often
predominates. It is often clear to members and even outside observers which level is
most-emphasized in church governance. Determining which level of authority should
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predominate is still a highly-controversial issue in the twenty-first century church. This
is made obvious by the ever-growing independent, non-denominational, and interdenominational churches forming in the U.S. and around the world—which essentially
opt out of denominational hierarchy in favor of local, congregational control (Smidt, et
al., 1996, 238, n9).
Scholars of religious governance refer to denominations’ forms of polity
(Harrison, 1959; Moberg, 1962; Takayama, 1974; Davidson, Schlangen, and D’Antonio,
1969; McMullen, 1994). Citing Harrison, Takayama defines polity as “formally (or
theologically) defined aspects of church government and administration, including the
relation between individual and groups within a denomination” (Takayama, 1974, 10-11).
McMullen (1994) understands religious polity as a form of institutionalized myth and
ritual. He writes, “Polities are the rules of ecclesiastical authority and dictate the rituals
by which church government operates” (Ibid, 712).
Takayama (1974) goes on to describe three main types of church polity: episcopal
(or hierarchical); presbyterian (or collegial); and congregational (or autonomous). In the
episcopal type, “formal hierarchy is most explicit…the church itself being sometimes
finally defined by and restricted to the clerical bureaucracy” (Takayama, 1974, 11).
Takayama lists the Roman Catholic Church as being “strictly hierarchical,” while other
examples like the Protestant Episcopal Church and the United Methodist Church are
somewhat more “balance[ed].” On the other end of the spectrum, “Congregationalism
places the maximum power in the local group both with respect to the choice of the
minister and the control of organizational affairs” (Takayama, 1974, 11). Prime
examples are the variety of Baptist groups—Takayama (1974, 29) writes that,
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Baptists believe that local congregations bear the marks of the true Church
and theologically they do not accept any higher human authority and
organization. They believe that their national conventions are merely
functional associations of local churches formed for their mutual support
and a channel for their cooperative efforts, but have no binding authority
over local churches.
While Takayama notes that Protestant denominations in the contemporary U.S.
have tended to resemble one another—many taking the congregational form—the Roman
Catholic Church is distinct as the only major body to retain a truly hierarchical/
centralized polity. Thus, a comparison of governance structures (polity) in the Catholic
Church and, for example, a prominent Baptist tradition like the Southern Baptist
Convention should be striking—theoretically, theologically, and in practice. I do not
emphasize the presbyterian-type denominations for several reasons: (a) there exists a
varying degree of reliance on regional institutions in these churches, thus preventing
broad generalizations; (b) Takayama (1974) suggests that a move to congregational polity
is at work in many presbyterian denominations, thus making regional institutions largely
into “fifth wheels”; and (c) these types are not highly represented in Louisville, the
location currently under study. Past studies comparing church polities have also sought
to compare examples representing the poles of church polity (McMullen, 1994).
Past research finds that congregants generally perceive the correct structure
implied by the polity typology, both of their own denomination and others’
denominations (Davidson, et al., 1969; McMullen, 1994). For example, Catholics
recognize a hierarchical structure in their own churches—although Protestants do tend to
see the Catholic Church as slightly more hierarchical than its own members (Davidson, et
al., 1969). Davidson, et al. (Ibid, 322) do theorize that their results may not be
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attributable to actual church practices but rather “ideological commitments to traditional
Protestant norms.”
Baptist Pastor George W. Truett (2001) classically portrayed Catholics as the
“exact opposite” of Baptists in his 1920 address from the U.S. Capital highlighting the
differences between Baptists and Roman Catholics and the disparaging views Baptists
hold of the Catholic Church. He said:
The Baptist message and the Roman Catholic message are the very
antipodes of each other. The Roman Catholic message is sacerdotal,
sacramentarian, and ecclesiastical. In its scheme of salvation it magnifies
the church, the priest, and the sacraments. The Baptist message is nonsacerdotal, non-sacramentarian, and non-ecclesiastical…the Catholic
conception of the church, thrusting all its complex and cumbrous
machinery between the soul and God, prescribing beliefs, claiming to
exercise the power of the keys, and to control the channels of grace—all
such lording it over the consciences of men is to the Baptist mind a ghastly
tyranny in the realm of the soul and tends to frustrate the grace of God, to
destroy freedom of conscience, and to hinder terrible the coming of [the]
Kingdom of God.
Cairns (1981, 79, emphasis in original) argues that the church is simultaneously
an “eternal, invisible, biblical organism” and a “temporal, historical, visible, human,
institutional organization.” He identifies these as the respective end and means of the
church. In essence, the end shapes the means (polity) chosen by a particular church.
Luther and other reformers often made reference to “the idea of the invisible church: the
enduring existence of true Christians—proto-Protestants—guided by Providence, yet
often invisible amid the deep anti-Christian corruption of the [Catholic] church” (Barnett,
1999). Cairns (Ibid, 79) writes that, “Any large corporate body must of necessity have
leadership; and, as it grows, the division of functions and consequent specializations of
leadership must come if it is to function effectively.”
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Sommerfeld (1968) similarly attributes denominations’ social structures to their
theology of the Divine Person or Godhead, which he labels “the Ultimate.” While not
exactly corresponding with the three historical polities, Sommerfeld’s typology does
exhibit striking similarities—confirming Cairns’ (1981) idea that the end (the Ultimate)
shapes the means (polity). He defines three ways of conceiving the Ultimate: Familial,
Democratic, and Dominical. Familial and Democratic correspond roughly to the
hierarchical and congregational polities, respectively. The Familial-type “views the
Ultimate primarily in terms of divine family relationships” among the members of the
Trinity—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. This Familial-type places authority in the Church
as the “cumulative possessor of knowledge.” Sommerfeld (1968, 182) writes, “To know
God is to know what the church has come to know of the Ultimate through the years.”
Religious authority is thus “recorded in corporate decisions arrived at in and through the
apostolic continuity of the divine family” (Sommerfeld, 1968, 184). This conception
characterizes the Roman Catholic Church (Ibid).
The Democratic-type, on the other hand, “emphasizes that there is a divine
Ultimate…whom each and all can individually know and experience” (Sommerfeld,
1968, 182). For the Democratic-type, religious authority is “centered in the spiritual
experience of the individual” (Sommerfeld, 1968, 184). This conception characterizes
“mainstream” American Protestantism, including Baptists, minus what some may call the
“high” or intellectual church with their emphases on documents. Lutherans,
Episcopalians, and Calvinist Presbyterians are characterized by Sommerfeld as a third
type, Dominical, and are more difficult to corporately fit into a traditional polity.
Dominical roughly corresponds with a blend of hierarchical and presbyterian governance.
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In sum, the Familial-type emphasizes the body corporate, the Church and its hierarchy;
the Democratic-type emphasizes the individual and individual congregations.
In many ways, the whole of the Reformation and later Protestant schisms were
due primarily to disputes over church governance systems (Cairns, 1981; Barnett, 1999;
Sullins, 2004). Cairns (1981) writes that the origins of church polity lie with Christ who
chose the twelve apostles to be the leaders of the fledgling church and these same
apostles developed the other offices of the church, presumably under the influence of the
Holy Spirit, the third member of the Godhead bestowed upon Christ’s followers at
Pentecost. Cairns cautions that this “does not by any means imply a pyramidal hierarchy,
such as the Roman Catholic church has developed, because the new officials were to be
chosen [democratically] by the people, ordained by the apostles” (Ibid, 79). This
statement reflects Cairns’ own bias. Protestant reformers like the Puritans opposed the
“un-Christian episcopal hierarchy” of Catholicism and “considered their presbyterianism
outlook [on polity] the same as that of the church polity practiced by the apostles”
(Barnett, 1999). Despite Vatican II’s liberal reforms and lower-level clergy and laity
demanding greater roles in church decisions, the Catholic Church remains committed to
its episcopal form of polity and has offered minimal concessions to Catholic
“congregationalists” (White, 1972; D’Antonio, et al., 1989; Kohmescher, 1980).
No scholarship has examined whether churches intentionally (or implicitly)
encourage their followers to prefer or even replicate these organizational structures
outside the walls of the church. Some scholars speak of “cue perceptions,” the explicit or
implicit instruction provided by religious leaders on “matters politic” (Leege, 1992;
Welch, Leege, Wald, and Kellstedt, 1993). If according to Sommerfeld and Cairns,
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conceptions of the Ultimate influence denominations’ own organizational and social
forms, then might not cues involve replicating a denomination’s own organizational
form? Phrased alternatively, if political issues concern the organization of government, it
makes sense that religious believers would prefer their own theologically-derived
organizational preferences based in their idea of the Ultimate. To use Schattschneider’s
(1960) famous terminology, organizations are defined by the “mobilization of bias.” In
this sense, religious organizations may be some of the most “biased” of all. Clergy, and
laity acting on cues, spread the message of the Gospel, distilled through their particular
religious tradition—of which one’s own conception of what constitutes the “true Church”
and how this body should be governed compose a key component of such a Gospel.
Political institutions at the national level in the U.S. are set by constitutional
prerogative: the roles of Congress (legislature), Presidency (executive), and Court
(judiciary) remain relatively unchanged, despite relative shifts in importance one
direction or the other. At the state and local level, there exists quite a deal of variation in
institutional design (Miller, 2002). Just as arguments persist over the proper
organizational structure of religious denominations, so do arguments continue over the
“best” form of local governance. At a basic level, these debates pit monocentrists against
polycentrists (Oakerson, 2004).
Monocentrists, or consolidationists, prefer a single, centralized government with
authority over the whole of a metropolitan area with power to regulate behavior and
development. Polycentrists favor many localized governments covering the metropolitan
region—“a pattern of governance that emerges from the interactions of multiple
independent centers of authority” (Oakerson, 2004, 21). While typically emphasizing the
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benefits of interjurisdictional competition, based in Tiebout (1956), polycentrists also
embrace institutions meant to encourage collective action but without centralizing
authority (see Feiock, 2004a). Monocentrists and polycentrists derive their commitments
from both empirical observation (such as the effect of one form of governance on
economic development outcomes, over the other) and normative values (such as beliefs
about government or the market’s abilities to direct society). Visser (2002) terms the two
camps’ models “reform-consolidation” and “market-public choice,” respectively. These
two terms are also used to describe historical stages of evolution of urban governance in
the U.S., with reform-minded monocentrism dominating the early twentieth century and
polycentrism achieving relevance in the mid-century wake of Tiebout’s thesis (Wallis,
1994; Schechter, 1996). Visser (2002) describes a later wave of reform encouraging
greater consolidation in the 1960s-70s, and again in the 1990s, together culminating in
several large scale city-county consolidations: Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee
(1962); Jacksonville-Duval County, Florida (1967); Indianapolis-Marion County, Indiana
(1969); and Louisville-Jefferson County, Kentucky (2003; Morgan, England, and
Pelissero, 2007).
These two terms, monocentric and polycentric, are also used in urban economics
and geography to describe theories or observations of the urban spatial form. The
monocentric city model posits a single central business district surrounded by declining
values of land rent and thus differing land uses from office to factory to housing and
eventually agriculture (see Anas, Arnott, and Small, 1998). This economic model, which
has much in common with the earlier sociological theories of urban form, is based in the
influential works of Alonso (1964), Muth (1969), and Mills (1972). Later scholars have
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documented a trend toward multi-centered urban regions with multiple business districts
and thus more-sporadic patterns of development (Garreau, 1991; Dear, 2002). This view
is associated with the LA School of urban geography (Dear and Flusty, 1998). The
political and economic versions of monocentrism and polycentrism are not
interchangeable. In this study, the terms are used in the political sense.
Is religious fervor, gained through religious participation, responsible, at least in
part, for passionate views on the structure of urban institutions? The prominent political
scientist, polycentrist, and Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom (2000) alleges that academic
monocentrists’ rely on “self-evident truths.” Ostrom makes the case that scholars and
policy practitioners often act as if their diagnosis and ensuing policy prescriptions are
dictated by “common sense” and thus obvious to all. The demonization of metropolitan
fragmentation is one of her two chief examples. Ostrom (2000, 33) admits that the “sheer
complexity of… [local] government service delivery arrangements” bewilders most
analysts and laypeople alike. Many perfunctorily presume that having “large numbers of
small governmental units” servicing a single metropolitan area obviously leads to
“inadequate, inefficient, and inequitable services” (Ibid). The inverse—that large,
centralized, consolidated governments are more professional, efficient, and equitable—
became conventional wisdom.
Often without recourse to scientific evidence, advocates of monocentrism push to
consolidate metropolitan regions under a single governmental entity. Ostrom cites
monocentric theorists claiming things like, “A diagnosis of the metropolitan malady is
comparatively easy and its logic is too compelling to admit disagreement….Nothing, it
would seem, could be more obvious or more rational [than consolidation]…” (from
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Hawley and Zimmer, 1970, 3). Modern-day advocates make similar claims, ignoring
evidence like Ostrom’s own comparative study of police agencies in 80 metropolitan
areas across the U.S. She and her colleagues conclude that small and medium-sized
departments are more effective at producing direct services and that police performance
is enhanced in metropolitan areas with larger numbers of departments. Both findings
contradict monocentrists’ claims.
Religionists often make reference to their Truth’s self-evidence; and are often
encouraged by philosophers and theologians to instead base their policy
recommendations on rational argument and commonly-held values/norms in pluralistic
societies (see Stout, 2004; Ambrosius, 2005). Perhaps it is only natural that those
favoring hierarchical church governance or localized, congregational governance would
see these structural forms as best for all organizations in society.
Catholics and evangelicals (of which Southern Baptists constitute the largest
component in Louisville and the nation) have the greatest penchant for receiving
ministerial cues (Leege, 1992). Thus, one would expect that these denominations are
prime candidates for the exhibition of the effect discussed here—which I label “polity
replication” for shorthand. One can imagine a Southern Baptist arguing with a Roman
Catholic friend over the proper role of authority in the church. What if the same
Southern Baptist and Catholic parishioners instead discussed an upcoming city-county
consolidation referendum? It is conceivable that the Southern Baptist may make the
claim, “I’ve always believed in local control, whether we’re talking about church or
matters of state.” The Catholic may respond something like, “There is nothing wrong
with large, central government—our church is large and lead by His Holiness the Pope.
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This is better for the church, and our city would be better off consolidated with a strong
mayor able to do as he/she sees fit.” These hypothetical statements are not meant to
stereotype but rather reflect past research findings and this present studies’ theoretical
orientation. This sentiment is certainly suggested by past research on elite and public
Catholic support for urban political machines in the U.S. and European Union integration
in Europe, where Catholic support was significantly higher than among Protestants
(Merton, 1972; Nelsen, Guth, and Fraser, 2001).
What of the direction of causality? Leege (1992, 200) writes that “religion is both
a shaper and mirror of culture and social life.” Are religious denominations shaping
attitudes about the proper design of political institutions; or are they themselves simply
mirroring the societal debate and pre-existing preferences of outsiders? While mirroring
no doubt occurs, shaping is much more important, and likely, in the contemporary U.S.
and elsewhere. Cross-national studies indicate, or at least theorize, that countries with
Catholic majorities exhibit centrist/corporatist forms of government, while Protestant
nations are more democratic and participatory. For example, Gill (2004, 2) writes that in
Latin America:
Catholic leaders and their devout followers often had strong preferences
for centrist and corporatist forms of government. During the nineteenth
century, the Church fervently resisted the advance of European liberalism
and fuelled the preference of practicing Catholics for more corporatist
forms of social organization.
While the Latin American case has colonial baggage, it does seem that the introduction of
Protestantism and increases in individual religiosity may advance democratic ideals—or
at least civic participation. Comparison of European countries, past and present, reveals
similar patterns. It is clear that a nation’s religious identity (in most if not all cases)
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predates the contemporary governance structure and even the existence of the modern
state. Christendom was inspired by Christianity’s universalism; and later Catholic
support for EU integration continues to draw its inspiration from the Church’s social
teachings (Nelsen, Guth, and Fraser, 2001). As Weber suggested, it is religion that
affects “other forms of social and political behavior” first—and then the culture itself
may begin to reshape religion (Gill, 2004, 2).
The roots of the Baptist movement lie in separatist Congregationalism, which
argued against the state church and were active in England during the late 1500s (Cairns,
1981). Early Congregationalist Robert Browne “argued that believers were to be united
to Christ and to one another by a voluntary covenant, that officers were to be chosen by
the [church] members, and that no congregation was to have authority over another”
(Ibid, 337). Followers were among the first settlers of North America who “applied [this]
covenant idea to political life by entering into the Mayflower Compact before landing at
Plymouth” (Ibid, 338). This is a past example of congregants’ vision of church polity
shaping other societal institutions. The first English Baptist church emerged from this
movement in the late 1500s and the first in the new world came in the 1600s (Ibid).
Other scholars like White (1972) argue that churches’ organizational structures
can be a reflection of their environments. For example, many American churches’
congregational polities are the result of America’s national emphases on democracy and
self-governance/reliance. White (Ibid, 100) writes, “we find churches in the free-church
tradition modeling their ecclesiastical organizations after the political structures of
society.” Combining the insights, it seems that polity affected the very foundations of
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American society, which then tend to reinforce and reproduce a certain democratic,
congregational polity in some indigenous religious movements.

City-County Consolidation: Attitudes and Religious Influences
City-county consolidation is one form of contemporary metropolitan reform with
profound influence on the life and governance of a city. Consolidation involves the
dissolution of City and County and the creation of a new government encompassing the
territory of both. The effect is akin to the annexation of all unincorporated land within a
county into the central city limits. Questions remain as to whether the new government is
a “city without suburbs” or, in cases of powerful suburban interests, “suburbs without a
city” (Rusk, 2003; Savitch and Vogel, 2004). Consolidation is “a radical form of
organizational change because it is so complete and often difficult to reverse” and is thus,
perhaps, the most drastic form of institutional (re)design available to local governments
in the U.S. (Savitch and Vogel, 2004, 760). Consolidation is almost universally
supported by Chambers of Commerce, who recognize this form of government as more
corporate-like in its structure.
Morgan, England, and Pelissero (2007, 52) summarize the consensus view of who
typically supports efforts at city-county consolidation and who does not:
The central-city business elite, civic organizations, big-city newspapers,
and reform groups often support reorganization, while suburban
newspapers, mayors and employees of small towns, fringe-area business
people, and central-city blacks often lead the opposition.
This seems to suggest that a regression analysis of individual beliefs about consolidation
would find positive effects on socio-economic indicators like income and education,
although mitigated by distance from the city center, and negative effects on
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suburbanization and African American status (Erie, Kirlin, and Rabinovitz, 1972;
Harrigan, 1993; Lyons, 1972; Temple, 1972). Temple (1972) and Horan and Taylor
(1977) find that socio-demographic variables are important predictors of attitudes on
consolidation. On the other hand, Edwards and Bohland (1991) find that sociodemographic factors are weak or insignificant predictors of consolidation support, except
for residence. Urban residents are more likely than suburban residents to support
consolidation, while suburban residents are more likely than rural residents. This
supports a hypothesized decline in support as one moves from the city center to the urban
fringe.
Edwards and Bohland (1991) conclude that one’s vote in a consolidation
referendum reflects two “attitudinal dimensions” of reform-mindedness and attitudes
toward economic development strategies. According to my reading of the issues, debates
over city-county consolidation often center on preferences for institutional design,
redistribution from suburb to city, political power/trust, and views of consolidation
elites—which may be reflected in individuals’ opinions. In other words, one’s opinion of
consolidation or a consolidated government may be a proxy for their ideas about
institutional design (under general terms such as the role of government in society),
redistribution, political power, or prominent personalities.
Research on religious actors and city-county consolidation is slim. Carr and
Feiock (2002) do find that religious organizations exert a modest impact on both “stages”
of the consolidation process: agenda-setting and referendum. Their comparative study is
based on data collected through a national survey of county officials in communities that
held referenda on city-county consolidation over a ten-year period. Carr and Feiock
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(2002, 84) write that, “Religious groups apparently had a very minimal role in the issue;
in fact, most respondents (62 percent) felt these groups had no effect whatsoever.” Their
data show that only nine percent of the responding county officials believed religious
actors had a significant involvement in agenda-setting or the referendum stages of
consolidation, respectively.
Savitch and Vogel (2004) suggest that churches may have played a role in
influencing public opinion about consolidation in the Louisville case. However, they
merely mention in passing that the coalition opposing consolidation, Citizens Organized
in Search of the Truth (CO$T), held meetings or rallies in local churches. It is unknown,
from their research, to what extent religious organizations themselves took stances on the
issue.
Much research on consolidation emphasizes elites or entrepreneurs’ attitudes
about consolidation and/or roles in placing the issue on the agenda and bankrolling
electoral support (e.g., Durning and Edwards, 1992). While consolidation may be put on
the agenda by elites, it is decided by the voting public. Peterson’s City Limits (1981)
approach and Logan and Molotch’s (1987) “growth machine” thesis surprisingly share
much in common but differ on who benefits from growth. Likewise, voters must decide
if consolidation is in the interest of “the city” as a whole or a subsection of the city’s
elite. Religious commitments’ influences on voters’ perceptions of consolidation and
decisions in consolidation referenda have not been investigated.
Current research on private actors’ involvement in the consolidation issue is
rather pluralist in orientation and based on power’s first face (decision making) or, at
best, its second face, manipulating agendas (Dahl, 1961/2005; Bachrach and Baratz,
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1962). It ignores more recent developments like Lukes’ (2005) third face of power—
manipulating people’s preferences. Religious organizations no doubt exercise power’s
third face. Church members make their own individual decisions that they believe are
based in their own conclusions, but are indeed shaped by the church and its leadership.
This use of power is not necessarily nefarious or even conscious. While it is assumed
that business, labor, and political groups shape preferences, religious organizations are
often ignored. While Carr and Feiock’s (2002) respondents may not have witnessed the
hand of the church in action, it still remains that religious organizations affected
consolidation referendum outcomes, in the least, through their encouragement (or
discouragement) of civic involvement and impartation of civic skills (Sharp, 2007;
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). The building of civic skills in churches is known
to vary based on type of church polity—hierarchical church structures like those
exhibited by Catholic churches are less conducive to learning civic skills than moreparticipatory Protestant congregations (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995).
Religious organizations may also shape attitudes about morality and institutional
design and, in this way, affect the outcome of a consolidation referendum. Scholars have
ignored the application of power’s third face to the study of religion and institutional
design. While churches certainly play minimal, if any, roles in setting metropolitan
agendas and bullying the public (at least successfully), they certainly shape members’
values and, to borrow a popular term, “worldviews”—the loose English translation of the
German, weltanschauung. Christian author James Sire (2004) defines a worldview as:
...a commitment, a fundamental orientation of the heart, that can be
expressed as a story or in a set of presuppositions (assumptions which may
be true, partially true or entirely false) which we hold (consciously or
subconsciously, consistently or inconsistently) about the basic constitution
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of reality, and that provides the foundation on which we live and move
and have our being.
Contemporary Christians, particularly evangelical Protestants, have attempted to
recast their faith as a worldview in opposition to the perceived secularism of other
modern and postmodern schools of philosophy (Naugle, 2002). The more
“subconscious” elements of a contemporary Christian worldview are ripe for sociological
and psychological analysis—including preferences for institutional design manifested
through consolidation referenda and subsequent perceptions of a merged city-county
government.

Toward a Theory of “Polity Replication”
A theory of polity replication should emphasize two mechanisms—ideological
and participatory polity replication. Figure 2.1 illustrates these two forms of polity
replication as a path diagram—in similar fashion to a logic model, a scheme used by
program evaluators to understand the theoretical connections between inputs and
outcomes (McLaughlin and Jordan, 1999). The arrows represent directions of causality
or feedback loops. On one hand, attendance at church worship and religious education
shapes a congregants ideology about God and spirituality (theology), state (political
ideology), society (social ideology), and structures/organizations. Presumably, those “in
the pews” more often will receive more “cues” and thus be more likely to vote on
political issues, like consolidation and morality-based referendums, reflecting their
church’s official or unofficial positions.
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On the other hand, those who participate in church programs and governance may
learn civic skills, according to Verba and colleagues (1995), and develop intense
preferences for similar governance structures. While participants in corporate or
government bureaucracies may come to loathe such structures, monetary constraints may
prohibit organizational members from leaving. The religious sector, however, is entirely
voluntary and thus participants can generally “self-select” the church that best fits their
preferences (McMullen, 1994). Since many religious adults were raised as religious
children, their preferences for a religious tradition are shaped early on through
socialization and their preferences for organizational structure will develop later, based
on positive or negative experiences. Some Catholics, who become disillusioned with
church ritual or hierarchy, may join a mainline or evangelical Protestant congregation
following a conversion experience. This should not, however, be seen as the norm (e.g.,
Hadaway and Marler, 1993). Most congregants are likely to believe their church
structure is the best or ideal form.
While this present study does not explicitly test which form of polity replication is
at work in consolidation referenda, I posit that both are present. However, the effects of
each cannot be parsed out due to limitations in the present data. This section and the
corresponding figure are included to better illustrate the theorized connections and inspire
further exploration of polity replication.

Religion, Redistribution, and Public Trust
Consolidation support, as a variable, may instead serve as a proxy for
redistribution support, because consolidation is often seen as marshalling suburban
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resources to aid a central city; or public trust, because consolidation support requires
taking elites’ claims at face value and the belief that elites consider citizens’ interests in
addition to their own.
Researchers have examined the effect of religious affiliation and religiosity on
penchants for redistributive policy. Wilson (2009) cites literature arguing that
evangelical Protestants tend to take conservative economic positions that place emphasis
on individual responsibility rather than government intervention (also see Johnstone,
1988; Hargrove, 1989; and Barker and Carman, 2000). This does not mean that
evangelicals take their faith’s requirement to love and serve the poor lightly (Wuthnow,
1994b). Instead, evangelicals tend to support “relational” approaches to alleviating
proverty—i.e., the charitable works of congregations and individual believers (Smith,
1998). Black Protestants tend to take very liberal positions on social welfare policy—and
are the only major U.S. religious tradition for which increased religiosity correlates with
increased liberalism (Wilson, 2009). Roman Catholics and mainline Protestants tend to
lie somewhere in the middle and are more likely to support government social programs
than evangelicals (Ibid).
Wilensky (1981) finds a strong relationship between Catholic party power and
social welfare spending in the liberal democracies of Europe and America. He also posits
a connection between Catholicism and corporatism. Wilensky (1981, 362) writes:
Catholic power (where it appears) is not only a more important source of
welfare state development than left party power, but as one might expect,
Catholicism is one historical root of corporatist democracy and has similar
effects… statistically speaking, they are substitutes for one another…
Catholic parties, once formed, can and do build upon the ancillary
institutions of the Catholic Church, which are much older than the
centralized state. Catholic party dominance thus taps an older socialpolitical complex.

68

Wilensky (Ibid) further argues that “while highly centralized governments may precede
the creation of Catholic parties, the fully developed corporatist-technocratic linkages
caught by our measures are a quite recent development.” His “simple” causal model thus
begins with Catholic political power and proceeds through the intermediate development
of corporatism and ends with significant welfare efforts by the state.
Benabou and Tirole (2006) employ Weber’s “Protestant Ethic” to argue that more
religious individuals oppose social welfare because they work hard and believe in justice
for those who do not. They write that, “At the individual level, studies universally find
that more religious individuals, particularly Protestants, have less favorable attitudes
toward redistribution than others and are more tolerant of inequality” (Benabou and
Tirole, 2006, 733; emphasis added). They cite several studies as evidence, including
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003) and Scheve and Stasavage (2006).
An interesting strain of research suggests that the rise of the welfare state in
Western liberal democracies may lead to declines in religiosity, a suggestion that may
support religiously-inspired skepticism of public welfare (Gill and Lundsgaarde, 2004).
In this sense, government social services replace the church’s role as social support
mechanism (see also Scheve and Stasavage, 2006). The Bush Administration’s FaithBased and Community Initiative—which sought to incorporate small and religious
organizations, including congregations, into the federal social service regime—recently
sparked public debate over the separation of church and state. It would seem that
conservative evangelicals may have found a happy medium between government largesse
and Christian charity—so long as the “government shekels” come without “government
shackles” (Kennedy and Bielefeld, 2002).
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The identification of a “religious effect” in a consolidation referendum could
represent polity replication in action or religious preferences for redistribution—because
Catholics tend to support social welfare while Southern Baptists tend to identify with
conservative parties and movements that do not (Wilson, 209; Wilensky, 1981;
Ammerman, 1991). Perhaps both are at work. Controls for political ideology may not
accurately represent Catholics’ positions, for example, since they tend to endorse liberal
economics and conservative social values (O’Brien, 2008). To test whether this is the
case, one may wish to examine religious attitudes on redistribution to central cities in the
mass public. If the same patterns emerge—i.e., the same religious traditions favor
redistribution as those favoring consolidation—then it may seem that the public
understands consolidation as a form of redistribution. However, if the same religious
patterns are absent, then one may conclude that another force is at work—such as polity
replication.
When it comes to political trust, Roman Catholics may be more trusting of
government than Southern Baptists. This relationship seems intuitive given the churches
corresponding polity structures and attitudes on income redistribution. However, one
scholarly investigation concluded that while trusting people is positively correlated with
confidence in public officials and religious institutions, no significant differences on trust
exist between religious traditions in the U.S. (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002). Their
findings do suggest a positive relationship between religiosity and public trust if the same
individuals trust people, governments, and churches (Ibid).
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Hypotheses
Table 2.3 features the expected signs of the various independent variables’ effects
on the chief dependent variables (or groupings of dependent variables) included in this
study. I discuss these hypotheses under the three headings of religious, culture war, and
consolidation hypotheses. While Table 2.3 focuses solely on individual-level variables
and relationships, I also discuss neighborhood-level hypotheses under the religious
hypotheses heading. While literature is cited in several respects, I do not cite evidence if
it has already been cited previously in this literature review.
Religious hypotheses. Church attendance and overall religiosity are likely
distributed fairly randomly throughout the city region because urban-dwelling African
Americans and suburban-dwelling whites, particularly evangelicals, are often very
religious (e.g., Taylor, et al., 1996; Wilcox, 1990; Wuthnow, 1988). However, central
cities themselves are often seen as irreligious places exhibiting unconventional, and often
secular, cultural elements (Cox, 1965; Fischer, 1975a). Louisville is largely composed of
three religious groupings—Southern Baptists (and other evangelical Protestants), Roman
Catholics, and Black Protestants. Given their demographic compositions, I expect to see
Black Protestants concentrating in the central city, Roman Catholics spreading across the
city region, and Southern Baptists congregating in the suburban rings. Past research has
found that religious salience increases moving outward from urban to suburban to rural
contexts (Miller, 2001). This suggests a negative linear relationship between religiosity
and distance from the city center, although this relationship may be mitigated in
Louisville by a common social structure across the metropolis. In other words, many
scholars of public opinion typically compare urban or metropolitan areas’ social
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Table 2.3: Expected Signs of Independent Variables' Effects on Dependent Variables/Groupings
City-County
City-County
Culture War
Consolidation
Consolidation
Independent Variables (IV)
Religiosity
Issues
Turnout
Vote/Opinion
Female

+

?

-

?

Black

+

?

-

-

Age

+

+

+

?

Education

-

-

+

+

Income

-

-

+

+

Fulltime

-

?

-

+

Married

+

+

+

?

House

+

+

+

+

Conservatism

+

+

+

-

Distance to CBD

+

+

+

-

Religiosity

NA

+

+

?

So. Baptist

+

NA

-

-

Catholic

-

NA

+

+

NOTE: + means a positive effect; - means a negative effect; ? means the direction is unclear; NA means
"not applicable" (i.e., that the IV does not or cannot appear in such a model). ? is inserted if there is no
precedent for such a relationship, or the literature indicates the relationship could be positive or negative.
Higher values on the dependent variables are, respectively: more religious, more conservative stances on
the culture war issues, more likely to vote in the consolidation referendum, and more likely to support citycounty consolidation in the referendum and in one's opinions. The expected effects of the religious affiliation
dummy variables compare the two traditions, So. Baptist and Catholic, with one another.

structures with rural areas and do not believe it necessary to subdivide between urban and
suburban (see Arcury and Christianson, 1993, for a Kentucky example of this practice in
environmental studies). However, in urban studies, urban-suburban differences are often
emphasized and found to be quite pronounced (e.g., Swanstrom, et al., 2004).
Churches should be more centralized than the population because original
structures were built in or near the downtown and these “first churches” are, in many
cases, still located in the central city (Form and Dubrow, 2005). These historical
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buildings are valuable for religious, artistic, and emotional reasons (“use value”; Logan
and Molotch, 1987), not to mention that their restoration is more environmentallyfriendly and, in some cases (but not all), more cost-effective than new construction.
However, Chicago school urban ecology predicts that churches will follow members to
the suburbs as they gain affluence and move outward to the suburbs (McRoberts, 2003).
Churches that moved at the height of urban decline likely relocated to original or innerring suburbs. Rural churches at the fringe of the county are few, as less dense
populations cannot support many membership organizations. These exurban areas do
tend to house at least one megachurch (Eiesland, 2000). This suggests a linear decline in
church presence across the urban continuum from the city to the urban edge. Churches at
the fringe likely have the largest lot sizes due to the ready availability of undeveloped
land parcels.
I predict that Louisville will compare favorably with past research and with the
nation in terms of what socio-demographic variables predict religiosity. Because
Louisville borders two regions and is a mix of native Kentuckians and those from other
regions, its population is more representative of the nation as a whole than the more rural
parts of Kentucky—which more resemble typical southern areas and have many
characteristics in common with Tennessee or West Virginia. Table 2.3 indicates that I
expect, holding other variables constant, conservatism, distance to the central business
district (CBD), and the female, black, age, married, house, and Southern Baptist dummy
variables to all have positive effects on religiosity. Southern Baptists are likely to be
more “religious” than Catholics because of their emphasis on individual accountability
and participation; and the presence of an “evangelical bias” in survey items (see

73

Mockabee, Monson, and Grant, 2001). I expect a negative relationship between the
indicators of socio-economic status (SES) and religiosity. These include education,
income, and fulltime employment. Fulltime status also represents a time constraint on
religious participation.
Culture war hypotheses. I believe Louisville exhibits similar political and moral
positions/attitudes to the nation as a whole on political ideology, partisan identification,
and the divisive issues of our time. When culture war issues are viewed as a group, I
expect positive (more-traditional) signs on age, marital status, house residence,
conservatism, distance from the CBD, and religiosity (see Table 2.3). I expect negative
signs on education, income, and in some cases, female and black. Females are often
supportive of abortion, gay rights, and sex-education, but in opposition to pornography
and other forms of adult entertainment. They are also less conservative and less
supportive of the Republican Party and former President Bush. Blacks are also less
conservative and less supportive of Republicans, but often opposed to abortion and
homosexual activity. However, blacks may be more supportive of sex education and
adult entertainment than whites. For brevity’s sake, I do not emphasize culture war
differences among religious traditions in this dissertation.
Consolidation hypotheses. Table 2.3 divides the hypothesized effects of the
independent variables between city-county consolidation referendum turnout and
vote/opinion towards consolidation and consolidated government. The expected signs on
turnout are based on both conventional views of turnout in general elections and literature
on consolidation specifically. Females, blacks, full-time workers, and Southern Baptists
are expected to exhibit lower likelihoods of voting; whereas, the older, more-educated,
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higher-income, more-suburban, more-religious, home-dwellers and Catholics are likely to
exhibit higher likelihoods of voting.
When it comes to vote choice in the consolidation referendum, I expect higher
SES to translate into electoral support for consolidation (education, income, fulltime, and
house). I expect black, conservative, and suburban voters to oppose consolidation. There
is little literature to draw from in predicting the consolidation views of women and
older/married persons—thus, these relationships are unclear or not statistically significant
(coded with a “?”). One might theorize, though, that all are more trusting and thus more
likely to support consolidation.
I suspect that religious differences do indeed extend beyond local culture war
issues to other political issues such as city-county consolidation and approval of the local
regime. In terms of religiosity, the direction is unclear. Because religious individuals
have largely identified with conservatism and the Republican Party in recent national
elections (e.g., Langer and Cohen, 2005), one may hypothesize that religiosity and
identification with conservative religious groups will negatively affect support for
consolidation. However, most religious faiths mandate or strongly encourage support for
the poor (see Pacione, 1990) and thus more religious people may endorse greater societal
concern for impoverished urban populations. In this case, more-religious individuals in
Louisville may favor consolidation for its oft-hypothesized redistributive benefits.
I expect differences over consolidation to exist between Southern Baptists and
Catholics due to my theory of polity replication. Southern Baptists will be less likely
than Catholics to support consolidation; or the converse, Catholics will be more likely to
support consolidation. This effect should be exhibited in both referendum vote and
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opinions of the consolidated entity. I would also expect Catholics to have higher rates of
turnout in the referendum. It is possible that differences in vote may be mitigated in
opinions by Southern Baptists adapting to the “popular” local view of supporting the
regime in power.

Conclusion
This literature review outlines the theory underpinning this dissertation’s research
questions and the hypotheses under examination. The remaining chapters summarize the
methodology and test the hypotheses, ultimately lending credence to my theory of polity
replication.
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CHAPTER III
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Introduction
This chapter details the methodology employed for this dissertation. I first
identify and discuss the data sources. I then describe in detail the construction of all
dependent and independent variables. Next I calculate and present the descriptive
statistics for all variables. Finally, I describe the statistical methods used to test my
hypotheses.

Data
This study utilizes multiple data sources at the individual and neighborhood
levels. The chief source of data is the Louisville Metropolitan Survey (LMS) collected in
spring 2006 by the University of Louisville’s Urban Studies Institute in consultation with
the Department of Sociology, whose faculty designed the questionnaire (Department of
Sociology, 2006). Previous versions of the LMS were collected in 2004, 2000, and
earlier years. The unit of analysis is the individual. Survey respondents were chosen by
random digit dialing across Jefferson County, Kentucky (Louisville Metro), a technique
which ultimately resulted in a sample of 807 complete interviews with adult respondents
aged 18 or over. Participants were asked for responses on political, moral, and religious
issues along with basic socio-demographic characteristics.
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Scholars who have previously utilized the 2006 LMS data have noted that the
respondents compare favorably with 2000 U.S. Census data and are thus likely fairlyrepresentative of Louisville’s population, although these analyses only examine a
subsection of respondents asked environmental questions (Ambrosius, 2008b;
Gilderbloom, Hanka, and Ambrosius, 2009; Walton, 2006). In this present analysis, I
find that the full sample is somewhat more female, older, and more educated than U.S.
Census Bureau data for 2006. The sample also drew slightly more white respondents
than the rate in the population of Jefferson County. Consequently, I weight the sample to
reflect better the population using four criteria: sex, race, age, and education (Sapsford,
1999). Rather than using dated 2000 Census data, which possibly would eliminate
important demographic shifts that have occurred over the six years from 2000 to 2006, I
utilize three-year estimates from the American Community Survey (ACS), 2005-2007.
The three-year estimates are more reliable than an ACS collected in a single year; and the
LMS collection year forms the center of the ACS analysis period. The weighting process
successfully weighted up male, black, younger, and less-educated respondents to their
approximate levels in the population. See Table 3.1 for a comparison of the ACS with
the unweighted and weighted versions of the LMS. The exact wording of all relevant
questions asked by the LMS is included in Appendix A.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the distribution of LMS respondents across the territory of
Louisville Metro. Respondents are scattered randomly throughout their ZIP codes of
residence using a dot density technique because a full street address was not provided (to
protect confidentiality). This map reveals that respondents’ locations are fairly
distributed across the metropolitan area and do not exhibit a substantial regional bias.

78

Table 3.1: Comparison of ACS, 2005-2007, with Unweighted and Weighted LMS, 2006
Dataset
Year
N

ACS, 3-year estimates
2005-2007
704,648

LMS, unweighted
2006
807

LMS, weighted
2006
805

Female

51.9

61.1

51.2

Male

48.1

38.9

48.8

White

75.6

79.1

73.5

Black

19.7

17.2

20.7

Other

4.6

2.3

4.4

Age (20+)
20-34

25.6

15.9

24.9

35-44

19.8

14.1

18.4

45-59

29.9

34.6

29.5

60-84

22.0

31.4

22.3

85+

2.7

2.5

3.0

No HS diploma

14.4

6.9

13.2

HS diploma

29.8

20.2

29.1

Some college

21.9

30.2

22.8

AA degree

6.5

8.3

7.5

BA degree

16.4

14.7

16.7

Graduate school

10.9

19.6

10.7

Sex

Race

Educ
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To illustrate better the distribution of religion across Louisville, I compiled my
own list of Louisville’s Christian congregations. My initial source for this congregational
census was Church Angel (www.churchangel.com). This website presents an excellent
starting point for an electronic database containing a particular community’s Christian
churches. While critics may allege that this source of data will miss many smaller,
African American and non-denominational congregations, the list includes a significant
number of churches from historically-black denominations (e.g., African Methodist
Episcopal) and those without denominational ties. Church Angel lists congregations by
their city. In addition to Louisville, I searched for the approximately 80 “lower-class”
cities (as defined by Kentucky law) in Jefferson County that remain intact after
consolidation (Savitch and Vogel, 2004). This search yielded a total of 554 Christian
congregations. This compares favorably with Jones, et al.’s (2002) figure of 594
religious congregations in Jefferson County, which includes non-Christian religious
establishments. Because Louisville is overwhelmingly Christian, I chose to disregard
other relatively-small religious traditions (including Judaism and the eastern religions),
with very few houses of worship in the city, in this analysis.
I geocode each congregation by its street address and ZIP code using the
Louisville/Jefferson County Information Consortium’s (LOJIC) interactive mapping
system (http://www.lojic.org/mylouisville/viewer.htm). This process returns the census
tract in which the church is located, while a search of the Jefferson County Property
Valuation Administrator’s (JCPVA) property database (http://www.pvalouky.org/
propertyinfo/search.php) yields the parcel identification number and the acreage of the
site. Eighty-six percent coded on the first run, which rises to over 93 percent following
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address corrections. A total of 38 correct addresses could not be located in LOJIC or
PVA records for a final N of 516.
To further gauge Louisville’s religious history and ecology, I integrate contextual
data from: (1) Stark and Bainbridge’s (1996) dataset Religious Ecology of 378 American
Cities, 1906-1936, which gathers data from the 1910, 1919, 1930 and 1941 U.S.
Government publications titled Religious Bodies; (2) the 1952, 1971, 1980, 1990, and
2000 Religious Congregations and Membership Studies (RCMS; Jones, et al., 2002); (3)
the 2000 LMS, which asked several religious questions; and (4) the Hartford Institute for
Religion Research’s Database of Megachurches in the U.S. (http://hirr.hartsem.edu/
megachurch/database.html).
For comparison with the nation as a whole and further testing of my hypotheses, I
employ the U.S. General Social Survey (GSS) collected in 2006, the same calendar year
as the LMS (Davis and Smith, 2006). The GSS is a respected project of the National
Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago funded by the National
Science Foundation (NSF). It is a nationally-representative, personal-interview poll of
non-institutionalized U.S. adults. The 2006 iteration represents the 26th round of
collection since the GSS began in 1972, which has proceeded biennially since 1994, and
is the first to include Spanish-language interviews. According to NORC, the GSS is the
most frequently analyzed social science data source other than the decennial U.S. Census
(National Opinion Research Center, 2009). The 2006 GSS dataset contains 4,510 cases.
Due to the 2004-2008 rounds of the GSS adopting a non-respondent, sub-sampling
design, one must use a weight variable when performing data analysis. I use the weight
variable “wtss,” which considers both the sub-sampling of non-respondents and the
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number of adults in each household. This weight allows one to generalize about the
population as a whole even though only one adult per household is eligible to participate
in the survey.
For comparison with the LMS, the GSS includes relatively-comparable questions
on political and moral positions, religious affiliation and religiosity, and basic sociodemographic characteristics. While the question wording is often different, the GSS is
the best available national dataset for direct comparison with the LMS. The exact
wording of all relevant questions asked by the GSS is included in Appendix B.

Dependent Variables
This study makes use of religious, moral, and political dependent variables. Some
of these variables are also employed as independent variables in other statistical models
alongside socio-demographic controls. The following subsections describe the various
dependent variables.
Neighborhood-level Church Variables. Using my database of churches in
Louisville, I construct several variables to represent the number of churches per
community-grouping. All are calculated by both census tract (N=170) and ZIP code
(N=32) because the geocoding process captured both. Census tracts are a better
approximation of neighborhoods because they are smaller and more numerous.
However, ZIP codes are also advantageous because LMS respondents were asked to
identify their ZIP code. This allows one to calculate neighborhood-level church
attendance and religiosity averages for those ZIP codes represented by sufficient
respondents (seven or greater) and compare with measures of neighborhood churches.
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The first church variable is a per capita measure capturing churches per 1,000
residents of the census tract or ZIP code. The second is churches per unit of land area,
measured by one square mile (i.e., church density). I employ population density (persons
per square mile) as a comparable measure calculated for census tracts using 2000 Census
population and the tract area in square miles. The third is the percentage of religious land
use, calculated in acres given the total lot sizes of all churches in the tract or ZIP code.
Census tract population and land area are provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. ZIP code
population and land area are obtained from CSG Network, a website existing “to provide
assistance, direction, information and reference material for students”
(http://www.csgnetwork.com/zcl.html).
Religious Identification. While serving as a key independent variable in
regression analyses, I discuss religious identification in detail here because it does serve
first as a dependent variable when I analyze the religious distribution. The LMS asks the
basic question, “What is your religious preference?” The response choices are (1)
Baptist; (2) Other Protestant Denomination; (3) Roman Catholic; (4) A Christian religion
not yet mentioned; (5) A non-Christian religion; and (7) No religious preference. The
dominant white American religious traditions are Roman Catholic, Mainline Protestant,
and Evangelical Protestant (Smidt, Kellstedt, and Guth, 2009a). This LMS question does
not allow for a division of Protestants into mainline and evangelical branches. However,
for unknown reasons, the question does isolate the “Baptist” religious family. The likely
reason for breaking out Baptists is their prevalence in Louisville—largely divided into
white Southern Baptists and various African American Baptist traditions. An
identification of evangelical Protestants is further hindered by their likely inclusion in
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several response categories: Baptist, Other Protestant, a Christian religion, and even no
religious preference. Non-Baptist evangelical Protestants who are unfamiliar with the
Protestant label likely answered “A Christian religion not yet mentioned” or, for those in
non-denominational or independent churches, perhaps even, “No religious preference.”
Many Christians, particularly evangelicals or “born again” Christians, deny that their
faith is comparable to other traditions and thus should not be labeled a religion (see
Ridenour, 1967 for one such example). It is clear that the other Christian religion
category includes respondents beyond Eastern Orthodox and conservative nontraditionalists (e.g., Mormons and Jehovah’s Witnesses) not captured by the other
categories because those choosing this category are greater than these traditions’ rates in
the population.
Given these constraints, the classification scheme that comes closest to that
offered by Smidt, Kellstedt, and Guth (2009b) divides the LMS sample into Southern
Baptists, Black Protestants, Other Protestants, Roman Catholics, Other Christians, Other
Non-Christians, and the unaffiliated, a diverse category including both religious, nonreligious, and anti-religious respondents. Southern Baptists do serve as a decent proxy
for evangelicals in Louisville because they account for about three-quarters of the
evangelical population (Jones, et al., 2002).
Southern Baptists are identified as those white respondents who selected
“Baptist.” This category likely includes a few mainline or other evangelical Baptists
because the percentage in the LMS (18.5 percent) is slightly higher than that found by the
2000 RCMS (15.6 percent), although the vast majority of white Baptists in Louisville are
indeed Southern Baptists (as is the case across the South—see Shortridge, 1976). The
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RCMS finds 164 Southern Baptist congregations but only 28 other Baptist congregations,
which together account for a mere 0.5 percent of religious adherents in Louisville.
Black Protestants are identified as those black respondents who selected
“Baptist,” “Other Protestant,” or “a Christian religion.” This category accounts for 18.0
percent of the LMS sample. While some of these Black Protestants may be members of
largely-white denominations, the bulk likely attend congregations associated with
historically-black denominations. As the cliché goes, Sunday morning is the “most
segregated hour” in America (Hadaway, Hackett, and Miller, 1984). Smidt, Kellstedt,
and Guth (2009b) argue that Black Protestants exhibit similar social, political, and
theological positions and thus deserve their own category without division into
evangelical and mainline.
The Roman Catholic category is fairly straight forward because it was selected by
the respondents themselves. 23.6 percent of respondents identify with the Roman
Catholic Church, making it the largest single religious body in Louisville.
Other Non-Christians, including Jews, Muslims, and Hindus, are only represented
by a few respondents (totaling 3.3 percent) and, as a composite category, are unfit for
stringent analysis. The other Christian categories—Other Protestants (13.0) and Other
Christians (10.4)—are ambiguous categories that likely include a mix of mainline
Protestants like Lutherans and Methodists, evangelical Protestants including both
Pentecostals and self-defined fundamentalists, various Eastern Orthodox traditions, and
other traditions taking the “Christian” label. There is no means by which one can
subdivide the two “other” categories into these individual traditions. The remaining
category, the religiously unaffiliated, accounts for 13.2 percent of the LMS sample.
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While the GSS offers considerably more detail in its variables “RELIG” and
“DENOM” (see Appendix B), I pare the responses down to those given by the LMS for
direct comparison. Southern Baptists are Protestants (RELIG) who selected Southern
Baptist in the denomination (DENOM) follow-up question. Black Protestants are those
black respondents who selected Protestant, Christian, or Non-denominational on RELIG.
Again, Roman Catholics are able to explicitly self-identify. Other Protestants are given
their own category. Other Christians are grouped by non-blacks who selected Orthodox
Christian, Christian, or Non-denominational. The remaining religious groups are placed
together in the Other Non-Christian category. Those selecting “None” are labeled
unaffiliated.
All religious categories are included in statistical analysis but the Southern Baptist
and Roman Catholic religious traditions are the dominant traditions in Louisville and the
key affiliations under study. Thus, they receive primary attention in discussion of this
study’s findings. Religious identification is measured at the individual-level but can also
be aggregated by ZIP code for those ZIP codes with more than seven respondents, an
arbitrary but necessary cutoff meant to ensure that a neighborhood score is not based on
one or few respondents’ characteristics.
Religiosity. Both the LMS and GSS ask a host of questions on one’s religious
salience, behaviors, and beliefs. I construct an index of religiosity from both datasets
using factor analysis. The LMS religiosity index sums information from three religious
salience questions, two religious behavior questions (one public, one private), and one
belief question. These LMS questions capture the following: importance of religion,
desire to become more religious, closeness to God, worship/religious activity attendance,
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frequency of scripture reading, and belief in an afterlife (see Appendix A for exact
question wording).
The GSS questions capture: strength of religious preference, the extent to which
one considers oneself religious, the extent to which one considers oneself spiritual,
worship attendance, religious activity attendance, frequency of prayer, and belief in an
afterlife (see Appendix B for exact question wording). The three religious salience
measures in the GSS are notably different from those in the LMS, but they capture
similar attitudes on one’s personal religiosity. The worship attendance question in the
LMS asks, “Over the past 12 months, how often did you attend a religious gathering such
as a worship service, Sunday school, or Bible study?” Because this item does not isolate
worship service attendance but includes other religious activities, I incorporate two GSS
questions into the index: “How often do you attend religious services?” and “How often
do you take part in the activities and organizations of a church or place of worship other
than attending services?” While the LMS features scripture reading as a private religious
behavior, the GSS only asks about frequency of prayer. This is likely the largest
difference in index construction because personal scripture reading is thought to reflect
an “evangelical bias” (Mockabee, Monson, and Grant, 2001). Finally, while the GSS
asks numerous belief questions, I only include belief in the afterlife (measured with an
ordinal “certainty” scale) because this is the only belief question asked by the LMS.
I use factor analysis, or more specifically a variant of factor analysis called
principal components analysis (PCA), to construct an index of religiosity from both
datasets (Jolliffe, 2002). The factor loadings, eigenvalue, and explained variance of both
the LMS and GSS religiosity indices are included in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. The factor
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loadings are comparable across the two datasets, the eigenvalues each exceed 3.0, and the
explained variance captured by the single factor each exceeds 50 percent. Thus, both
indices fulfill basic statistical requirements (Ibid). Like religious identification, this
variable is used at the individual-level but can also be aggregated by ZIP code for those
ZIP codes with more than seven respondents.
Table 3.2: Religiosity Index, LMS
Factor loadings
Importance of religion

.822

Closeness to God

.770

Desire to be more religious

.668

Worship/church attendance

.728

Bible/holy book reading

.725

Belief in life after death

.530

Eigenvalue

3.051

Explained variance (%)

50.843

Political Ideology. Political ideology is captured by a five-point scale of
conservatism. The LMS asks the question, “Do you think of yourself as a Liberal, a
Conservative, or as middle-of-the-road?” It then follows-up with, “Do you consider
yourself a strong or not very strong [liberal or conservative]?” I combine these two
questions to create the following scale: (1) strong liberal; (2) weak liberal; (3) moderate;
(4) weak conservative; and (5) strong conservative.
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Table 3.3: Religiosity Index, GSS
Factor loadings
Strength of religious preference

.730

Extent considered religious

.817

Extent considered spiritual

.713

Worship/church attendance

.785

Religious activity participation

.697

Frequency of prayer

.748

Belief in life after death

.468

Eigenvalue

3.589

Explained variance (%)

51.272

The GSS asks a more-detailed, seven-point question: “I'm going to show you a
seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from
extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this
scale?” This scale is as follows: (1) extremely liberal; (2) liberal; (3) lean liberal; (4)
moderate; (5) lean conservative; (6) conservative; and (7) extremely conservative. The
“lean” categories compare well with the “not very strong” (or “weak”) categories in the
LMS. To collapse this scale into the same five-point one captured by the LMS, I make
these categories equivalent and instead combine “extremely [liberal or conservative]” and
“liberal or conservative” into single categories. While a slightly different approach for
each dataset, the results of statistical analysis should be comparable.
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Political Identification. The GSS does ask a question labeled “PARTYID” which
asks, “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat,
Independent, or what?” The LMS, however, does not ask such a question. The LMS
does ask whether one feels “very favorable, favorable, neutral, negative, or very negative
[towards] George W. Bush?” of approximately half the sample (440 cases). Using the
very favorable and favorable categories, I create a dummy variable that represents those
respondents (30 percent) likely to have voted for Bush in 2004. Jefferson County does
lean Democratic but the Bush-Cheney Republican ticket in 2004 claimed nearly half of
the vote (almost 49 percent). The LMS approximation is lower because: (a) the sample
includes those who did not vote in 2004 but responded with a negative opinion of Bush;
and (b) it reflects the fact that some 2004 Bush supporters likely jumped ship to “neutral”
or “negative” given Bush’s falling approval ratings and unpopular war in Iraq.
Interestingly though, using the estimated population from the 2004 ACS, Bush garnered
2004 electoral support from 31.6 percent of the total 520,727 adults (18 and over) in
Jefferson County. Thus, this variable is a decent approximation of Bush’s electoral
support.
The GSS asks more straightforward questions: “Do you remember for sure
whether or not you voted in [the 2004] election?”; “Did you vote for Kerry or Bush?”;
and “Who would you have voted for, for President, if you had voted?” Given the
responses to these questions, I create a dummy variable that sums those who: (a) voted
for Bush; and (b) would have voted for Bush if they had voted or had been eligible to
vote. Because the second component (b) allows for change of opinion between 2004 and
2008, but the first (a) does not (unless one misreports), I would expect this dummy
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variable to be higher in support of Bush than the LMS. It is (43 percent). Nationally,
Bush garnered support from nearly 51 percent of 2004 voters or just shy of 30 percent of
2004 (ACS) U.S. adults. Despite the inherent differences, these two dummy variables are
the best comparable measures of political identification across the two surveys. I caution
readers to compare these measures carefully with full awareness of their
incompatibilities.
Homosexuality. Both the LMS and GSS ask a comparable question on the
morality of homosexual relationships. The LMS asks, “Homosexuality is wrong. Do
you…” (1) strongly agree; (2) agree; (3) not sure whether you agree or disagree; (4)
disagree; or (5) strongly disagree? I flip this scale so that higher scores represent greater
disapproval of homosexuality. The LMS question does not seem to make a distinction
between homosexual orientation and homosexual behavior.
I create a comparable five-point scale from the GSS variable “HOMOSEX”
which asks, “What about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex—do you
think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at
all?” I code this scale: as (1) not at all wrong; (2) unsure if wrong; (3) sometimes wrong;
(4) almost always wrong; and (5) always wrong. I place the unsure category at level 2
rather than in the center because the next category is “sometimes wrong” which does not
fit on the same side as “not at all wrong.” The GSS question does seem to emphasize
behavior over orientation.
Sex Education. On the issues of sex education in public schools, the LMS asks,
“How supportive are you of some form of sex education being taught in public schools?”
following a short statement priming the respondent: “Now I'd like to ask you some
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questions about sex education, a topic that is often debated among communities and in
schools. The Centers for Disease Control reports that in 2003, just over 52 percent of
teens surveyed in Kentucky claimed to have had sexual intercourse at least once.” A
second statement and question was then read regarding “comprehensive” sex education
(which includes, by the definition given in the survey, discussion of contraception but
also abstinence), as well as several other follow-ups probing respondents attitudes
toward, and knowledge of, the issue.
In a rare instance of providing less detail, the GSS simply asks, “Would you be
for or against sex education in the public schools?” Because this is a two-point division,
unless non-responses are placed in-between, I am forced to do the same with the LMS
and create comparable dummy variables that express (1) opposition or (0) support for
public sex education. Because the GSS question does not include the term
“comprehensive,” I simply use the first LMS question which refers to “some form of sex
education.” Nine percent of the LMS sample asked the sex-ed questions oppose sex
education, while eleven percent of the GSS respondents are in opposition. The LMS is
likely slightly lower because it is an urban area with more liberal views than the nation as
a whole, which includes rural populations holding more conservative views.
Adult Entertainment. Regulation of adult entertainment, or sexually-oriented
businesses, is a moral issue faced by all local governments (Sharp, 2004). The LMS asks
three questions on adult entertainment establishments’ effects on local neighborhoods.
They begin with: “Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following
statements about various community issues.” The three statements are: “Adult
bookstores and strip clubs tend to create an unsafe neighborhood;” “Communities that
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have adult bookstores and strip clubs are more likely to have robberies;” and “Adult
bookstores and strip clubs hurt other businesses in the area.” I combine these three into
an index capturing opposition to adult entertainment. I first recoded all responses into the
same five-point scale expressing increased levels of opposition (i.e., agreement with the
statement): (1) very much disagree; (2) somewhat disagree; (3) no opinion; (4) somewhat
agree; and (5) very much agree. I then run PCA using these three items. Factor loadings
are all above 0.85, the eigenvalue is over two, and the explained variance exceeds 73
percent. See Table 3.4 for the PCA results.
Table 3.4: Adult Entertainment Opposition Index, LMS
Factor loadings
Adult ent. unsafe

.857

Adult ent. makes robberies more likely

.867

Adult ent. hurts other businesses

.850

Eigenvalue

2.210

Explained variance (%)

73.662

City-County Consolidation. A large portion of the LMS is devoted to the recent
2003 merger of Jefferson County and the City of Louisville. The 2004 LMS contains the
same questions on merger but lacks any questions on religion. From the 2006 questions,
I created two dummy variables and a factor score.
First, I simply established whether one voted in the merger referendum using the
basic question: “Did you vote for the merger, against the merger, or did you not vote at
all?” I summed those voting for or against the merger and code them as 1. I then coded
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those living in Jefferson County or Louisville in 2000 but who did not vote as 0. Those
who were ineligible to vote, meaning they reported living elsewhere in 2000, are coded as
“system missing.” This does miss those living in Jefferson County but otherwise
ineligible or unregistered to vote. According to these LMS questions, 59 percent of
adults living within Jefferson County reported voting in the 2000 merger referendum.
Second, from the same question, I establish whether a voter supported
consolidation. Of the 59 percent of eligible respondents reporting a vote, roughly 70
percent supported and 30 percent opposed consolidation. The actual referendum results
show that 54 percent of voters approved consolidation. As with most surveys, slightly
more respondents report voting than the amount actually turning-out; and more report
supporting the winning vote (in this case, consolidating the city and county).
Finally, I use the follow-up questions asked of all respondents, “regardless of
whether [one] voted,” to create a factor score of support for the merger and subsequent
merged government. The full question text of these six items is located in Appendix A.
In short, they ask whether one: is (1) better off since merger; (2) trusting of the merged
government; (3) convinced that merger benefits all residents; (4) convinced that the
merged government does not waste taxes; (5) convinced that the merged government’s
employees are honest; and (6) convinced that race relations have improved postconsolidation. All items load on a single factor. The eigenvalue is greater than 2.5 and
most factor loadings are high, although the questions on merger making one better off
and improving race relations load lower. The explained variance is slightly lower than 50
percent, but the index is acceptable for use. The results of the PCA are included in Table
3.5.

95

Table 3.5: Merger Index, LMS
Factor loadings
Merger made one better off

.431

Trust merged government

.768

Merger benefits all

.786

Merged government does not waste taxes

.683

Merged government's employees honest

.744

Race relations better post-consolidation

.414

Eigenvalue

2.584

Explained variance (%)

43.073

One further measure of support for the merged government is support for
Democratic Mayor Jerry Abramson, the former mayor of the City of Louisville,
champion of consolidation, and present mayor of Louisville Metro. Abramson, locally
labeled “mayor for life,” is so connected with the issue of consolidation that his own
approval rating should compare favorably with personal opinions of merger and the
merged government. However, this question was only asked of half of the sample (440
cases) and thus, if included in the PCA, would delete half of the LMS cases listwise from
the consolidation index. I analyze this item on its own as an alternative explanation of
consolidation position. This variable is measured on the same five-point scale as the
original Bush variable—asking whether one feels “very favorable, favorable, neutral,
negative, or very negative” towards Mayor Abramson. The scale is kept as a five-point
variable but flipped so higher responses capture positive views.
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Redistribution and Political Trust. The GSS asks several questions concerning
one’s beliefs about national spending priorities, two of which deal directly with federal
spending on redistribution to “big cities.” The pair of 2006 GSS questions labeled
“NATCITY” and “NATCITYY” has a subtle difference in question wording.
Respondents are first read the following statement: “We are faced with many problems in
this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I’m going to name
some of these problems, and for each one I’d like you to tell me whether you think we’re
spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount.” Then, 1467
interviewees responded to “spending on solving the problems of the big cities.”
Alternatively, 1530 responded to “spending on assistance to big cities.” These two
questions are part of a host of GSS items that are reworded slightly to examine the impact
of question wording on the answers respondents gave.
Given the slight difference in wording, I make use of both of these items
individually and then in a combined measure. A Chow test comparing regression
coefficients indicates whether the two samples belong together or are in fact too different
(Chow, 1960). It appears that respondents to the question worded “solving the problems”
were more likely to call for increased spending—48 percent for additional spending
versus 12 percent believing too much is spent; whereas respondents to the more general
term “assistance” are more likely to oppose additional spending—22 percent for
additional spending versus 36 percent believing too much is spent. It is not surprising
that the combined measure’s distribution lies somewhere in between. The coding is as
follows: (1) spending too much; (2) spending just right amount; and (3) spending too
little.
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The GSS asks several questions concerning political trust. I combine four
questions into an index using PCA. The results of the PCA are included in Table 3.6.
The index meets accepted standards—the Eigenvalue exceeds two, the variance exceeds
50 percent, and all four factor loadings exceed 0.5. The four items are whether: (1)
politicians treat people fairly; (2) treatment depends on who one knows; (3) politicians
are corrupt; and (4) government administrators are corrupt. An additional item, bribery
frequency, was removed from the PCA due to an extremely low factor loading (0.199).
The political trust questions were asked of a subsection of the GSS respondents.

Table 3.6: Political Trust Index, GSS
Factor loadings
Politicians treat people fairly

.518

Treatment depends on who one knows

.512

Politicians are corrupt

.865

Government administrators are corrupt

.865

Eigenvalue

2.027

Explained variance (%)
50.678
NOTE: Initial PCA included an additional item (bribery frequency) that
was removed from index due to a low factor loading (.199).
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Independent Variables
While also serving as dependent variables, religious identification and religiosity
are the key independent variables predicting political and moral attitudes and political
behavior. The following subsections describe the independent variables—both test
variables and controls.
Neighborhood-level Characteristics. I make use of a single neighborhood-level
independent variable—location—that takes two forms: distance to/from the central
business district (CBD) and concentric ring of residence. Distance from the CBD is a
standard explanatory variable in the urban subfields of economics, geography, and
sociology. This variable captures the distance from the downtown ZIP code (40202) or
census tract (004900) in miles. Distance to the CBD is calculated using MapQuest for
ZIP codes and, for census tracts, using the geographic coordinates of tract centroids
provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. Because Louisville is still a very monocentric city
with a single downtown and a relatively centralized housing market, this measure may be
of interest in predicting church locations (Ambrosius, Gilderbloom, and Hanka, 2010). I
also use tract location to assign a three-point ordinal measure of urban ring. My method
is discussed in detail below under the heading “Individual Socio-Demographic Controls.”
I include summary statistics for nonwhite percent, percentage of total residents
identifying as something other than “white only” on the 2000 Census, in the coming table
for reference even though race is not considered at the neighborhood level in further
analysis.
Religious Identification and Religiosity. The construction and measurement of
these variables are discussed above in the section on dependent variables.
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Political Ideology. This variable—level of conservatism—is also discussed
above.
Individual Socio-Demographic Controls. These control variables include sex,
race, age, educational attainment, annual income, employment status, marital status, and
dwelling type. All are available and are nearly identical in the LMS and GSS. Several of
these are measured as dummy variables with values of 1 for female, black, fulltime
employment, married, and single-family home residency. All other values are assigned 0.
Age is an interval level variable measured in years. Education (1-8) and income (1-9) are
ordinal-level variables capturing SES.
The LMS allows for further classification of respondents based on their place of
residency. While Jefferson County was once divided into city and county prior to
consolidation, a new residential classification scheme is being advocated by the elites of
Louisville Metro (Louisville-Jefferson County Metro, 2006). The post-consolidation
Comprehensive Housing Strategy attempts to divide the city-county into three concentric
rings of neighborhoods. These are demarcated by the area’s two beltways—the inner
beltway (I-264) known as the Watterson Expressway and the outer beltway (I-265)
named the Gene Snyder Expressway. The three rings are thus the areas (1) inside the
inner beltway; (2) between the two beltways; and (3) outside the outer beltway up to the
county line. The report states that these correspond to the “urban core and 1st suburban
ring”; “2nd suburban ring”; and “3rd suburban ring,” respectively (Louisville-Jefferson
County Metro, 2006, 7). I simply refer to these areas as (1) urban and original suburban;
(2) inner/older suburban; and (3) outer/newer suburban and rural. The inner-ring suburbs
contain 1950s suburbs, many with ranch houses, and numerous shopping complexes.
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The outer-ring includes new high-end subdivisions as well as preexisting family farms.
Outside the outer beltway could be described, to borrow Sharp and Clark’s (2008)
language, as the “rural-urban fringe” or where the “country and the concrete” meet.
I use the respondents ZIP codes to identify their ring of residence. In cases where
a ZIP code crosses a beltway, I assign it to the area containing the majority of the ZIP
code. Alternatively, LMS respondents may be coded with their distance from the CBD
given their ZIP codes. I use MapQuest to calculate the distance from each ZIP code to
the downtown ZIP code (40202).
The 2006 GSS lacks any indicator of urban, suburban, or rural residence except in
the past tense—an item called “RES16,” which asks “Which of the categories on this
card comes closest to the type of place you were living in when you were 16 years old?”
The responses include rural, farm, suburb, and various city sizes. In today’s economy,
there is no reason to expect that people currently live in the same setting in which they
were raised.

Descriptive Statistics
I include descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, and range) for all
variables in Tables 3.7 through 3.12. I divide them by type of variable (independent,
dependent); level of analysis (neighborhood, individual); and dataset, for the individuallevel variables (LMS, GSS). Table 3.7 contains the descriptive statistics for
neighborhood-level dependent variables. Table 3.8 includes the descriptive statistics for
individual-level dependent variables from the LMS. Table 3.9 consists of the descriptive
statistics for individual-level dependent variables from the GSS. Table 3.10 contains the
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descriptive statistics for neighborhood-level independent variables. Table 3.11 includes
the descriptive statistics for individual-level independent variables from the LMS.
Finally, Table 3.12 consists of the descriptive statistics for individual-level independent
variables from the GSS.
From a cursory analysis of the descriptive statistics, several initial findings are
evident. I separate these into descriptions of: (a) Louisville neighborhoods; and (b) a
comparison of Louisville (LMS) and the nation (GSS).
Neighborhoods. From Table 3.7, the average neighborhood (proxied by census
tract) contains approximately three churches while 23 neighborhoods have no churches
and five neighborhoods, all urban or black inner suburbs, have more than ten. The
neighborhood with the most churches, Russell (tract 002400), has 23. This together
seems to suggest that the church database is not lacking in African American churches, as
many scholars claim of the RCMS data (Finke and Scheitle, 2005). At a minimum, my
database certainly includes a multitude of churches in black neighborhoods. The average
neighborhood has one congregation per 1,000 inhabitants, although the top two
neighborhoods, again both black urban neighborhoods, have four and five. These
findings are consistent with the literature on black “religious districts,” which finds that
black neighborhoods are often “overchurched,” meaning they possess too many churches
given the local population and its available resources (McRoberts, 2003).
The average neighborhood contains nearly nine acres devoted to church use,
which accounts for approximately one percent of total land area. Three tracts contain
over fifty acres of religious land use, two of these exceeding 100 acres. One of these
tracts (010706) contains Southeast Christian Church’s campus, which itself covers 102
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Table 3.7: Descriptive Statistics for Neighborhood-level Dependent Variables
Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Number of churches (tract)

170

3.03

2.97

0

23

Number of churches (zip)

32

17.09

10.96

3

50

Churches per 1,000 persons (tract)

170

.82

.79

0

5.07

Churches per 1,000 persons (zip)

32

1.04

1.14

.27

6.49

Churches per sq. mi. (tract)

170

3.49

5.08

0

35.38

Churches per sq. mi. (zip)

32

2.82

3.30

.18

16

Percent of religious land use (tract)

170

.84

1.24

0

12.37

Percent of religious land use (zip)

32

.72

.78

.03

4.55

Neighborhood religiosity (zip)

32

2.39

.34

1.59

3.17

Neighborhood church attendance (zip)

32

3.24

.46

2.03

4.07

Persons per square mile (tract)

170

3,856

2,498

115

11,231

Persons per square mile (zip)

32

2,867

1,773

50

6,946
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Table 3.8: Descriptive Statistics for Individual-level Dependent Variables, LMS
Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Relgious Identification
Roman Catholic dummy

805

.24

-

0

1

Southern Baptist dummy

805

.19

-

0

1

Black Protestant dummy

805

.18

-

0

1

Other Protestant dummy

805

.13

-

0

1

Other Christian dummy

805

.10

-

0

1

Non-Christian dummy

805

.03

-

0

1

Unaffiliated dummy

805

.13

-

0

1

Religiosity Index

805

.00

1.00

-.2.94

1.36

Political Ideology
Conservatism

805

3.10

1.15

1

5

Political Identification
Support for Bush

440

2.63

1.32

1

5

440

.30

-

0

1

Homosexuality Opposition

805

3.19

1.41

1

5

Sex Education Opposition

382

.09

-

0

1

Adult Entertainment Opposition Index

805

.00

1.00

-2.17

1.22

City-County Consolidation
Vote? dummy

710

.59

-

0

1

Vote for? dummy

417

.71

-

0

1

Merger Support Index

709

.00

1.00

-2.14

2.09

440

3.56

1.06

1

5

Support for Bush dummy

Support for Abramson
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Table 3.9: Descriptive Statistics for Individual-level Dependent Variables, GSS
Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Relgious Identification
Roman Catholic dummy

4512

.27

-

0

1

Southern Baptist dummy

4512

.07

-

0

1

Black Protestant dummy

4512

.09

-

0

1

Other Protestant dummy

4512

.35

-

0

1

Other Christian dummy

4512

.02

-

0

1

Non-Christian dummy

4512

.04

-

0

1

Unaffiliated dummy

4512

.16

-

0

1

Religiosity Index

2996

.00

1.0

-2.25

1.68

Political Ideology
Conservatism

4483

3.13

1.25

1

5

Political Identification
Support for Bush dummy

4512

.43

-

0

1

Homosexuality Opposition

1999

3.45

1.81

1

5

Sex Education Opposition

1960

.11

-

0

1

Redistribution Support
Solve problems of big cities

1343

2.35

.70

1

3

Assistance to big cities

1349

1.86

.75

1

3

Combined problems/assistance

2692

2.10

.76

1

3

1410

.00

1.0

-2.28

3.21

Political Trust Index
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Table 3.10: Descriptive Statistics for Neighborhood-level Independent Variables
Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Distance to the CBD in miles (zip)

32

9.83

5.24

0

18.72

Distance to the CBD in miles (tract)

170

7.04

4.03

0

18.58

Percent of nonwhite persons (tract)

170

25.35

29.51

1.37

99.43
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Table 3.11: Descriptive Statistics for Individual-level Independent Variables, LMS
Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Relgious Identification
Roman Catholic dummy

805

.24

-

0

1

Southern Baptist dummy

805

.19

-

0

1

Black Protestant dummy

805

.18

-

0

1

Other Protestant dummy

805

.13

-

0

1

Other Christian dummy

805

.10

-

0

1

Non-Christian dummy

805

.03

-

0

1

Unaffiliated dummy

805

.13

-

0

1

Religiosity Index

805

.00

1.00

-.2.94

1.36

Political Ideology
Conservatism

805

3.10

1.15

1

5

Female dummy

805

.51

-

0

1

Black dummy

795

.21

-

0

1

Age in years

788

48.27

17.78

18

96

Education

805

4.22

1.80

1

8

Income

699

4.93

2.70

1

9

Employed fulltime dummy

805

.46

-

0

1

Married dummy

805

.46

-

0

1

House dummy

805

.75

-

0

1

Location
Distance to the CBD in miles

805

10.21

4.91

.00

23.85

Sex

Race
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Table 3.12: Descriptive Statistics for Individual-level Independent Variables, GSS
Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Relgious Identification
Roman Catholic dummy

4512

.27

-

0

1

Southern Baptist dummy

4512

.07

-

0

1

Black Protestant dummy

4512

.09

-

0

1

Other Protestant dummy

4512

.35

-

0

1

Other Christian dummy

4512

.02

-

0

1

Non-Christian dummy

4512

.04

-

0

1

Unaffiliated dummy

4512

.16

-

0

1

Religiosity Index

2996

.00

1.0

-2.25

1.68

Political Ideology
Conservatism

4483

3.13

1.25

1

5

Female dummy

4512

.54

-

0

1

Black dummy

4512

.13

-

0

1

Age in years

4496

45.34

16.55

18

89

Education

4512

4.08

1.845

1

8

Income

3806

5.46

2.69

1

9

Employed fulltime dummy

4512

.53

-

0

1

Married dummy

4512

.56

-

0

1

House dummy

4512

.72

-

0

1

Sex

Race
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acres and is compared to a “minitown” due to its variety of secular services (Brown,
2002). This results in over 12 percent of this tract given over to “religious” use, defined
by church ownership of the land. Questions of multiple uses present on church grounds
permeate the legal literature on megachurches (Evans-Cowley and Pearlman, 2008;
Galvin, 2006; Mertes, 2005). The other tract (010306), located in Northeast Jefferson
County, has four churches claiming twenty or more acres—although this amounts to less
than two percent of the tract’s land. The average lot size of the city’s seven
megachurches is 26 acres. The average tract has 3.5 churches per square mile, while
several urban tracts have church densities exceeding ten per square mile. Russell and a
diverse, historic neighborhood of Victorian homes near the University of Louisville (Old
Louisville, 005100) are the most-dense neighborhoods—with 28 and 35 churches per
square mile, respectively.
From Table 3.10, one can see that Louisville is still a very segregated city (also
see Cummings and Price, 1997; Hudson, 2004). Some urban census tracts are nearly 100
percent composed of African Americans, while the average tract has 25 percent and the
lowest tract has nearly none (just over one percent). The average neighborhood is seven
miles from the downtown while the farthest fringe communities are almost 20 miles out
from the CBD.
Comparison. Tables 3.8 and 3.11 report means for Louisville and Tables 3.9 and
3.12 report means for the nation from the GSS. In terms of religious identification,
Louisville contains more Southern Baptists (19 percent versus 7 percent) and Black
Protestants (18 percent versus 9 percent) than the nation as a whole—evidence of its
southern context and urban demographics. Despite its Roman Catholic heritage,
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Louisville contains slightly fewer Catholics than the nation (24 percent versus 27
percent). The same is true of the unaffiliated—13 percent of Louisville’s adult
population claims no affiliation while 16 percent of adults across the nation do the same.
This would seem to indicate that Louisville tends to be slightly more religious in its
identification than the nation due to its Bible belt location. I suggest that this difference
is even more pronounced because I think the LMS unaffiliated category is slightly
inflated by the inclusion of non-denominational evangelicals claiming Christianity is not
their “religion.” I explore Louisville’s religious landscape further in the following
chapter.
Politically, Louisville is slightly less conservative and less supportive of President
Bush than the nation. While Kentucky is a “red state,” Jefferson County is a “blue city.”
This is again demonstrated by slightly less opposition to homosexuality and sex
education in public schools in Louisville. Just shy of two-thirds of adult residents voted
in the 2000 city-county consolidation referendum with seven of ten casting their ballot in
support.
On the control variables, the GSS is slightly more female (54 percent versus 51
percent) and a little less African American (13 percent versus 21 percent) than the LMS.
The average age is also slightly older in the LMS than the GSS, although both are in the
mid-to-late 40s. The Louisville sample is a little more educated, on average, but averages
less income—an odd urban paradox. More of the national respondents are married and
employed full-time. Finally, a full three-quarters of the LMS respondents live in a house,
compared with 72 percent in the national sample. This is a bit unusual for an urban area
but reflective of Louisville’s distinctive architecture. The city consists largely of small
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“shotgun” houses for those with minimal income and larger Victorian homes in historic
neighborhoods. The suburban areas feature mid-sized ranch homes, larger, newly-built
development homes, and original farm houses.

Statistical Methods
This study uses both descriptive and inferential statistical techniques to address
the research questions. I first calculate basic univariate descriptive statistics and examine
differences of means. I ultimately make use of multivariate modeling techniques
including linear regression, or ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, and binary
logistic regression, or logit regression. Before addressing the individual research
questions, I describe the two regression approaches. The following sections then describe
the models constructed to answer each respective research question.
Linear Regression. The purpose of linear regression is to find a linear
relationship between a dependent variable and one or more explanatory variables. The
multiple linear regression (MLR) equation, in simple matrix form, is as follows:
y = Xβ + ε,
where y is the dependent variable, X is a vector of independent variables, and ε is the
error term, which captures the effects of all omitted variables.
Various procedures have been developed for parameter estimation and inference
in linear regression. The simplest and most common is ordinary least squares (OLS),
which estimates β by minimizing the sum of squared prediction errors, also known as
residuals. Despite the relative simplicity of a linear regression model estimated by OLS,
many scholars, particularly political scientists, still rely solely on or begin their analyses
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with OLS regression (Krueger and Lewis-Beck, 2008). Krueger and Lewis-Beck (2008,
4) write that OLS “remains the principal multivariate technique in use by researchers
publishing in our best [political science] journals.” OLS regression analysis is based on
several assumptions that can be referenced in any statistics text (see Berry, 1993 for a
concise discussion).
Logistic Regression. The Binary Logistic Regression Model (BLRM) is an
appropriate model if the dependent variable is dichotomous, reflecting whether an event
occurs or does not occur (Pampel, 2000). The BLRM thus estimates the probability of an
event occurring. The linear probability model (LPM), performing OLS with a binary
dependent variable, has several problems (Johnson, Joslyn, and Reynolds, 2001). For
one, it generates nonsensical predicted y-values (i.e., probabilities) that are negative or
greater than one at extreme values of the independent variable. In addition the LPM is an
inappropriate functional form because Xs may have diminishing returns as the predicted
probability nears 0 or 1 (i.e., taking the form of an S-shaped curve). The LPM generates
heteroscedastic errors and thus biased standard errors and tests of significance (t)—in
other words, the model predicts better near probabilities of 0 and 1. Finally, the LPM
also results in non-normally distributed errors, which can lead to biased standard errors.
There are two assumptions for the BLRM: (1) cases must be independent and (2) the
model must be correctly specified, without omitted variable bias. The multivariate
BLRM model, simplified, is written:
Prob(event) = 1/(1 + e–Z),
where Z is the regression equation, β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + . . . βkXk; k is the total number of
independent variables in the model; and e (~=2.7818) is the base of the natural logarithm.
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Prob(event) is the probability that the event will occur. BLRM uses a Maximum
Likelihood (ML) algorithm to arrive at a solution.
Specific Models. I initially examine descriptive statistics on Louisville’s religious
past using available data from 1906 to 2000. Using the LMS and church location data, I
divide the city into three rings and compare: means on church attendance and religiosity;
proportions of the four highlighted religious traditions; and the number of churches,
churches per capita, church density, and religious land usage. I construct a bivariate
linear regression model to calculate a “density gradient” for churches—that is, the
percent churches decline with each additional mile from the city center (see Clark, 1951
for population equivalent). I create several map figures using Arc-GIS to better illustrate
the distribution of religion across Louisville Metro.
I construct individual-level MLR models predicting religiosity in Louisville
(LMS) and the nation (GSS). I compare significant variables and coefficients across the
two models. I specify regression models from the LMS and GSS for each of the four
political variables. I use MLR to compare Louisville to the nation on political
conservatism and attitudes on the morality of homosexuality. I again compare significant
variables and coefficients. I use BLRM to compare Louisville and the nation on support
for President Bush and sex education in public schools. I compare significant variables
and predicted probabilities. The key independent variables in all of the models are
religiosity and religious identification. To test for religious differences on another key
local moral issue, that has no GSS counterpart, I specify a MLR model to predict
attitudes on adult entertainment. I use BLRM to calculate probabilities of voting in the
consolidation referendum and voting in favor of merger. Furthermore, I construct MLR
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models predicting the merger index and favorability towards Abramson. I use MLR to
predict attitudes towards national urban policy and political trust from the GSS.
Since the GSS redistribution question was worded differently when asked of two
subsections of the sample, I conduct a Chow test. A Chow test assesses whether
regression coefficients are equal across two subsamples (Chow, 1960). If respondents
can be divided into two distinct samples, one can write:
y = Xβ1 + ε;
y = Xβ2 + ε,
where y is the dependent variable, X is a vector of independent variables, ε is the error
term, and β1 and β2 are parameters to be estimated for each subsample. The null
hypothesis to test is:
H0: β1 = β2
The Chow test statistic is calculated as follows:
F = [ESSc – (ESS1 + ESS2)]/k
____________________
(ESS1 + ESS2)/(n – 2k),
where F is the test statistic, ESSc is the error sum of squares for the combined model,
ESS1 is the error sum of squares for the first subsample, ESS2 is the error sum of squares
for the second subsample, k is the number of estimated parameters, and n is the total
sample size. The resulting test statistic is distributed F(k, n–2k).
If I reject the null of equal coefficients, then the two samples are distinct and
cannot be combined. If I do not reject the null, the responses are similar enough to
combine the sample into one and perform MLR predicting the combined variable.
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Conclusion
This chapter covered in detail the data and methodology of this study. The
remaining chapters present the findings, organized into three chapters on “congregants,
culture, and consolidation,” respectively; and finally the implications for research,
religion, and politics/policy.
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CHAPTER IV
LOUISVILLE’S RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE
Introduction: Religious Congregations in Louisville
Louisville’s present and future lie in its past. This is true of Louisville’s
demographics, politics, economics, and social relations. It is also true of its religious
ecology. For over two hundred years, the people of Louisville—whites, free blacks and
enslaved blacks—have flocked to their chosen houses of worship, whether Protestant,
Catholic or Jewish. This rich religious heritage still exists today and is as important to
Louisville’s society as ever. This short review emphasizes Louisville’s three largest
religious traditions—Roman Catholics, Baptists (and their Stone-Campbell breakaway
group), and Black Protestants—which together have historically (and presently)
dominated the religious scene.
Louisville’s first church, under the supervision of the Episcopalians, was built in
1803, twenty-five years after the area’s first settlement at the Falls of the Ohio
(Wickendon, 1921). The second church constructed in 1811 was the first Catholic church
in Louisville (Ibid). A French Priest was active in Louisville as early as 1794, while the
first sermon in the area may have been preached by Baptist Squire Boone, brother to the
famous frontiersman and folk hero Daniel Boone (Ibid). Early on, Baptist, Catholic, and
black congregations succeeded at demonstrating their presence in Louisville, alongside
several other Protestant denominations (Episcopalian, Methodist, Presbyterian).
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The Catholic Church established the Diocese of Kentucky in 1808 (Wickendon,
1921). The first Catholic church in Louisville was built on Main St. in 1811 (Ibid).
Originally, the Diocese was centered south of Louisville in nearby Bardstown but moved
to Louisville in 1841 because the local Bishop “found that Bardstown was not gaining in
importance” (Ibid, 12). Early Catholic congregations founded in Louisville catered to
particular ethnicities such as Germans (St. Boniface, 1836) and the French (Notre Dame
de Port, or the Church of Our Lady in Portland, 1841). Wickendon (1921) documents a
variety of Catholic contributions to education and social services in Louisville, including
the creation of hospitals and orphanages. Catholic schools still have a particularly strong
presence in modern-day Louisville.
Baptists, and the splinter movement including Christian Churches and the
Disciples of Christ, also made an early impression on Louisville. The first Baptist
congregation in Jefferson County was the Baptist Church of Beargrass founded in 1784
near the Shelbyville Pike (Wickendon, 1921). In 1803, Kentucky’s Baptists founded the
Long Run Baptist Association covering Jefferson as well as neighboring Shelby, Spencer,
Bullitt, and part of Hardin counties (Ibid). Wickendon (1921, 16) cautions that, in
traditional Baptist fashion, “This association was merely a gathering for consultation and
advice.” Hudson (1998, 45) labels Long Run “a rather loose association of Baptist
churches in the [Louisville] region.” The First Baptist Church of Louisville was
established in 1815, which later split into other white Baptist, black Baptist, and Christian
Church congregations (Wickendon, 1921).
Wickendon (1921, 21) writes that while “The Baptists of Louisville [are] now
very powerful in the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC), [they] had no part in its
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organization, which occurred in 1845 in Augusta, Georgia.” The conventions’ creation
was a protest against the American Baptist Home Mission Society’s refusal to allow a
slave-holder’s participation in missions (Ibid). Foreshadowing events to come, the
Charleston Mercury newspaper wrote, “When we are forced out of the church by the
Northern fanatics we shall next be forced out of the Union by the same nefarious arts”
(quoted in Wickendon, 1921). A month after its creation, Kentucky’s Baptist churches
renounced the northern Baptists and pledged their allegiance to the SBC. Louisville
gained its prominence in the convention when the Southern Baptist Theological
Seminary, founded in 1859 under the pro-slavery leadership of James P. Boyce, moved
from Greenville, South Carolina to Louisville in 1877 (Ibid). In 1921, the President of
the seminary, Dr. E. Y. Mullins, ascended to the presidency of the SBC, forever
cementing Louisville’s prominence in the convention (Ibid).
The Disciples of Christ were founded in 1810 by Alexander Campbell and his
father Thomas in Pennsylvania, breaking ties with the Baptist church according to
Wickendon (1921). The Campbell’s later merged with former Presbyterian minister
Barton Stone, a Kentuckian who began the Christian Church, in 1832 (Davis, 1915).
Together, these churches are known as the Stone-Campbell or Restoration movement—
united around common ideals of restoring the early church’s emphasis on regular
communion and the necessity of baptism of believing adults by immersion, apart from
denominational division and creeds (Ibid). Alexander Campbell visited Louisville in
1824, delivering a passionate speech, and by 1825 various Louisville Baptists followed
his lead by “break[ing] the loaf every Lord’s Day and…attend[ing] regularly to the
contribution for the poor” (Wickendon, 1921, 52-53).
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Today, the Christian Church and Southern Baptists have much in common—
religiously, socially, and politically—particularly in Louisville. Alexander Campbell
(1970, xv) penned a work titled The Christian System, which refers to Christianity as a
“system” likened to the human body or universe, for the purpose of “communicating a
correct knowledge of the Christian Institution.” Campbell (Ibid, vii) praises Luther’s
“effort to dethrone the Man of Sin,” in reference to the Roman Catholic Pope, but equally
condemns the various “Protestant Popes, who gradually assimilated the new church to the
old.” According to White (1972, 102), the Disciples of Christ denomination sprung from
this tradition has “retained sufficient emphasis on local autonomy to prevent them from
developing a genuine formal structure.” Today, the Christian Church is undoubtedly the
second largest mostly white Protestant presence in Louisville—with over 80
congregations and tens of thousands of adherents, largely due to Louisville’s largest
congregation, Southeast Christian Church. With the conservative turn in the SBC, the
two groups share many mutual interests, such as emphasis on congregational polity,
baptism by immersion following a confession of faith, and Biblical primacy/inerrancy.
Southeast Christian Church began in 1962 with 77 charter members, originally
meeting in a basement and then elementary school (Southeast Christian Church, 2007).
The church outgrew two other buildings, officially growing to megachurch size in 1985
and first achieving “Gigachurch” attendance, exceeding 10,000 average weekly
attendees, in 1990 (Ibid; Southeast Outlook, 2008). In 2007, Southeast ranked sixth
nationally in size and seventeenth in reputation (Outreach Magazine, 2007; Church
Report, 2007). The church calls an over one-hundred acre campus home, complete with
several structures, a 9,000 seat sanctuary, a full-service café, Christian bookstore, and a
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50,000 square-foot exercise facility, among countless other congregational amenities
(Brown, 2002). The church even produces an Easter Pageant that rivals Broadway and
Hollywood (Smith, 2008). One of the other four majority white megachurches is a
Christian Church, two are Southern Baptist, and one is Pentecostal (Assembly of God).
The two remaining megachurches are associated with the black Baptist tradition.
Black Protestantism has always been strong in Louisville, even in the days of slavery. In
the early and mid-1800s, blacks were forced to choose between “either their master’s
church, a separate African American branch of their master’s church (i.e., separate but
not independent), the ‘invisible institution’ of slave religion, or little or no religion at all”
(Hudson, 1998, 44). Early denominations seeking to evangelize the black population of
America included the Baptists and Methodists (Kolchin, 1993; Lincoln and Mamiya,
1990; Raboteau, 1978). Eventually, black Baptists and black Methodists successfully
founded their own independent denominations—such as the African Methodist Episcopal
church, founded in 1816 by Richard Allen (Lincoln and Mamiya, 1990). Today, black
Protestantism is the third largest tradition in Louisville following Roman Catholicism and
the Southern Baptist Convention (Jones, et al., 2002; Department of Sociology, 2006).
During the early 1920s, University of Louisville graduate student Homer E.
Wickendon (1921) wrote that there were 269 churches in the city, including 38 Catholic
(two of which were black), 72 Baptist (including 40 black), 14 Episcopal (one black), and
16 Christian Churches (three black). Wickendon tracked the number of congregations in
Louisville from 1800 to 1920, providing a count for every ten years. There existed only a
handful of churches prior to the 1830s with the population of congregations at
approximately 60 by the Civil War. In 1860, there were eight independent African
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American churches in Louisville (Hudson, 1998). In the two decades following the war,
the number of Louisville churches more than doubled to over 120. This count again
doubled between 1880 and 1920. While this rate of increase slowed during the twentieth
century, the total exceeded 500 congregations by 1980 (Jones, et al., 2002).
Figure 4.1 features the approximate locations of the over 500 Christian
congregations in Louisville today. Churches are distributed randomly within the census
tracts that house them. Each dot represents a single church. One can see that the census
tracts located immediately adjacent to the downtown, particularly in the African
American dominated west end, feature the highest density of church buildings. As one
moves farther out to the more sparsely populated fringe, churches thin out.

Religious Identification in Louisville
Table 4.1 reports Census data on religious adherents in the City of Louisville from
1906 to 1936. Approximately two-thirds of the population was religiously affiliated over
this thirty-year period. Catholics composed forty percent of the population around the
turn of the century but dropped to just under one-quarter from 1916 to 1936. This large
presence of Catholics distinguishes Kentucky from other parts of the South—and is due
to northern Kentucky’s location at the base of the “German Triangle,” with points in
nearby Cincinnati, Ohio; St. Louis, Missouri; and Milwaukee, Wisconsin (Ownby, 2005).
A geographic analysis of the dominant religious traditions in U.S. counties finds that
Louisville is the boundary between Southern Baptist territory, stretching north from the
Gulf of Mexico, and German Catholic territory coming down from the central Midwest
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(Jones, et al., 2002). Around one-third of the early-1900s population held a non-Catholic,
primarily Protestant, affiliation.

122

Table 4.1: Louisville Religious Adherents, 1906-1936 (Percent of Population)
Year

1906

1916

1926

1936

Religiously affiliated

68.7

56.5

62.4

59.3

Religiously unaffiliated

31.3

43.5

37.6

40.7

Roman Catholic affiliation

39.7

23.3

23.9

24.1

Non-Catholic affiliation

29.0

33.2

38.6

35.3

229,410

271,318

313,411

Population Estimate
214,330
Source: Stark and Bainbridge (1996)

Table 4.2 features data on religious adherence in Jefferson County, Kentucky—
now consolidated Louisville Metro—covering the latter half of the twentieth century.
Catholics have remained at around one-quarter of the population from the 1950s to the
present. Southern Baptists are consistently about one-sixth (16-17 percent) of Jefferson
County’s population. Southern Baptists compose about one-third of religious adherents
in the Kentucky-Tennessee region, more so than even other parts of the South (Ownby,
2005). Other Protestants appear to grow from the 1970s to 1990 and then decline sharply
prior to 2000. The RCMS data is reliable when one compares within a tradition—so long
as a denomination does not alter the way it counts members—but amorphous categories
like “Protestants” may shift over time due to the inclusion of different denominations
with each iteration of the RCMS. Furthermore, the population not counted in 1990
amounted to one-third while nearly half are uncounted in 2000. While this may be seen
as a decline in religious adherence, it is just as likely that several denominations ceased
reporting membership data to the RCMS study team or it may reflect increasing
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Table 4.2: Louisville-Jefferson County Religious Adherents, 1952-2000 (Percent of Population)
Year

1952

1971

1980

1990

2000

Southern Baptist

13.8

16.8

17.0

17.1

15.6

Other Protestant

15.8

14.6

19.2

26.0

14.1

Total Protestant

29.6

31.4

36.2

43.1

29.7

Roman Catholic

25.8

22.5

24.0

23.5

22.6

Population Not Counted
Source: Jones, et al., 2002

42.8

45.9

39.1

32.1

45.4

identification with non-denominational congregations, which the RCMS does not reliably
count.
To establish the reliability of the 2006 LMS data on religious identification, I
compare the proportions responding with each religious denomination to the 2000 RCMS
and the 2000 LMS, which also asked a simplified religious preference question. The
comparison is contained in Table 4.3. The numbers for the major traditions—Catholics
and Southern Baptists—are similar across the data sources, again reflecting
approximately one-quarter and one-sixth, respectively, of the total population of Jefferson
County. A discrepancy does exist when one tallies total Protestants. While the 2000
RCMS reports only 30 percent Protestant, the 2000 and 2006 LMS datasets report nearly
half and over half, respectively. This is easily resolved because the RCMS underreports
Protestants due to not counting most African American and independent Protestants. The
religious preference question asked in the 2006 LMS included more categories, including
several ambiguous ones, which make comparison with the 2000 LMS difficult. While
certainly an improvement over the simplistic 2000 response categories, the 2006 LMS
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added open-ended categories which capture disparate denominations and neglected to
include specific non-Christian religious categories like Judaism.

Table 4.3: Comparison of 2000 RCMS and 2000/2006 LMS Estimates of Religious Adherence
Dataset
Year

RCMS
2000

LMS
2000 (Unweighted)

LMS
2006 (Weighted)

Southern Baptist

15.6

-

18.5

Black Protestant

-

-

18.0

Other Protestant

14.1

-

13.0

Other Christian

-

-

10.4

Total Protestant

29.7

44.6

59.9

Roman Catholic

22.6

26.1

23.6

Other Non-Christian

2.0

-

3.3

Jewish

-

0.7

-

Other

-

21.8

-

45.4

-

-

-

6.9

13.2

Evangelical Protestant

21.6

-

-

Mainline Protestant

8.5

-

-

Population Not Counted
Unaffiliated/None

Table 4.4 compares the presence of religious traditions in Louisville with the
nation using 2006 LMS and GSS data. Louisville has comparable proportions of Roman
Catholics, non-Christian religious traditions, and the religiously unaffiliated. The nonCatholic Christian population is slightly higher in Louisville due to elevated evangelical
Protestant proportions. Since the LMS does not ask an evangelical identification
question, I compare Southern Baptists and other Protestants/Christians. Louisville has
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over twice the proportion of Southern Baptists as the nation. The percentage of other
Protestants and Christians in Louisville is only about two-thirds as much as their
representation in the nation as a whole. In addition, Louisville has twice as many Black
Protestants when compared with their proportion in the national population.

Table 4.4: Comparison of Louisville's Major Traditions with the Nation (% of pop)
Louisville

Nation

Roman Catholic

24%

27%

Southern Baptist

19%

7%

Black Protestant

18%

9%

Other Protestant/Christian

23%

37%

Total Non-Catholic Christian

60%

53%

Non-Christian

3%

4%

Unaffiliated

13%

16%

Source: LMS and GSS (both 2006)

Louisville’s Religious Urban Ecology
Table 4.5 captures the religious ecology across the three rings of Louisville
Metro—urban, within the inner beltway; inner suburban, between the inner and outer
beltways; and outer suburban, beyond the outer beltway. While neighborhoods in urban
Louisville average over one church per 1,000 residents, this number falls to 0.6 in the
older suburbs and rebounds slightly to nearly 0.8 in the newer fringe suburbs. Church
density—churches per square mile—declines tenfold with distance from the center,
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dropping from an average of 6.2 in the urban core to 0.62 at the county’s edge. Figure
4.2 illustrates this decline in church density by mapping churches per square mile for
each census tract. The densest neighborhoods are located within the inner beltway, while
the communities outside the outer beltway are all within the lowest category. While there
may be less church structures per square mile, church campus size grows with distance
from the central city. Urban churches average just over one acre while inner and outer
suburban churches tend to each cover about five acres. Churches are less frequent sights
at the fringe but, when seen, are likely to cover more ground or hold more land.

Table 4.5: Comparison of Congregational and Individual Religious Variables' Means by Urban Ring
Ring

Urban

Inner Suburban

Outer Suburban

Number of churches

3.51

2.58

3.35

Churches per 1,000 persons

1.10

0.61

0.76

Churches per sq. mi.

6.22

1.88

0.62

Percent of religious land use (% of acreage)

0.73

1.00

0.50

Average church campus size (acres)

1.27

4.88

5.14

Religiosity

-0.10

0.10

-0.02

Church attendance

3.19

3.24

3.23

Southern Baptist (% of pop)

14.9

21.7

18.4

Roman Catholic (% of pop)

18.1

27.7

24.6

Black Protestant (% of pop)

31.0

14.8

5.3

Other Protestant (% of pop)

9.3

13.5

17.4

Other Christian (% of pop)

6.0

9.4

17.9

Other Non-Christian (% of pop)

5.0

1.3

4.3

Unaffiliated (% of pop)

15.7

11.6

12.1
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Table 4.5 also presents individual level data on affiliation and religiosity in
Louisville from the 2006 LMS. Both Catholics and Southern Baptists are most-highly
represented in the inner-suburbs, claiming respective 22 and 28 percents of the
population here. As a percentage of total population, they both claim higher proportions
in the outer suburbs than the urban core. Interestingly, if one calculates the share of each
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tradition residing within each ring (not shown in Table 4.5), the distributions are nearly
identical. Forty-six percent of both traditions live in the inner suburbs while the
remainder of each is divided between the urban area and the outer suburbs, each claiming
between 26-28 percent of each tradition. Figure 4.3 highlights the residential
distributions of both Southern Baptists and Catholics. This visual representation
confirms that while both traditions are concentrated in the inner suburbs, they each spread
proportionally over most of the county’s land area.
Black Protestants are concentrated in the inner-city while other Protestants and
other Christians make up higher proportions of the two suburban rings. Non-Christians
make up nearly five percent each in the urban and outer suburban rings, while only
accounting for one percent in the inner suburbs. While highest in the central city, the
religiously unaffiliated account for a steady 10-15 percent of the population per ring.
Average religiosity, based on the factor score index, peaks in the inner suburbs
and is lowest in the urban core—perhaps supporting a “backward bending” relationship
like that found by Azzi and Ehrenberg’s (1975) analysis of religiosity and income.
Average church attendance, one component of the religiosity index, is statistically
identical across all three rings—with all three average scores corresponding to attendance
just over once per month.
Figure 4.4 maps the mean religiosity score for each ZIP code. The urban core
boasts some of the highest scores in the African American west end, while the more
affluent east end drags the urban average down with the lowest religiosity in the entire
county. Other African American and inner suburban ZIP codes are also highly religious.
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The bulk of the eastern and southern portions of the county are mildly religious, with the
eastern portion demonstrating greater religiosity levels than the bulk of the southern
county.
Table 4.6 reports the results of four bivariate linear regression models calculating
density gradients for population and churches, each by census tract and ZIP code. The
coefficients on distance from the CBD are the rates at which population or churches
decline with each additional mile from the city center (Clark, 1951). The results show
that the population is more sprawled than the houses of worship. More specifically,
churches per square mile decline more sharply with distance from the city center than the
population per square mile. Results are consistent whether one employs census tracts or
ZIP codes, although the ZIP code models each boast a higher adjusted R-Square statistic.

Table 4.6: Population and Congregation Density Gradients by Tract and Zip

Constant

Coefficient on
Distance from CBD

Adj. R-Square

LN(persons per sq. mi., tract)

9.008

-0.142

0.437

LN(persons per sq. mi., zip)

8.983

-0.134

0.500

LN(churches per sq. mi., tract)

2.209

-0.208

0.518

Dependent Variable

LN(churches per sq. mi., zip)
2.146
-0.167
0.674
NOTES: Constants and coefficients are all significant at .001 level; Constants are predicted values of
LN(density) at the CBD; Coefficients are the rates at which density declines with distance from CBD

Religiosity in Louisville and the Nation
Tables 4.7/8 and 4.9/10 present the findings of OLS regression models predicting
the individual religiosity index using 2006 data for Louisville (LMS) and the nation
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(GSS), respectively. Model 1 in Table 4.7 is equivalent to the lone model in Table 4.9.
The findings on almost all independent variables’ effects are nearly identical. Age,
political conservatism, and the female, black, married, and house dummy variables are all
statistically significant and positive with similar magnitudes. Income and the fulltime
employment dummy are not significant in either model. One difference between the two
models is the effect of education. While not significant in the LMS model, education is
significant and positive in the GSS model. Both models explain near one-fifth of the
variation in religiosity.
Model 2 in Table 4.7 includes an additional variable unique to the local dataset—
miles from the CBD—which is not present in the GSS. While distance from the CBD is
significant and positive, signifying an increase in religiosity with distance from the city
center, it does little to alter the model—all other variables’ effects maintain significance
and remain similar in magnitude and the adjusted R-Square increases by a mere 0.005.
Tables 4.8 and 4.10 compare local and national models including religious
tradition dummy variables and excluding the black dummy variable due to excessive
multicollinearity with black Protestant. The most significant finding from these tables is
that while Southern Baptists are more religious than Catholics in the nation, there is no
significant difference in religiosity between them in Louisville. The inclusion of
religious tradition dummies in the models predicting religiosity raises the adjusted RSquares above 0.4 in both the local and national models.
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Table 4.7: Predicting Individual Religiosity in Louisville (LMS)
Model 1

Model 2

Unstandardized
Coefficient

Standard
Error

Standardized
Coefficient

-1.744***

.189

-

-1.863***

.195

-

Female

.502***

.072

.244

.492***

.072

.240

Black

.632***

.091

.249

.677***

.093

.266

Age

.013***

.002

.218

.013***

.002

.214

Education

-.001

.023

-.002

.004

.023

.007

Income

.000

.018

-.001

-.007

.018

-.019

Fulltime

-.046

.080

-.022

-.051

.080

-.025

Married

.319***

.080

.155

.313***

.080

.152

House

.164‡

.087

.070

.151‡

.087

.064

.161***

.030

.183

.150***

.030

.171

-

-

-

.018*

.008

.086

Independent Variable
(Constant)

Conservatism
Distance to CBD

Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Coefficient
Error
Coefficient

F

22.677***

21.102***

Adj. R-Square

.223

.228

N
681
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. ***p<0.001.

681
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Table 4.8: Predicting Individual Religiosity in Louisville (LMS), Contd.

Independent Variable
(Constant)

Model 3

Model 4

Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Coefficient
Error
Coefficient

Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Coefficient
Error
Coefficient

-1.081***

.181

-

-.940***

.175

-

Female

.354***

.063

.173

.354***

.063

.173

Age

.010***

.002

.166

.010***

.002

.166

Education

.008

.020

.014

.008

.020

.014

Income

-.014

.015

-.038

-.014

.015

-.038

Fulltime

.077

.071

.038

.077

.071

.038

Married

.259***

.070

.126

.259***

.070

.126

House

-.014

.076

-.006

-.014

.076

-.006

.109***

.026

.125

.109***

.026

.125

So. Baptist

.142

.094

.054

-

-

-

Black Prot.

.506***

.099

.188

.365***

.103

.135

-

-

-

-.142

.094

-.059

Other Prot.

.106

.106

.034

-.036

.114

-.012

Other Christ.

.240*

.114

.070

.099

.120

.029

Non-Christ.

-.424*

.170

-.078

-.565**

.174

-.104

Unaffiliated

-1.282***

.109

-.420

-1.424***

.113

-.466

Conservatism

Catholic

F

34.538***

34.538***

Adj. R-Square

.406

.406

N
689
689
NOTE: *p<0.05. **p<.01. ***p<0.001. Model 3 reference category is Roman Catholic. Model 4 reference
category is Southern Baptist. Black is excluded due to multicollinearity with Black Protestant.
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Table 4.9: Predicting Individual Religiosity in the Nation (GSS)
Model 1
Unstandardized
Coefficient

Standard
Error

Standardized
Coefficient

-1.390***

.090

-

Female

.370***

.037

.187

Black

.656***

.057

.213

Age

.005***

.001

.086

Education

.023*

.011

.044

Income

-.007

.008

-.018

Fulltime

-.059

.039

-.030

Married

.224***

.040

.113

House

.147**

.043

.067

Conservatism

.196***

.014

.254

Independent Variable
(Constant)

F

59.845***

Adj. R-Square

.173

N
2525
NOTE: *p<0.05. **p<0.01. ***p<0.001.
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Table 4.10: Predicting Individual Religiosity in the Nation (GSS), Contd.

Independent Variable

Model 2

Model 3

Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Coefficient
Error
Coefficient

Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Coefficient
Error
Coefficient

(Constant)

-.703***

.079

-

-.322**

.095

-

Female

.248***

.031

.125

.248***

.031

.125

.002‡

.001

.028

.002‡

.001

.028

Education

.041***

.009

.076

.041***

.009

.076

Income

-.017*

.007

-.046

-.017*

.007

-.046

Fulltime

-.063‡

.033

-.032

-.063‡

.033

-.032

Married

.147***

.033

.074

.147***

.033

.074

House

.081*

.035

.037

.081*

.035

.037

Conservatism

.114***

.012

.147

.114***

.012

.147

So. Baptist

.381***

.064

.096

-

-

-

Black Prot.

.682***

.061

.185

.301***

.079

.082

-

-

-

-.381***

.064

-.172

.192***

.038

.094

-.189**

.063

-.092

Other Christ.

.146

.105

.021

-.235*

.116

-.035

Non-Christ.

-.056

.077

-.012

-.437***

.093

-.090

Unaffiliated

-1.287***

.048

-.476

-1.668***

.070

-.617

Age

Catholic
Other Prot.

F

139.722***

139.722***

Adj. R-Square

.435

.435

N
2525
2525
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. **p<.01. ***p<0.001. Model 3 reference category is Roman Catholic. Model 4
reference category is Southern Baptist. Black is excluded due to multicollinearity with Black Protestant.
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Summary and Discussion
Louisville’s religious ecology is largely composed of Roman Catholics,
representing a quarter of total persons, and Southern Baptists, composing one-sixth of the
population. These proportions have remained remarkably consistent throughout the
twentieth century. While the Catholic figure is similar to the percentage in the nation,
Louisville contains over twice the Southern Baptists as the national norm. This is a
product of the evangelical religious subculture of the South, which contrasts with larger
numbers of mainline Protestants in other regions of the country. This is the major
difference between Louisville and the nation. To establish the exact differences, better
data must be collected that captures the full range of Protestant traditions in Louisville—
including mainline, evangelical, Pentecostal, black, and independent/nondenominational.
Current data sources either exclude certain denominations/traditions or fail to
differentiate among the major traditions within Protestant Christianity.
Turning to the examination of religious geography in Louisville, I find that
religiosity generally increases with distance from the city center—although the inner
suburbs exhibit greater religiosity than the outer suburbs. This is confirmed by the
finding that both Catholics and Southern Baptists appear to dominate this middle zone of
the city-county more so than the center or fringe. Church attendance is generally low
across all three regions—corresponding to an average attendance at just over once per
month. This is, though, higher than the national average, which is less than once per
month and thus consistent with the Bible belt image and evangelical emphasis on
religious participation. Church facilities, while more centralized than the population as a
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whole, are larger in the outer suburbs due to the availability of land. This is consistent
with the conventional wisdom on megachurch locational decisions.
Predictive models of religiosity in Louisville and the nation are largely
comparable—with similar directions and magnitudes of variables’ effects and analogous
R-Squares, which describe the amount of variation in religiosity explained by the models.
The adjusted R-Square statistics are each around one-fifth in the original models, but
catapult to over two-fifths when religious tradition is included as a predictor. It seems
that despite some differences in affiliation and religious culture, Louisville’s population
exhibits similar patterns as the nation as a whole. One interesting finding is that while
Southern Baptists are more religious than Catholics in the nation, in terms of the
religiosity index, there is no difference between them in Louisville once one accounts for
other socio-demographic factors. This seems to suggest that Louisville’s Catholics are
more traditional, or at least more dedicated to their faith than Catholics nationwide. This
is again consistent with the picture of Louisville as more faithful than the country as a
whole, despite the influences of seemingly unconventional urban culture.
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CHAPTER V
CULTURE WAR IN LOUISVILLE AND THE NATION
Introduction: Culture War in Louisville
Culture war is a concept introduced (or at least popularized) by James Davison
Hunter (1991) in his book by the same name. In writing his book, Hunter (1991, 34)
argues that “America is in the midst of a culture war that has had and will continue to
have reverberations not only within public policy but within the lives of ordinary
Americans everywhere.” Religion plays a central role in this conflict—pitting “Christian
fundamentalists, Orthodox Jews, and conservative Catholics…against their progressive
counterparts for control of American secular culture” (Hunter, 1991, back cover).
Religion influences public debate in the southern states more so than any other U.S.
region, an area dominated religiously and often politically by evangelical Protestants—
referred to as the “Southern Religious Establishment” (Wilson and Silk, 2005).
The culture wars came to a head nationally during the 2000 and 2004 presidential
elections and the resulting two administrations of President George W. Bush. The media
harped on issues separating cultural conservatives from their progressive opponents.
Religious actors, particularly evangelical Protestants and other brands of the conservative
faithful, were ever-present in the discussion of elections, politics, and policymaking.
While the national scene is often emphasized in media accounts, one cannot lose sight of
the fact that many, if not most, culture war battles take place at the local level (see for
examples, Deckman, 2004; Djupe and Olson, 2007; Sharp, 1999; 2004; 2005). Like
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other U.S. communities, Louisville faces numerous local political issues where religion is
certain to influence the debate. These include moral arguments over homosexuality and
gay rights, sex education in public schools, and pornography and adult entertainment.
Louisville presents a particularly interesting case study of all three issue areas.
Gay rights are a very important issue facing Louisville. From 2000-2006, the six
years prior to the Louisville Metro Survey, Louisville experienced the highest percentage
increase in unmarried same-sex households in the U.S., a recognized proxy for gay
couples (Brown 2007; Gates 2007; see Florida, 2005, 94). While once discrete and
hidden, Louisville’s gay community has emerged to take an active role in the community
since the 1970s (Williams, 2001). The lesbian community founded a branch of the
Metropolitan Community Church in 1972 (chartered 1985), which formerly met at the
First Unitarian Church before purchasing its own building (Ibid). Also in the 1970s, a
chapter of Dignity—a support group for gay Catholics—was founded in Louisville (Ibid;
also see Davidson, 1987). In the 1980s, the gay community formed an advocacy
coalition (Gays and Lesbians United for Equality, or GLUE), a gay newspaper, and a
local television program to bolster their cause (Ibid). While gay rights legislation faced
difficulties, the Louisville Board of Alderman eventually passed an ordinance by a vote
of 7-5 in January, 1999 banning workplace discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation (Ibid). These legislative efforts faced steady opposition from religious
conservatives (Ibid). Savitch and Vogel (2004) report that gays organized against
Louisville’s merger with Jefferson County based on fears that the consolidated entity
would reflect a power shift to the suburbs, which are generally seen as less sympathetic to
the fight for gay rights and anti-discrimination legislation.
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I must note in this discussion that there is a vibrant debate amongst American
Christians, and Christians worldwide, on whether Christianity should condemn (if at all)
homosexuality as an orientation in general or homosexual activity on its own. This
sometimes takes the form of the classic distinction “love the sinner, hate the sin,”
language which has crept into the academic lexicon (Mak and Tsang, 2008). Thus, many
Christians now accept homosexual orientation but, even so, do not permit homosexual
activity among committed believers, including clergy members. Other Christian
denominations have openly welcomed the gay and lesbian communities (Summers,
2007).
Sex education in Louisville and Kentucky’s public schools is another
controversial issue. Because Kentucky received abstinence-only funding from federal
Title V grants from 1997 to 2008, the Jefferson County School District’s (JCSD) sex
education instructors “can mention STDs, but not how to use a condom or how to access
birth control” (Ungar, 2008; also see LEO, 2008). JCSD’s abstinence funding, $79,000
(10 percent) of the state’s total $817,000, goes to the Teen Youth Program of
Encouragement (TYPE) where instructors discuss “self-esteem and healthy relationships”
with sex-segregated middle-schoolers (Ungar, 2008). Instructors sometimes ask students
to sign “virginity pledges,” a practice allegedly causing teens to practice unsafe sex when
they do become sexually active because they “believe using a condom means sex is premeditated, enhancing feelings of guilt” (LEO, 2008). The teachers can discuss safe-sex
only if a teenager asks a question, and typically the response is given after the session’s
conclusion. More-comprehensive education is only available for students who are
already pregnant or parenting (Ungar, 2008). Local health department officials, nonprofit
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and progressive activists, and professors of medicine at the University of Louisville are
among the opponents of Kentucky’s abstinence-only sex education (Ungar, 2008; LEO,
2008). The recently-elected Democratic Governor Steve Beshear has not announced any
intention to forego receiving federal abstinence-only funding, which requires a match of
$3 for every $4 received (LEO, 2008). Recent evidence does suggest, however, that
abstinence-only sex education initiatives may persuade a significant portion of
participating teenagers to delay sexual activity and, as such, constitute worthy
investments of education dollars (Jemmott, Jemmott, and Fong, 2010; Stein, 2010).
Sex-oriented business regulation has also been a hot-button concern—even one of
the “most contested decisions” facing the post-consolidation Louisville Metro Council
(Savitch, Tsukamoto, and Vogel, 2008, 447). The adult entertainment issue has rallied
religious congregations into political action, including the Southeast Christian
megachurch. Savitch, et al. (2008, 446-447) note that Southeast Christian “has
substantial voting power and the capability to influence public opinion, especially on
issues of vice and morality.” They further write that, “Large evangelical Christian
organizations have come to the political fore by demonstrating their clout in both local
elections and state referenda; they have also successfully campaigned against vice in
downtown strip clubs” (Savitch, et al., 2008, 448). The ROCK organization, which
stands for Reclaim Our Culture Kentuckiana, was formed in March 2004 to “defend and
sustain the Judeo-Christian principles upon which our country was founded” (Birke,
2007). ROCK formed as a result of a series of stories in Southeast Christian’s weekly
newspaper, the Southeast Outlook, which “described how sexually oriented businesses
had spread from downtown like poison ivy, and reported that 60 such businesses were
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operating inside Jefferson County” (Ibid). ROCK, led by director Bryan Wickens, an
attorney with the conservative Alliance Defense Fund, seeks support from Louisville-area
churches to fight adult entertainment venues, including strip clubs and pornographic
retailers (Ibid). They do this by lobbying and educating local governments in Kentucky
and Indiana, reaching out to addicts and “women caught up in the pornography industry,”
and otherwise promoting Christian values (Ibid).
While the South is considered a highly-conservative area, with portions
simultaneously holding membership in the oft-mentioned Bible belt, it does seem that the
South contains urban areas that are considerably less conservative as a whole or that
express a form of repressed hedonism. In one unscientific investigation of Google search
terms, Louisville ranks among the top-five U.S. cities for searches of: “wife swapping,”
“girls gone wild,” “anal sex,” and “masturbation” (Classically Liberal, 2008).
Interestingly, Louisville’s residents are number one in searches for “homosexuality”
(Ibid). This may signify a large homosexual presence or, more likely, a general interest
in the topic, positive or negative. Birke (2007) quotes ROCK director Wickens as stating
that, “We’ve had more than one expert tell us that [the Louisville] area is one of the most
saturated with sexually oriented businesses in the country.”
This chapter constructs regression models comparing the determinants of public
opinion on these prominent culture war issues in Louisville with the nation. I explore
political conservatism, support for former President George W. Bush, and perspectives on
homosexuality, sex education, and one local-only issue—adult entertainment.
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Data Analysis and Comparison
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 compare MLR models predicting individual political
conservatism in Louisville and the nation, respectively. Table 5.1 contains a second,
non-comparable model with the addition of distance to the CBD. The national model
explains more variation in conservatism than the local model (12.4 versus 5.2 percent)
and includes many more statistically significant predictors. Findings are similar on three
independent variables: religiosity (strong positive), house dummy (positive), and fulltime
employment dummy (not significant). The remaining six predictors are not significant in
the LMS model but significant with varying effects in the GSS model. Education and the
female and black dummy variables are negative while age, income, and the married
dummy are positive. The signs on the LMS predictors are the same except age and
income, which are both negative. The inclusion of the distance to the CBD variable in
Table 5.1, Model 2 enhances the model’s predictive power—the change in adjusted RSquare is .015, raising the explained variation to 6.7 percent. This variable, which
measures suburbanization, has a significant, positive effect on conservatism.
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 look at BLRMs predicting support for President George W.
Bush in Louisville and the nation, respectively. The dichotomous LMS variable is based
on those responding in support for Bush in an “approval rating” type question. The
dichotomous GSS variable is based on those who voted for Bush in 2004 added to those
who would have voted for Bush had they voted or been eligible to vote. In the Louisville
model, the female and black dummy variables are significant and negative, while
conservatism, religiosity, and the fulltime employment dummy are all significant and
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Table 5.1: Predicting Individual Conservatism in Louisville (LMS)

Independent Variable
(Constant)

Model 1

Model 2

Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Coefficient
Error
Coefficient

Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Coefficient
Error
Coefficient

3.091***

.222

-

2.800***

.236

-

Female

-.030

.093

-.013

-.039

.093

-.017

Black

-.032

.119

-.011

.058

.121

.020

Age

-.002

.003

-.029

-.002

.003

-.032

Education

-.007

.029

-.010

.003

.028

.004

Income

-.000

.022

.000

-.013

.022

-.029

Fulltime

-.125

.100

-.053

-.132

.099

-.056

Married

.116

.102

.050

.107

.101

.046

House

.190‡

.109

.071

.166

.109

.062

.254***

.048

.223

.235***

.047

.206

-

-

-

.032**

.010

.136

Religiosity
Distance to CBD
F

5.170***

5.875***

Adj. R-Square

.052

.067

N
681
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. **p<0.01. ***p<0.001.

681
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Table 5.2: Predicting Individual Conservatism in the Nation (GSS)
Unstandardized
Coefficient

Standard
Error

Standardized
Coefficient

(Constant)

3.217***

.108

-

Female

-.261***

.050

-.102

Black

-.554***

.077

-.139

.004*

.002

.050

-.085***

.014

-.123

Income

.021‡

.011

.044

Fulltime

-.020

.053

-.008

Married

.238***

.053

.093

House

.102‡

.057

.036

.349***

.026

.269

Independent Variable

Age
Education

Religiosity
F

40.677***

Adj. R-Square

.124

N
2525
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. ***p<0.001.
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Table 5.3: Predicting Individual Support for Bush in Louisville (LMS)
Model 1

Model 2

Coefficient

Standard
Error

Coefficient

Standard
Error

-3.590***

.780

-3.546***

.804

-.784**

.281

-.788**

.282

-1.603***

.415

-1.622***

.425

Age

.013

.009

.014

.009

Education

.011

.090

.010

.090

Income

-.033

.070

-.032

.070

Fulltime

.685*

.317

.693*

.319

Married

.091

.303

.097

.304

House

.206

.342

.210

.343

Conservatism

.672***

.123

.674***

.123

Religiosity

.833***

.178

.839***

.181

-

-

-.006

.030

Independent Variable
(Constant)
Female
Black

Distance to CBD
-2 Log likelihood

357.727

357.681

Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square .342

.342

N
369
NOTE: *p<0.05. **p<0.01. ***p<0.001.

369
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Table 5.4: Predicting Individual Support for Bush in the Nation (GSS)

Coefficient

Standard
Error

-2.671***

.255

-.166‡

.099

-2.124***

.208

Age

-.003

.003

Education

-.019

.028

Income

.080***

.021

Fulltime

-.103

.103

Married

.061

.103

House

.188‡

.113

Conservatism

.748***

.043

Religiosity

.311***

.052

Independent Variable
(Constant)
Female
Black

-2 Log likelihood

2731.596

Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square

.340

N
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. ***p<0.001.

2567
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positive. The remaining variables are not significant, including distance from the CBD
which is added in Model 2 and has no net impact on the model. The model for the nation
is similar—with a nearly identical Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square at 0.34. Most significant
variables and their effects are the same except for the following differences: income is
significant and positive, the fulltime dummy is not significant, and the house dummy is
significant and positive. The positive effect of conservatism is strengthened in the
national model, while the positive religiosity effect is cut by more than half.
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 examine MLR models predicting beliefs about the morality of
homosexuality in Louisville and the nation, respectively. Again, Model 2 in Table 5.5
includes the distance to the CBD variable. The LMS and GSS models are very similar,
both predicting 27 percent of the variation in beliefs about homosexuality’s morality.
Most independent variables’ effects are comparable. Education, income, and the female
dummy are significant and negative—meaning that women and individuals with higher
socio-economic status are less likely to commit to the view that homosexuality is wrong.
On the other hand, conservatism, religiosity, and the married dummy are significant and
positive—meaning that married, more-conservative, and more-religious persons are more
likely to claim homosexuality is wrong. Fulltime employment status is not significant in
either model. Age and the house dummy are only significant in the national model but
have similar positive effects, though not statistically significant, in the Louisville model.
The glaring difference is the black dummy variable, which is significant and positive in
the GSS model but does not approach significance in the LMS model. Consistent with
the findings on religiosity and conservatism, the distance to the CBD variable is
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Table 5.5: Predicting Individual Beliefs that Homosexuality is Wrong in Louisville (LMS)

Independent Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Coefficient
Error
Coefficient

Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Coefficient
Error
Coefficient

(Constant)

3.031***

.266

-

2.783***

.274

-

Female

-.683***

.099

-.242

-.693***

.098

-.246

Black

.089

.125

.025

.182

.128

.052

Age

.004

.003

.045

.003

.003

.042

-.113***

.030

-.142

-.103**

.030

-.130

Income

-.043‡

.023

-.082

-.056*

.023

-.107

Fulltime

.025

.106

.009

.015

.105

.005

Married

.222*

.108

.079

.215*

.107

.076

House

.135

.116

.042

.113

.115

.035

Conservatism

.248***

.041

.205

.230***

.041

.191

Religiosity

.506***

.051

.368

.491***

.051

.357

-

-

-

.034**

.010

.117

Education

Distance to CBD
F

26.987***

25.894***

Adj. R-Square

.276

.287

N
681
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. **p<0.01. ***p<0.001.

681
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Table 5.6: Predicting Individual Beliefs that Homosexuality is Wrong in the Nation (GSS)
Unstandardized
Coefficient

Standard
Error

Standardized
Coefficient

(Constant)

3.108***

.200

-

Female

-.461***

.080

-.126

Black

.583***

.127

.102

Age

.007**

.002

.064

Education

-.185***

.023

-.185

Income

-.069***

.017

-.102

Fulltime

.082

.084

.022

Married

.263**

.085

.072

House

.156‡

.091

.038

Conservatism

.326***

.032

.228

Religiosity

.533***

.042

.291

Independent Variable

F

64.219***

Adj. R-Square

.274

N
1673
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. **p<0.01. ***p<0.001.
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significant and positive in Table 5.5, Model 2 with an increase of .011 in the adjusted RSquare.
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 contrast BLRMs predicting opposition to public school sex
education in Louisville and the nation, respectively. Both models find a significant
negative effect of income and a significant positive effect of conservatism but agree on
little else, despite similar Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square statistics just below 0.2. In
Louisville, status as a female exerts a significant negative effect on opposition to sex
education. In the nation as a whole, female status has no significant effect while age,
religiosity, and living in a house all exert significant positive influences on personal
opposition to sex education. Thus, religiosity is a significant factor in national opinion
but apparently has no influence on public opinion about the sex-ed issue in Louisville. In
Model 2 from Table 5.7, the addition of the distance from the CBD variable has no major
impact on the model’s fit or findings.
Table 5.9 presents an MLR regression model predicting opposition to adult
entertainment in Louisville. Because this is another culture war issue, it is expected that
the investigation of a possible religious effect is pertinent. Consistent with this
assumption, the inclusion of the religiosity index as a predictor in Model 2 increases the
adjusted R-Square by .079 over Model 1. Age, conservatism, and the female and married
dummies are statistically significant and positive while the black dummy variable is
negative. The remaining variables—education, income, distance from the CBD, and the
fulltime employment and house dummy variables are not significant. The inclusion of
the religiosity index in Model 2 removes the significant effect of conservatism while
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strengthening the negative effect of the black dummy variable. Religiosity is the most
powerful predictor of opposition to adult entertainment in one’s neighborhood.

Table 5.7: Predicting Individual Opposition to Sex Education in Louisville (LMS)
Model 1

Model 2

Coefficient

Standard
Error

Coefficient

Standard
Error

(Constant)

-2.965*

1.257

-3.022*

1.286

Female

-1.015*

.480

-1.011*

.480

Black

-.601

.607

-.567

.627

Age

.017

.014

.017

.014

Education

-.032

.139

-.031

.139

Income

-.357**

.127

-.361**

.129

Fulltime

.485

.560

.486

.559

Married

.508

.488

.506

.488

House

-.331

.527

-.340

.528

Conservatism

.496*

.195

.490*

.197

Religiosity

.265

.256

.265

.256

-

-

.010

.048

Independent Variable

Distance to CBD
-2 Log likelihood

163.747

163.702

Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square .195

.195

N
NOTE: *p<0.05. **p<0.01.

330

330
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Table 5.8: Predicting Individual Opposition to Sex Education in the Nation (GSS)

Coefficient

Standard
Error

-4.829***

.527

Female

.023

.181

Black

.368

.255

Age

.010‡

.006

Education

-.058

.054

Income

-.072‡

.040

Fulltime

.158

.193

Married

.241

.202

House

.627*

.243

Conservatism

.536***

.080

Religiosity

.549***

.107

Independent Variable
(Constant)

-2 Log likelihood

952.149

Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square

.179

N
1696
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. ***p<0.001.
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Table 5.9: Predicting Individual Opposition to Adult Entertainment in Louisville

Independent Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Coefficient
Error
Coefficient

Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Coefficient
Error
Coefficient

(Constant)

-1.384***

.200

-

-.789***

.203

-

Female

.453***

.074

.222

.296***

.073

.145

Black

-.176‡

.096

-.070

-.392***

.095

-.155

Age

.015***

.002

.256

.011***

.002

.187

Education

.003

.023

.005

.002

.022

.003

Income

.019

.018

.051

.022

.017

.058

Fulltime

-.081

.082

-.040

-.065

.078

-.032

Married

.284**

.082

.139

.184*

.079

.090

House

-.079

.089

-.034

-.127

.085

-.054

Conservatism

.072*

.031

.083

.025

.030

.028

Distance to CBD

.009

.008

.043

.003

.008

.016

-

-

-

.319***

.038

.321

Religiosity
F

14.961***

21.495***

Adj. R-Square

.170

.249

R-Square Change

-

.079

N
681
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. **p<.01. ***p<0.001.

681
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Summary and Discussion
The models included in this chapter have uncovered some interesting findings on
the culture war in Louisville and the nation. Louisville does not exhibit many of the
socio-demographic differences that characterize the national culture war. On political
ideology, differences in race, gender, age, and SES do not predict conservatism in
Louisville like they do in the nation. Nonetheless, most variables’ signs confirm
conventional knowledge of the U.S. political landscape. While there are distinct
differences in the Bush support variables between the datasets, the local and national
models are remarkably similar. It does seem that conservative ideology is more
important in shaping national support for President Bush while religiosity is more
important in the Louisville context, a finding again consistent with Louisville’s morereligious nature.
On the moral issues, Louisvillians and Americans are similar on their views of the
morality of homosexuality. The main difference lies in the views held by blacks.
Holding other variables equal, blacks in the nation are significantly more likely to hold
that homosexuality is immoral—a finding consistent with recent political events,
including blacks’ overwhelming support of Proposition 8’s ban on same-sex marriage in
California’s November 2008 election (although actual levels of support are debated; see
Wildermuth, 2009). However, in Louisville, black opinions are statistically indistinct
from the population as a whole, ceteris paribus. This is a surprising finding considering
Louisville’s religious nature. Interestingly, a comparison of means shows that urban
blacks in Louisville are slightly more conservative, less religious, and less against
homosexuality when compared with blacks nationwide. While these differences are not
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pronounced, they do conflict with conventional thinking—which would predict that
Louisville’s blacks are less conservative but more religious given their urban and
southern contexts, respectively. This finding on homosexuality may mean that support
for same-sex marriage may also be higher among Louisville’s black community than
elsewhere, a theory that could be tested by analyzing survey data on the 2004 referendum
in which Kentucky voted to add a same-sex marriage ban to the state’s constitution (USA
Today, 2004).
On opposition to sex-education, the Louisville and national models are very
different despite similar proportions of variation explained. One glaring difference is the
non-significance of religiosity in the local model. On opposition to adult entertainment,
religiosity is the most powerful predictor. Its inclusion in the model raises the explained
variation by nearly one-third of its former value. It would be interesting to compare this
local model to a national counterpart, although similar questions are unavailable in the
2006 GSS.
Religiosity, the key variable in this chapter’s set of tables, is positively correlated
with conservative culture war positions in all regression models included in this chapter,
except the local model predicting sex-education support. It is, though, positive in
direction in the local sex education model. In all other models, including the national sex
education model, the variable is significant at the .001 level. Thus, religiosity has proved
to be the primary driver of the culture war even when controlling for demographics, SES,
and political ideology. While many variables retain their significance, when religion is
included in the models it often dampers conservatism’s effect. For example, in Table 5.9
predicting adult entertainment opposition, conservatism exerts a weak but statistically
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significant positive effect. When religion is included in the model, it removes
significance from conservatism, has a stronger effect, and contributes to better model fit.
Thus, religiosity is demonstrated to be a very important predictor of public opinion on
several prominent moral and political issues in both Louisville and the nation.

159

CHAPTER VI
RELIGION AND CITY-COUNTY CONSOLIDATION IN LOUISVILLE
Introduction: Recent Political History and Consolidation Debate in Louisville
In the latter part of the twentieth century, Louisville and Jefferson County went
through the various intra-metropolitan rescaling stages from: (a) interjurisdictional
competition and annexation wars; to (b) regional revenue sharing under a city-county
compact to; (c) full-blown merger of the city with the surrounding suburban/rural county
(Savitch and Vogel, 2000; 2004). This chapter explores the recent debates over
regionalism culminating in the 2000 consolidation referendum and the city-county
merger in 2003; and analyzes data predicting participation and vote in the referendum
and attitudes on the merged government.
Political and business elites have attempted to amalgamate the City of Louisville
and surrounding Jefferson County through city-county consolidation or annexation of
large unincorporated portions of the county since the 1950s (Savitch and Vogel, 2000).
Their plans have repeatedly failed—consolidation was rejected in both 1982 and 1983
referenda. An earlier effort to annex significant portions of the county in the 1950s called
the Plan for Improvement, or Mallon Plan, also failed due to rejection by suburban voters
by a 2-1 margin (Ibid).
Attempts at consolidation in the 1980s were motivated by the city’s declining
share of the county’s population, down from three-quarters to one-third over the latter
half of the twentieth century, and tax base and revenues (Savitch and Vogel, 2000). As a
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result of deindustrialization and suburbanization, Louisville also housed a
disproportionate number of the county’s poor and minority residents. Project 2000, an
organization of business elites in cooperation with the mayor and county judge-executive,
pushed the state legislature in the early 1980s to establish a charter commission that
would study and propose city-county merger. With an exemption in place for the 90some legally-classified “lower-class” cities in the county, the legislature created the
commission (Ibid; Schulman, 1987). The resulting plan was defeated at the polls by less
than 1,500 votes. Despite a seemingly more “palatable” plan successfully placed on the
ballot the following year, consolidation was again defeated, by a margin of over 5,000
votes.
The major opponents of merger each year were a coalition of African Americans
from Louisville’s west end and the white working class in the south end of the city and
the unincorporated area of southwest Jefferson County (Savitch and Vogel, 2000).
Despite recent battles over busing, these strange bedfellows were brought together by the
possibility of merger (Ibid; Schulman, 1987). Savitch and Vogel (2000, 200), two local
academics, partially attribute consolidation’s defeat to fears of a “conspiracy among the
‘downtown’ and [affluent] ‘east end’ establishment,” with consolidation serving as the
backbone of the “community power structure’s agenda” (also see Schulman, 1987).
According to Schulman (1987, Lo3), this unlikely marriage was the result of the fact that,
…two generations of Southwest county whites felt they had been treated
by the city establishment and by East Enders as second-class, hillbilly
bumpkins, perennially on the short end for roads, sewers, and
representation on city-county boards and commissions. And for many
blacks, still only in transition to educational, economic, and participatory
equality, nothing short of commanding evidence would retrieve a nagging
worry that government consolidation might mean some loss of newly won,
black political power.
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Other coalition supporters included the NAACP, local police lodges, 18 state
representatives, and five city aldermen.
In 1985, Louisville made an effort to annex all of the remaining unincorporated
parts of Jefferson County. As a result, the county agreed to a “compact” with the city
that enabled tax sharing, better division of agencies/functions, and a moratorium on
further annexations and incorporations (Savitch and Vogel, 2000). The compact
reorganized metropolitan governance, allowing the city and county to reduce their
rivalry, cooperatively plan for economic development, and provide public services in a
more-efficient manner (Ibid).
Despite the seemingly successful compact, local elites bolstered by the Louisville
area’s daily newspaper, the Courier Journal, again placed city-county merger on the
agenda in the 1990s (Savitch and Vogel, 2004). The Jefferson County Governance
Project, including a citizens’ task force, was created in 1994 to study local governance
and make recommendations for future restructuring. In 1996, the task force rejected
consolidation as a strategy in favor of a “transfer of many services and revenues from the
city to the county and reorganization of county government” (Savitch and Vogel, 2000).
The state legislature did not enact the task force recommendations. In 1998, the compact
was renewed for another ten years beyond its original 12-year term with few changes—
including the same tax-sharing formulas and moratorium on new annexations and
incorporations (Ibid). The renewal eliminated a joint city-county office of economic
development, shifting its functions into the hands of a public-private partnership, Greater
Louisville, Inc. (GLI), which doubles as the Chamber of Commerce (Ibid).
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The area’s state legislative delegation subsequently created a new Task Force on
Local Government (TFLG), which in addition to the delegation included the city’s mayor
and board of alderman, the county judge-executive, the fiscal court, and representatives
from the small suburban cities. In late 1999, the mayor and judge-executive jointly
proposed the merger of city and county governments. The TFLG voted in favor of the
proposal in early 2000 and the Kentucky General Assembly passed a bill authorizing
consolidation during the Spring 2000 session. According to Savitch and Vogel (2004),
consolidation’s supporters closely mirrored Molotch’s (1976) growth machine players—
including corporations, developers and realtors, lawyers, other professionals, the
newspaper, and state, city, and county politicians (both Democrat and Republican).
A merger referendum was placed on the ballot for the November 2000 general
election. At the time of the referendum, there were 116 governments in Louisville—the
City plus 85 small cities and 29 special districts. As a political concession, these other
governments were again exempted from merger (Savitch and Vogel, 2004). While
opponents and casual observers believed consolidation would again fail, Savitch and
Vogel (2004) identify three key changes that altered the environment and debate since
merger was last considered in the 1980s. Middle and upper-class suburbs had emerged,
stocked with voting professionals sympathetic to the “government as business,”
corporate-style rhetoric. Louisville’s governing coalition, which pushed for
consolidation, is categorized as a developmental or corporate-centered regime (Stone,
1989; Savitch, Tsukamoto, and Vogel, 2008). Secondly, voters believed allegations that
Louisville was and would be falling behind its consolidated big-city neighbors:
Indianapolis, Indiana and Nashville, Tennessee. Furthermore, “failure to merge” may
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have resulted in also-consolidated Lexington-Fayette County, the home of the University
of Kentucky, surpassing Louisville as the largest city in Kentucky following the 2000
Census (Savitch and Vogel, 2000). This time 54 percent of Jefferson County voters
approved city-county consolidation. The vote was countywide, despite some calls to
allow the city its own, separate vote (Savitch and Vogel, 2004). Religious actors may
have played a significant role in supporting or opposing consolidation in Louisville, but
there is no known, direct evidence.
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to analyzing consolidation turnout and
support using both MLR and BLRMs and discussing the findings.

Data Analysis
Table 6.1 predicts turnout in the 2000 Louisville city-county consolidation
referendum, employing a BLRM. This and subsequent consolidation models are
presented in two base forms—Model 1 without the religiosity index and Model 2 with it.
This strategy allows one to gauge the impact of religiosity’s inclusion on other variables’
effects and the model’s predictive power. I will primarily discuss the findings of the
specification containing the religiosity index except when highlighting any major changes
wrought by its inclusion. I then run further specifications with religious tradition added.
The inclusion of religiosity in Table 6.1, Model 2 has minuscule impact on model fit—
raising the Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square from 0.31 by a mere 0.003 to 0.313. Religiosity
is positive in direction but not statistically significant. Several major socio-economic
variables are significant and positive in both specifications: education, income, and the
house dummy. Furthermore, two demographic variables are significant in both as well:
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age is positive while female is negative on turnout. The remaining variables did not
significantly affect one’s initiative to vote in the referendum: conservatism,
suburbanization (distance from the CBD), fulltime employment, marital status, and the
black dummy.
Table 6.2 adds dummy variables for religious traditions to Model 2 from Table
6.1. The black dummy variable is excluded from the models in Table 6.2 due to high
multicollinearity with the black Protestant dummy because such a large proportion of
Louisville’s black population identify as Protestants. Interestingly, these variables’
inclusion has little impact on the model. No religious traditions are significantly different
from Southern Baptists or Catholics, nor are Southern Baptists or Catholics significantly
different from one another in terms of turnout. The Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square
exhibits minuscule improvement. The only change in independent variable significance
is conservatism, which becomes significant at the 0.1 level and retains its negative sign.
Table 6.3 reports results of a BLRM predicting electoral support for city-county
consolidation in the same referendum. This model explains less of the variation (0.129)
than the turnout model. Again, religiosity does not exert a significant impact. The
Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square remains identical in Model 1 and 2. The only significant
predictor of consolidation vote is education, which is positive. However, a model with
education only (not shown) explains just half the variation explained by the full model
(0.065).
Table 6.4 adds dummy variables for religious traditions to Model 2 from Table
6.3. The inclusion of religious tradition increases the explained variation by 6.1 points to
nearly one-fifth. The black dummy variable is again excluded due to multicollinearity.

165

With the inclusion of religious tradition, the house dummy joins education as a
significant predictor but is negative. Education remains positive with a somewhat
weakened effect. When including the religious tradition dummy variables, this and
subsequent tables present two models—one excluding Catholics and one excluding
Southern Baptists. This allows one to compare the two traditions to one another and all
others. The coefficient on Catholic in Model 4 is naturally the mirror image (i.e.,
opposite sign but same magnitude) of the coefficient on Southern Baptist in Model 3.
The key finding from Table 6.4 is that Southern Baptists lent significantly less electoral
support to consolidation than Roman Catholics—they were indeed less likely to report
voting in favor of consolidating city and county in Louisville. The predicted probability,
holding other independent variables constant at their means, of a Catholic voting in favor
of consolidation is 0.740; whereas the predicted Pr[vote=1] for a Southern Baptist is
0.541. In comparison to Catholics in Model 3, other Protestants were significantly more
likely to support consolidation and non-Christian faiths were significantly less likely.
When compared with Southern Baptists in Model 4, black and other Protestants and the
unaffiliated were significantly more likely to vote in favor of consolidation than Southern
Baptists. A full ordering of religious traditions is unnecessary because several categories
include potentially unrelated traditions due to ambiguity in the LMS question wording.
Figure 6.1 explores the distribution of consolidation referendum voters throughout
the metropolitan region. This map again uses the dot density function to approximate
actual residential locations. “Yes” voters outnumber “no” voters by about 2-1. Many of
the supportive voters came, as they have historically, from the eastern urban and
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suburban areas. Supporters reside in all areas of the county, although the west and south
ends appear much more balanced by opposing voters.

Table 6.1: Predicting Individual Consolidation Referendum Participation in Louisville
Model 1

Model 2

Coefficient

Standard
Error

Coefficient

Standard
Error

-4.215***

.600

-3.954***

.627

-.363‡

.199

-.438*

.206

.057

.250

-.036

.260

Age

.046***

.006

.044***

.007

Education

.391***

.071

.391***

.071

Income

.136**

.050

.137**

.050

Fulltime

.307

.219

.314

.220

Married

.178

.218

.131

.221

House

.546*

.238

.529*

.239

Conservatism

-.098

.083

-.120

.085

Distance to CBD

.001

.022

-.001

.022

-

-

.151

.110

Independent Variable
(Constant)
Female
Black

Religiosity
-2 Log likelihood

649.080

647.188

Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square .310

.313

N
602
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. **p<.01. ***p<0.001.

602
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Table 6.2: Predicting Individual Consolidation Referendum Participation in Louisville, Contd.
Model 3

Model 4

Coefficient

Standard
Error

Coefficient

Standard
Error

-3.884***

.660

-4.015***

.644

Female

-.412*

.207

-.412*

.207

Age

.044***

.007

.044***

.007

Education

.387***

.071

.387***

.071

Income

.147**

.051

.147**

.051

Fulltime

.322

.224

.322

.224

Married

.085

.221

.085

.221

House

.580*

.239

.580*

.239

Conservatism

-.140‡

.085

-.140‡

.085

Distance to CBD

.005

.022

.005

.022

Religiosity

.155

.122

.155

.122

So. Baptist

-.131

.298

-

-

Black Prot.

-.158

.319

-.028

.332

-

-

.131

.298

Other Prot.

-.325

.340

-.194

.357

Other Christ.

-.353

.354

-.222

.368

Non-Christ.

.258

.572

.389

.580

Unaffiliated

-.182

.389

-.051

.405

Independent Variable
(Constant)

Catholic

-2 Log likelihood

650.834

650.834

Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square

.317

.317

N
609
609
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. **p<.01. ***p<0.001. Model 3 reference category is Roman Catholic. Model 4
reference category is Southern Baptist. Black is excluded due to multicollinearity with Black Protestant.
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Table 6.3: Predicting Individual Electoral Support for Consolidation in Louisville
Model 1

Model 2

Coefficient

Standard
Error

Coefficient

Standard
Error

(Constant)

.886

.824

.812

.857

Female

-.012

.253

.011

.263

Black

.102

.353

.135

.368

Age

-.004

.009

-.004

.010

.338***

.084

.334***

.085

Income

.025

.069

.026

.069

Fulltime

-.086

.295

-.089

.295

Married

.171

.304

.182

.306

House

-.607

.376

-.604

.377

Conservatism

-.152

.102

-.145

.104

Distance to CBD

-.045

.028

-.043

.029

-

-

-.050

.156

Independent Variable

Education

Religiosity
-2 Log likelihood

389.915

389.813

Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square .129

.129

N
NOTE: ***p<0.001.

403

403
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Table 6.4: Predicting Individual Electoral Support for Consolidation in Louisville, Contd.
Model 3

Model 4

Coefficient

Standard
Error

Coefficient

Standard
Error

1.648‡

.913

.768

.891

Female

-.029

.269

-.029

.269

Age

-.009

.010

-.009

.010

Education

.267**

.085

.267**

.085

Income

.060

.071

.060

.071

Fulltime

-.134

.304

-.134

.304

Married

.133

.315

.133

.315

House

-.718‡

.394

-.718‡

.394

Conservatism

-.172

.109

-.172

.109

Distance to CBD

-.050

.029

-.050

.029

Religiosity

-.010

.178

-.010

.178

So. Baptist

-.880*

.352

-

-

Black Prot.

.253

.437

1.133*

.445

-

-

.880*

.352

Other Prot.

.806‡

.473

1.686***

.484

Other Christ.

-.163

.439

.717

.453

Non-Christ.

-1.166‡

.692

-.286

.697

Unaffiliated

.203

.578

1.084‡

.581

Independent Variable
(Constant)

Catholic

-2 Log likelihood

381.001

381.001

Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square

.190

.190

N
410
410
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. **p<.01. ***p<0.001. Model 3 reference category is Roman Catholic. Model 4
reference category is Southern Baptist. Black is excluded due to multicollinearity with Black Protestant.
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Tables 6.5 and 6.6 contain four MLR models predicting individual approval of the
consolidated government in the years since merger was completed in 2003. The
dependent variable is the consolidation index derived from PCA. The base model, Model
1, accounts for just over 12 percent of the variation in attitudes toward the consolidated
government. In Table 6.5, the four economic variables wield the largest impacts on
consolidation approval—but two are positive (education and income) and two are
negative (fulltime and house). Alone, these four variables account for ten percent of the
explained variation (model not shown). In addition, age is positive while conservatism,
distance from the CBD, and the black dummy are negative. Gender and marital status are
not significant. Religiosity is significant and positive in Model 2. Its inclusion in the
model amounts to less than one percentage point in adjusted R-Square change.
Table 6.6 adds in the religious tradition dummy variables and increases the
amount of explained variation to just below 14 percent. The black dummy is once more
eliminated due to multicollinearity with black Protestant. Catholic is the reference
category in Model 3 while Southern Baptist is the reference in Model 4. Again, Southern
Baptists express less approval of consolidation than Catholics. Furthermore, black
Protestants are lower still. In Model 4, other Protestants and Christians and nonChristians express even greater (positive) differences with Southern Baptists. If one
restricts the model to only respondents identifying as Catholics and Southern Baptists,
with all independent variables from Model 2 plus a Southern Baptist dummy (model not
shown), the coefficient on Southern Baptist is -0.256*—nearly identical to the coefficient
when the full sample is analyzed. The adjusted R-Square for the model limited to
Catholics and Southern Baptists is 0.160, greater than for the full sample.
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Table 6.5: Predicting Individual Approval of Consolidated "Louisville Metro" Government
Model 1

Independent Variable

Unstandardized
Coefficient

Model 2

Standard Standardized
Error
Coefficient

Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Coefficient
Error
Coefficient

(Constant)

-.224

.217

-

-.070

.228

-

Female

.014

.078

.007

-.029

.081

-.014

Black

-.185‡

.103

-.075

-.244*

.106

-.099

Age

.006*

.002

.106

.005*

.002

.089

Education

.109***

.025

.196

.110***

.025

.197

Income

.064**

.020

.174

.066**

.020

.179

Fulltime

-.229**

.087

-.115

-.221*

.087

-.111

Married

.049

.089

.025

.016

.090

.008

House

-.481***

.098

-.206

-.502***

.098

-.215

Conservatism

-.063‡

.033

-.074

-.077*

.033

-.091

Distance to CBD

-.017‡

.009

-.081

-.018*

.009

-.088

-

-

-

.092*

.042

.094

Religiosity
F

9.553***

9.166***

Adj. R-Square

.123

.129

R-Square Change

-

.006

N
609
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. **p<.01. ***p<0.001.

609
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Table 6.6: Predicting Individual Approval of Consolidated "Louisville Metro" Government, Contd.
Model 3
Independent Variable

Model 4

Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Coefficient
Error
Coefficient

Unstandardized
Coefficient

Standard Standardized
Error
Coefficient

(Constant)

.075

.240

-

-.193

.228

-

Female

-.057

.080

-.029

-.057

.080

-.029

Age

.004‡

.002

.073

.004‡

.002

.073

Education

.104***

.025

.187

.104***

.025

.187

Income

.056**

.020

.153

.056**

.020

.153

Fulltime

-.215*

.087

-.108

-.215*

.087

-.108

Married

.024

.090

.012

.024

.090

.012

House

-.451***

.097

-.192

-.451***

.097

-.192

Conservatism

-.075*

.033

-.089

-.075*

.033

-.089

Distance to CBD

-.019*

.008

-.095

-.019*

.008

-.095

Religiosity

.095‡

.049

.097

.095‡

.049

.097

So. Baptist

-.268*

.115

-.108

-

-

-

Black Prot.

-.343**

.127

-.131

-.075

.129

-.029

-

-

-

.268*

.115

.116

Other Prot.

.034

.131

.011

.302*

.139

.100

Other Christ.

.073

.142

.022

.341*

.150

.102

Non-Christ.

.123

.216

.023

.391‡

.221

.072

Unaffiliated

-.051

.154

-.017

.217

.159

.072

Catholic

F

7.067***

7.067***

Adj. R-Square

.136

.136

N
616
616
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. **p<.01. ***p<0.001. Model 3 reference category is Roman Catholic. Model 4
reference category is Southern Baptist. Black is excluded due to multicollinearity with Black Protestant.
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Figure 6.2 maps the consolidation index means by ZIP code. Approval is lowest
in the African American urban west end, south end, and rural parts of the southeastern
county. The working class, inner suburbs exhibit medium levels of support while the
affluent urban and suburban east ends express the highest consolidation approval ratings.
Because the LMS lacks a measure of partisan identification, I do run vote choice
and approval models with a control variable capturing Republican Party affinity (models
not shown). This variable is a factor score of support for Bush and Republican Governor
Fletcher. The sample size is reduced significantly, to below 200 in one case, enough to
make these models questionable. In the vote choice model, this Republican variable is
not significant. In the approval model, the variable is a strong positive predictor (.703**)
and does increase the explained variation to beyond one-fifth. Its inclusion removes
significance from the religiosity and affiliation variables and greatly strengthens the
negative impact of conservative ideology.
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Further Analysis
To test if consolidation vote or the index serve as proxies for other variables,
Tables 6.7 through 6.12 employ MLR models with the same independent variables to
predict three different dependent variables: individual attitudes about redistribution to
central cities (ordinal), political trust (PCA score), and views of a prominent personality,
Mayor Abramson (ordinal).
Tables 6.7 and 6.8 use the GSS to predict support for expanding redistribution to
“big cities.” The Chow test statistic (F=28.491) is statistically significant at the 0.001
level, thus I reject the null hypothesis of equal regression coefficients and conclude that
coefficients indeed differ when performing regressions with “expanding assistance”
versus “expanding spending to solve the problems” of large central cities. Thus, one
cannot combine the respondents to the two GSS variables into a single measure and
sample for regression analysis. I choose to present regression findings for one of the two
variables, “expanding assistance,” because the effect of religiosity is strongest in this
model. However, the effect of religiosity still fails to reach statistical significance, nor
does its inclusion vastly alter Model 2 (over Model 1) in Table 6.7. Religiosity’s addition
to the model does somewhat weaken the significant negative effect of conservatism and
strengthen the significant positive effects of female and black. All other variables are not
significant in either model, except marital status which is negative and significant at the
0.1 level in Model 1. Both models’ adjusted R-Square statistics are low, approximately
0.04.
Table 6.8 features two models nearly identical to Table 6.7, Model 2 but without
the black dummy and with the religious tradition dummy variables. Again, Model 3
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Table 6.7: Predicting Individual Support for Expanding Assistance to the "Big Cities" (GSS)
Model 1

Independent Variable

Unstandardized Standard
Coefficient
Error

(Constant)

Model 2
Standardized
Coefficient

Unstandardized
Coefficient

Standard
Error

Standardized
Coefficient

2.137***

.106

-

2.098***

.110

-

Female

.135**

.045

.090

.146**

.046

.097

Black

.180**

.069

.076

.199**

.071

.084

Age

-.002

.001

-.035

-.001

.001

-.032

Education

-.013

.013

-.031

-.012

.013

-.029

Income

.013

.010

.047

.013

.010

.047

Fulltime

.001

.047

.001

-.001

.047

-.001

Married

-.080‡

.048

-.053

-.074

.048

-.049

House

-.027

.052

-.016

-.024

.052

-.014

-.080***

.017

-.138

-.074***

.018

-.128

-

-

-

-.030

.024

-.040

Conservatism
Religiosity
F

6.282***

5.817***

Adj. R-Square

.039

.040

R-Square Change

-

.001

N
1169
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. **p<.01. ***p<0.001.

1169

178

Table 6.8: Predicting Individual Support for Expanding Assistance to the "Big Cities" (GSS), Contd.

Independent Variable
(Constant)

Model 3

Model 4

Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Coefficient
Error
Coefficient

Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Coefficient
Error
Coefficient

2.202***

.112

-

2.048***

.137

-

Female

.136**

.045

.091

.136**

.045

.091

Age

-.001

.001

-.020

-.001

.001

-.020

Education

-.006

.013

-.014

-.006

.013

-.014

Income

.011

.010

.041

.011

.010

.041

Fulltime

-.001

.047

-.001

-.001

.047

-.001

Married

-.079

.048

-.052

-.079

.048

-.052

House

-.023

.052

-.014

-.023

.052

-.014

-.071***

.018

-.124

-.071***

.018

-.124

Religiosity

-.018

.029

-.024

-.018

.029

-.024

So. Baptist

-.155

.094

-.051

-

-

-

Black Prot.

.023

.089

.008

.178

.115

.064

-

-

-

.155

.094

.094

-.217***

.055

-.139

-.063

.092

-.040

Other Christ.

-.446*

.188

-.069

-.291

.202

-.045

Non-Christ.

-.245*

.109

-.068

-.090

.134

-.025

Unaffiliated

-.120

.080

-.057

.034

.112

.016

Conservatism

Catholic
Other Prot.

F

4.965***

4.965***

Adj. R-Square

.048

.048

N
1169
1169
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. *p<0.05. **p<.01. ***p<0.001. Model 3 reference category is Roman Catholic. Model 4
reference category is Southern Baptist. Black is excluded due to multicollinearity with Black Protestant.
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Table 6.9: Predicting Individual Political Trust (GSS)
Model 1

Independent Variable

Unstandardized Standard
Coefficient
Error

(Constant)

Model 2
Standardized
Coefficient

Unstandardized
Coefficient

Standard
Error

Standardized
Coefficient

-.575***

.143

-

-.492**

.150

-

.040

.058

.020

.029

.058

.015

-.420***

.084

-.143

-.451***

.086

-.154

.000

.002

.003

.000

.002

-.005

Education

.060**

.017

.107

.059**

.017

.106

Income

.032*

.014

.086

.032*

.014

.086

Fulltime

.027

.060

.014

.026

.060

.013

Married

-.083

.064

-.041

-.088

.064

-.043

House

-.081

.068

-.036

-.094

.069

-.042

.097***

.023

.121

.087***

.024

.108

-

-

-

.054‡

.030

.054

Female
Black
Age

Conservatism
Religiosity
F

9.206***

8.613***

Adj. R-Square

.058

.060

R-Square Change

-

.002

N
1197
1197
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. * p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<0.001. Religiosity index is limited to two items (worship attendance and
strength of religious preference) because other items were not asked of those respondents asked the political
trust questions.
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Table 6.10: Predicting Individual Political Trust (GSS), Contd.

Independent Variable

Model 3

Model 4

Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Coefficient
Error
Coefficient

Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Coefficient
Error
Coefficient

(Constant)

-.440**

.155

-

-.639***

.181

-

Female

.018

.058

.009

.018

.058

.009

Age

.000

.002

.002

.000

.002

.002

.062***

.018

.112

.062***

.018

.112

Income

.029*

.014

.078

.029*

.014

.078

Fulltime

.008

.061

.004

.008

.061

.004

Married

-.078

.064

-.038

-.078

.064

-.038

House

-.078

.069

-.035

-.078

.069

-.035

.085***

.024

.106

.085***

.024

.106

Religiosity

.053

.041

.053

.053

.041

.053

So. Baptist

-.199‡

.116

-.054

-

-

-

Black Prot.

-.554***

.110

-.165

-.355*

.137

-.105

-

-

-

.199‡

.116

.085

Other Prot.

-.068

.076

-.032

.131

.111

.062

Other Christ.

-.021

.184

-.003

.178

.201

.028

Non-Christ.

-.562**

.172

-.097

-.362‡

.192

-.063

Unaffiliated

-.088

.113

-.033

.111

.146

.042

Education

Conservatism

Catholic

F

6.272***

6.272***

Adj. R-Square

.062

.062

N
1197
1197
NOTE: ‡ p<0.1. * p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<0.001. Religiosity index is limited to two items (worship attendance and
strength of religious preference) because other items were not asked of those respondents asked the political
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Table 6.11: Predicting Individual Approval of Louisville's Mayor Abramson
Model 1

Independent Variable

Unstandardized
Coefficient

(Constant)

Model 2

Standard Standardized
Error
Coefficient

Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Coefficient
Error
Coefficient

3.131***

.288

-

3.125***

.306

-

Female

.007

.108

.003

.008

.111

.004

Black

-.092

.141

-.035

-.090

.148

-.034

.013***

.003

.211

.013***

.003

.212

Education

.046

.037

.073

.046

.037

.073

Income

.038

.027

.097

.038

.027

.097

Fulltime

-.087

.120

-.041

-.087

.120

-.041

Married

-.180

.122

-.085

-.179

.125

-.084

House

-.106

.130

-.044

-.106

.130

-.044

-.138**

.047

-.150

-.137**

.048

-.150

.008

.011

.036

.008

.012

.036

-

-

-

-.003

.059

-.003

Age

Conservatism
Distance to CBD
Religiosity
F

3.453***

3.131***

Adj. R-Square

.061

.058

R-Square Change

-

-.003

N
380
NOTE: **p<.01. ***p<0.001.

380
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Table 6.12: Predicting Individual Approval of Louisville's Mayor Abramson, Contd.
Model 3
Independent Variable
(Constant)

Model 4

Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Coefficient
Error
Coefficient

Unstandardized
Coefficient

Standard Standardized
Error
Coefficient

3.518***

.320

-

3.012***

.307

-

Female

-.053

.111

-.025

-.053

.111

-.025

Age

.011**

.003

.189

.011**

.003

.189

Education

.027

.036

.043

.027

.036

.043

Income

.025

.027

.064

.025

.027

.064

Fulltime

-.019

.119

-.009

-.019

.119

-.009

Married

-.181

.121

-.086

-.181

.121

-.086

House

-.053

.128

-.022

-.053

.128

-.022

-.141**

.047

-.154

-.141**

.047

-.154

Distance to CBD

.003

.011

.016

.003

.011

.016

Religiosity

-.057

.065

-.055

-.057

.065

-.055

So. Baptist

-.506**

.164

-.189

-

-

-

Black Prot.

-.217

.177

-.078

.290

.181

.104

-

-

-

.506**

.164

.204

Other Prot.

.067

.179

.022

.573**

.190

.186

Other Christ.

.111

.195

.032

.618**

.205

.178

Non-Christ.

-.192

.349

-.028

.314

.359

.046

Unaffiliated

-.494*

.197

-.163

.013

.206

.004

Conservatism

Catholic

F

385

385

Adj. R-Square

.090

.090

N
3.373***
3.373***
NOTE: **p<.01. ***p<0.001. Model 3 reference category is Roman Catholic. Model 4 reference category is
Southern Baptist. Black is excluded due to multicollinearity with Black Protestant.
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omits Catholic while Model 4 excludes the Southern Baptist dummy. The percent of
explained variation rises slightly to 4.8 percent with the inclusion of religious
identification. Southern Baptists and Catholics do not differ in their support for
expanding assistance to central cities. In fact, Model 4 shows that Southern Baptists do
not differ from any other religious traditions. In Model 3, other Protestants and
Christians and Non-Christians are demonstrated to have significantly less support than
Catholics for expanding assistance. Conservatism and female status retain their
significant, respective negative and positive effects while all other variables are
nonsignificant.
Tables 6.9 and 6.10 present MLR models predicting political trust from the GSS.
The variables included in Table 6.8 together predict about 6 percent of the variation in the
index of public trust in political leaders. In Model 1, income, education, and
conservatism are statistically significant and positive, while the black dummy is
significant and negative. These patterns hold in Model 2 with the addition of religiosity
to the model. Religiosity is positive, though the effect is weak and only significant at the
0.1 level. Religiosity improves model fit by 0.002 or 0.2 percentage points. The
religiosity index used in these models is a PCA score limited to two items: frequency of
worship attendance and strength of religious preference. Other religious items were not
asked of those GSS respondents asked the political trust questions which compose the
dependent variable index.
Table 6.10 again removes the black dummy and adds the religious tradition
dummy variables to the model. The adjusted R-Square is again improved by just 0.002.
Southern Baptists possess less political trust than Catholics, although the coefficient is
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weak and only significant at the 0.1 level. Not surprisingly, black Protestants and nonChristians are significantly lower in trust than both Catholics and Southern Baptists. The
remaining traditions do not differ from either denomination.
Tables 6.11 and 6.12 use the LMS data to construct models predicting support for
Louisville’s Mayor Abramson, consolidation entrepreneur and first post-consolidation
mayor. In Table 6.10, only two variables significantly alter support for the mayor—age,
which is positive, and conservatism, which is negative. The inclusion of religiosity does
not alter these effects and, with its complete insignificance, actually harms model fit,
lowering the adjusted R-Square from 0.061 to 0.058.
Table 6.12 presents models predicting Abramson support without the black
dummy but with religious tradition dummies. The inclusion of religious identification
improves the percentage of explained variation by three points to nine percent. Southern
Baptists and the unaffiliated lend significantly less support to Abramson than Catholics
(Model 3). In Model 4, Catholics, other Protestants, and other Christians have
significantly higher levels of support than Southern Baptists.
If indeed a polity replication effect is present, I would expect that those
parishioners with more exposure to church activities and cues would exhibit greater
(Catholic) or lesser (Southern Baptist) levels of support for consolidation than those
minimally involved with the tradition. Regression models restricted to either the Catholic
or Southern Baptist traditions’ members do not find a significant effect on the religiosity
index as an independent variable (models not shown). However, Figures 6.3 and 6.4
present data on the general relationship between consolidation support and religious
participation and salience, respectively, for both Catholics and Southern Baptists.
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Figure 6.3 shows that Catholics that attend church more frequently tend to offer
higher levels of support for the merged government than those who nominally attend.
The Southern Baptist relationship is unclear. Those attending every other week offer the
highest support, while those attending once a month and every week are about equally
lower. Those who attend nominally—every few months—offer the lowest support for
the regime, which is also true of Catholics. A church attendance variable is significant
and positive (0.118*; Std. Err. 0.056; Beta 0.184) in a regression model restricted to
Catholics but is not significant in a model restricted to Southern Baptists.

Figure 6.3: Merger Index Means by Church Attendance for Southern Baptists and Catholics
0.50

0.40

0.30

0.20
Southern Baptist
0.10
Catholic
0.00
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-0.10
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month

every other week nearly every week

-0.20

-0.30

Figure 6.4 displays merger support and its relationship to religious salience for
each tradition. Here, Catholics again demonstrate a positive relationship between
religiosity (salience) and support for consolidated government. The relationship for
Southern Baptists is again unclear. Consolidation support declines as one moves from
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“slightly important” to “important” but then rebounds slightly for those in the “very
important” category. Importance of religion is not significant in Catholic or Southern
Baptist-only regression models (not shown).

Figure 6.4: Merger Index Means by Religious Importance for Southern Baptists and Catholics
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Summary and Discussion
This chapter presents the results of my investigation into whether religiosity
affects individual political behavior and public opinions on issues of local institutional
design as it does moral political issues. Furthermore, does religious affiliation affect
behavior and opinions about consolidation in Louisville? Religiosity and religious
identification both failed to attain statistical significance in the model predicting
consolidation referendum turnout. However, theoretically key predictors like political
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ideology and African American status were also not significant in the base model. SES is
the most important set of predictors in the turnout model.
Religiosity also does not affect one’s vote in the consolidation referendum.
Education is the only significant predictor, although the other variables double the
model’s predictive power when included. Religious tradition does, however, greatly
improve model fit and demonstrates significant differences between traditions. The key
finding is that Catholics are 37 percent more likely to vote for consolidation than
Southern Baptists, holding other factors equal. This difference exists despite nearly
identical residential patterns and no significant difference in ideological means. The
other traditions are ambiguous because the composition of each category is unknown.
The traditions significantly enhance the model predicting consolidation support
using an index composed of six items. Southern Baptists again demonstrate lower levels
of support for the consolidated government, controlling for other influences. Once again
the findings on the other traditions are unclear. For the lone tradition for which the real
composition is known—black Protestants—the findings are equally unclear. In the
consolidation vote model, black Protestants were more likely to vote for consolidation
than Southern Baptists; but in the approval model, black Protestants are significantly
lower than Southern Baptists when compared to Catholics. This finding suggests that
black Protestants picked up on the traditional black opposition to consolidated
government, for fear of power dilution and distrust of power reasons, but nonetheless
supported consolidation at greater levels than white Southern Baptists.
To weed out possible “noise” wrought by the inclusion of these other ambiguous
religious categories, I ran a model restricted to Louisville’s Southern Baptists and
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Catholics. The differences between them hold, and are remarkably equivalent in size.
Furthermore, this restricted model explains a greater amount of variation in consolidation
support.
Religiosity is also a significant, positive predictor of one’s views of the
consolidated government. It is a more powerful predictor than political ideology,
residence, and select demographic characteristics (marital status, age, and sex) and on par
with race. It nonetheless fails to compare with the predictive power of the four indicators
of SES—including education, income, fulltime employment, and single-family home. It
is unclear why these variables split their effects—education and income are positive,
which is expected, but fulltime and house are negative. It must be noted that, while
correlated, these variables do capture disparate aspects of SES. For examples, some LMS
respondents with higher levels of education and income may not work full-time (such as
stay-at-home parents/spouses) nor live in a house (like high-end apartment or condodwellers). The consolidation approval model seems superior to the vote model because it
is based on an interval dependent variable and captures a wider range of opinion than the
dichotomous vote model. This MLR model brings out significance in several variables
hypothesized to play a role in the consolidation referendum that are not significant in the
vote model. It is also important to recall that individuals do not always report their
electoral support accurately. This is likely a factor in the LMS since support for
consolidation is reportedly higher than the actual electoral support. Consolidation is
popular enough locally that respondents may feel pressure to say they supported it
electorally, but then are more free to express their opinions honestly when asked to pick
among a range of values when gauging individual facets of consolidation.
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This chapter also includes models testing whether consolidation vote/support
serve as proxies for other variables—stances on redistribution to central cities, political
trust, and views of Louisville’s Mayor Abramson. I conclude that consolidation is not a
proxy for redistribution. This model, based on the national GSS sample, finds no
statistically significant difference between Catholics and Southern Baptists. One may
argue that this model should be restricted to the South or Midwest, or even these regions’
metropolitan areas, so the respondents are more similar to Louisville’s population. I
believe that this comparison is adequate because the bulk of the nation’s Southern
Baptists reside in the southern states. One would think that, when restricted to the South,
it would make sense if Catholics and Baptists thought similarly due to the region’s
distinctive subculture. At the national level, with the inclusion of northern, Midwestern,
and western Catholics, it seems that distinctions would boil to the surface more easily.
The finding that Catholics and Southern Baptists do not differ significantly on
redistribution, I believe, is conclusive evidence that the public does not view
consolidation as a proxy for redistribution of suburban resources.
The findings on public trust and Mayor Abramson require greater examination.
When examining trust of political and governmental leaders at the national level,
Southern Baptists are less trusting than Catholics—however the differences are at the 0.1
level of significance and would be ignored as not significant by many other social
scientists. This suggests that differences in political trust may partially be driving views
on consolidation among the two traditions. I would argue, however, that differences in
public trust are the result of the same forces shaping denominational polity, and thus
preferences for similar forms of governance in other institutions. It is clear that early
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Protestants were less trusting of Catholic leadership and thus created forms of church
government that relied on higher bodies only consultatively, if at all. Today’s
congregational churches likely retain the distrust that motivated their forebears to
establish local, autonomous control of their religious houses.
The model predicting support for Mayor Abramson finds sharp differences
between Catholics and Southern Baptists. In fact, the direction mirrors the findings on
consolidation vote and approval but is strengthened. The difference between the two
traditions rivals the effects of age and political ideology as the most important variables
in the model. This effect perhaps captures the same dynamics motivating differences on
consolidation in general because Mayor Abramson is seen as the driver of consolidation
and, as the head of consolidated government, it is only natural that the same effects
would arise in this model as the consolidation models. Of course, others may argue that
differences on consolidation merely capture differences in opinions about Abramson—
due to his personality, religious preference, partisan affiliation, or political ideology. I
favor the former explanation because it is consistent with a theory of polity replication. I
do not think these findings contradict my theory but instead bolster its applicability. The
Abramson model is, I believe, capturing preferences for consolidation in addition to
general personality preferences. It does seem odd that Abramson’s support does not
mirror consolidation support—the Abramson model doubles the effects of age (positive)
and conservatism (negative) but fails to find significance on the key SES variables that
indeed motivated consolidation support. This may be due to consolidation receiving
support outside Abramson’s loyal supporters—urban Democrats—in the Republican and
corporate-minded suburbs, for example.
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When examining the effects of religious participation, I conclude that greater
exposure to church activities and greater levels of religious salience are more important
in shaping consolidation views in Catholics than Southern Baptists. Catholics may care
more about the issue of consolidation, perhaps due to the strong Catholic educational
institutions in Louisville promoting the Catholic worldview and polity replication.
Participation in a church’s institutional structure is more-important in hierarchical polities
like the Catholic Church (McMullen, 1994). McMullen (1994, 724) argues that “a
congregational polity cannot mobilize individual behavior or attitudes to the same extent
as an episcopal polity can…because of its particular myth of ecclesiastical authority
embedded in its institutional structure.” He admits that this argument may seem
counterintuitive—because one “might expect the more ‘democratic’ congregational
polity…to allow for the free flow of information, facilitating members’ knowledge about
organizational policy” (Ibid). McMullen adds:
It is precisely the lack of legitimated hierarchical authority promoted by a
congregational polity (i.e., a loosely structured institution) that severs the
connections between the local church and national leadership. The
institutional myth of local church autonomy prevents mechanisms from
being socially constructed to facilitate the movement of information
between institutional levels, as well as the interest and motivation for even
listening to what is being said “from on high” (Ibid).
Concerning the Catholic Church, one of the two denominations under study here,
McMullen (1994, 724) writes:
…one might expect that the greater bureaucratic maze maintained by the
institutional myth of ecclesiastical authority would clog communication
channels; but instead, those myths have socially constructed the
motivation for parishioners to be aware of church policy, exactly because
they acknowledge as legitimate the authority of the episcopal authority.
My findings further support McMullen’s assertions.
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CHAPTER VII
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Introduction
This dissertation’s theory and findings hold implications for social science,
church structures, and policymaking. I discuss each in turn and then offer concluding
remarks and recommendations for future work.

Implications for Academic Research
This research has several implications for the social scientific study of urban and
metropolitan governance, societal and governmental institutions, and religious
organizational structures. I will first discuss the renewed importance of religion to the
study of urban politics. Secondly, I will review institutional implications.
I began this dissertation recalling the past importance of religious phenomena, its
banishment from academic discourse, and its recent resurgence in the social sciences. I
have personally lamented religion’s continued absence in urban studies here and
elsewhere (Ambrosius 2008a; 2009a). In one exception, Sharp (2007) theorized that
religious and other cultural forces likely impact urban elections indirectly, rather than
directly and substantively, by shaping the prospective electorate and turnout. However,
this research argues that religion does affect urban political outcomes beyond partisan
allegiance and electoral participation. In fact, neither religiosity nor religious affiliation
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significantly altered participation in Louisville’s consolidation referendum. Instead,
religion’s effect was indeed substantive. Religiosity, an important variable affecting
national elections, is the key driver of the culture war in Louisville and other American
communities. In addition, religiosity—although failing to rival SES—indeed influences
views of city-county consolidation on par or greater than most socio-demographic
characteristics, including race. Controlling for political ideology, which also serves as a
proxy for partisan identification, does not damper religiosity’s influence.
Furthermore, religious affiliation continues to play a role in communities’ debates
over local governance. This is validation that the Catholic-Protestant division dominating
ethno-religious theory in the early to mid-twentieth century still is relevant when one
examines issues of institutional design, issues that do not really appear in national
elections but feature prominently in local referenda (see Freeman, 1958 for a historical
example). Differences between traditions must receive further examination using betterspecified data sources and multiple methods.
This dissertation extends the understanding of religious polities as institutions
pioneered by McMullen (1994) and others. It further shows how New Institutionalism
can enhance the urban politics field. Other scholars have called for investigation of New
Institutionalism’s implications for urban politics (Lowndes, 2001; 2009). While
somewhat unorthodox due to its emphasis on religious institutions’ roles in urban
politics, this study fulfills these goals. It also suggests psychological political effects of
voluntary institutional association/membership. McMullen’s (1994) work was partially
motivated by a desire to understand religious institutions as differentiated from other
institutions because of their voluntary nature. My suggestive findings beg for further
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exploration of the links between religious denominations’ structures and individual
preferences for institutional design in all realms of politics and society—beyond
metropolitan governance to federalism and states’ rights, the United Nations and
international law, and a host of other policy/issue areas.

Implications for Religious Organizations
Despite their historical (and profound) differences, Roman Catholics and Baptists
have engaged in a series of recent talks meant to identify common elements of their faiths
and areas for future dialogue (Radano, 2007). It is clear to observers that any efforts at
reconciliation will face difficulty in moving past the inflammatory rhetoric of the past
and the vast doctrinal and cultural divide (Freeman, 2009). As Monsignor John Radano
(2007) notes, “Baptists will hesitate to join in a call for structural unity or doctrinal
unity”—the two legs of the church, polity and conceptions of the Ultimate (emphasis
added; see earlier citations in Chapter II).
These differences tend to mask a contemporary tendency towards balance in the
practice of church polity. Some scholars find that the Southern Baptist Convention
(SBC) is no longer as decentralized as many other Protestant denominations. In fact,
Sullins (2004) labels the SBC “moderately centralized,” or less decentralized than over
100 other Protestant denominations—a list which includes many fellow Baptists.
Following the liberalizing reforms of Vatican II, the Catholic Church is less centralized
than ever, and is feeling pressure for further reforms. While churches with presbyterian
polities were once thought of as occupying a middle-ground, this model is largely defunct
and these denominations are becoming more and more congregational (see Takayama,
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1974). This leaves the poles of polity—each of which is adopting elements of its
opposite.
White (1972, 107) wrote a proposition for future review in the 1970s: “Resolution
of problems centering around social acceptance by the dominant society will tend to force
the churches in the direction of conformity with constituting norms calling for more
decentralized decision-making and greater centralization” (emphasis added). Thus, even
over thirty years ago, the middle-ground was becoming some combination of centralized
authority and decentralized decision-making. While the poles of polity remain the same,
they are each, to borrow the Hegelian/Marxian triad, navigating toward a synthesis of
thesis (centralized) and antithesis (decentralized). This parallels a similar move in other
realms of society: from how we live (Old Urbanism versus Suburbanism to New
Urbanism; see Bohl, 2000) and how we organize metropolitan governance (Old
Regionalism versus Polycentrism to New Regionalism; see Savitch and Vogel, 2009) to
how we manage our public sector organizations (Traditional Public Management versus
New Public Management/Privatization to a synthesis currently under development; see
Norman, 2009). It would seem that somewhat centralized organizations that
simultaneously adopt some decentralized elements are best suited to govern our
congregations and communities. Churches of all stripes and sizes are moving in the
direction of this middle-ground—a balanced polity, or polity synthesis—that gleans best
practices from both types. Whether centralization or decentralization will predominate is
yet to be determined.
This study finds that pronounced differences do exist today between followers of
different religious traditions on seemingly non-spiritual issues. Leaders of religious
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denominations and congregations should carefully consider the cues, intentional and
unintentional, they are displaying for congregants to absorb. In light of organizational
change, do congregations still wish to encourage parishioners to pattern their political
opinions after churches’ wavering commitments to organizational structures that arose in
the past? This is a question that individual traditions must grapple with as we usher in a
new political and economic synthesis in light of the 2008 economic crash.
It is clear that political and religious pluralism have been positive for America’s
development as a liberal democracy. America typifies the so-called “denominational
principle;” which “rests on the assumption that all churches are good, and it does not
matter to which church one belongs, just so he [or she] belongs” (White, 1972, 104).
This ideal is distinctly American—the result of the “institutionalization of the norm of
religious pluralism” (Ibid). I believe that despite recent attacks on religion by the “new
atheists,” religious organizations should continue to take on the role of political
participants in the public square—including local elections and referenda on issues like
consolidation. I agree with Putnam (2000) that their participation is not only healthy but
necessary for vibrant democracy. If Louisville contained a different mix of religious
traditions but the same socio-demographic composition, it is possible (maybe even likely)
that consolidation would not have been enacted. Religious bodies, no matter the
tradition, wield power and must use this power peacefully to craft the better worlds
envisioned by each tradition.

197

Implications for Politics and Policy
My findings allow political entrepreneurs to look beyond class and racial lines to
rally support or opposition better, depending on where one sits, for reforms of
metropolitan government or governance. For example, class groupings, lower, middle,
and upper, particularly among whites, are all divided along religious lines. While lower
strata may be more fundamentalist and upper strata more mainline, it is clear that each
level of society has elements of many religious traditions. Emphasizing a particular
economic sub-group—the poor, the middle class, or the wealthy—in a political or policy
campaign is naïve if one does not differentiate potential supporters among each grouping.
Because of beliefs about religious and societal authority, it may be wise to target
grassroots efforts at particular religious traditions that are predisposed to support one’s
cause. In addition, any political effort to mobilize the African American community
must understand the central role of the black church, especially in inner-city
communities.
Republicans have rallied religious publics very well in recent elections; and
Democrats are getting better at speaking the language of faith, as demonstrated by their
successful 2008 bid for the White House (Pew Forum, 2008). Most would agree that
partisan affiliation is not as significant in local elections as it is in national elections.
This does not mean that political differences in party or ideology do not matter locally—
far from it. But locally, voters may reach across the aisle to support a friend or family
member’s bid for office or a “common sense” policy strategy originating with the other
party. After all, local politics are often more mundane politics (or “sewage without tears”
to use one metaphor) that elicit less passionate responses and lower electoral turnout
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(John, 2009, 19). But if religious differences exist over non-morality, seemingly
mundane issues like whether two independent governments should consolidate, maybe
religion matters for a whole host of local issues. Perhaps even sewage.

Recommendations and Conclusion
Recommendations. This dissertation has filled an important gap in the religion
and politics and urban politics literatures. I pioneer a link between both religiosity and
religious affiliation and local institutional design—namely, city-county consolidation.
While providing compelling evidence, I believe this dissertation should be understood as
exploratory: as inspiring future research. The results are suggestive of a polity replication
effect and discount consolidation as a proxy for redistribution. Future research must
better specify all religious traditions for more precise analysis so one can compare across
the full gamut of church polities. This includes the churches that still represent the polity
extremes, the blended churches, and the regional or presbyterian denominations. This
effort requires more-detailed primary survey datasets that use the collection strategy of
the General Social Survey (which asks for the specific denomination with which one
affiliates) and ask questions about one’s organizational preferences. This will establish:
(1) if denominational participants do prefer their churches’ organizational structure; and
(2) if differences exist across a range of institutional design issues. Scholars should also
conduct qualitative research, including interviews, participant observation, and content
analysis of denominational and congregational documents and communications to bolster
the findings of quantitative analyses.
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Furthermore, scholars may wish to expand my reasoning beyond religious
organizations. This requires asking, are religious organizations unique? While my
theory of polity replication is perhaps strongest in religious organizations, due to their
very nature and accompanying transcendent experiences, it is likely applicable to other,
secular organizations—private, public, or voluntary. Experience with a “successful”
(self-identified) organization tends to alter one’s thoughts about how institutions or
organizations should be structured.
McMullen (1994, 724) closes his article on church polity’s effect on individual
knowledge of church policy with the following passage:
Although there is the danger in neoinstitutional theory of reifying and
anthropomorphizing the “actions” of institutions on individual behaviors, I
hope this article has shown how these scripts and rules, myths and rituals
become part of an individual’s thinking and acting. Continuing research
could further delineate the characteristics of tightly structured and loosely
structured institutional forms. Evidence suggests that those authority
structures operate in similar ways across organizational fields—even in
religious organizations with voluntary membership.
I echo McMullen’s sentiments.
I also encourage further spatial research on religion’s role in the city. While
religious ecology is a staple research topic in the sociology of religion, collaboration with
urban planning is needed and seems to be building. Interest in New Urbanism, which
prizes centrally-located religious houses, spreading knowledge and use of Geographic
Information Systems (GIS) software like ArcGIS, and churches’ desires to understand
their environments and congregants’ communities all will drive further interest in
religious ecology. This study only explored religious ecology, including the locations of
religious followers and places of worship, to understand better the community of
Louisville. Because the LMS lacked respondents’ addresses, I was unable to assign
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geographic coordinates or census tract locations and was instead forced to locate them by
ZIP code only. This inhibited detailed statistical analysis beyond the density gradient
because the sample size was low (N=32). Future survey research should seek to establish
accurate locations, minimally at the census tract or block group levels and preferably at
the street or address levels, to better test research questions relating to religious ecology.
Conclusion. It is my hope that this dissertation spawns further work on religion
by scholars of urban politics and more work on local politics by scholars of religion. But
just as with religious conviction and conversion, altering actions must begin with a
change of heart. If readers take away a renewed appreciation of religious forces in
American society, particularly urban communities, I consider this dissertation a
successful and useful contribution to the literature.
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APPENDIX A
2006 LOUISVILLE METROPOLITAN SURVEY (LMS) QUESTIONS
Government and Politics Questions
GOV01: At the time of the vote for or against the City-County merger in November of
2000, were you living in the City of Louisville, outside of Louisville but within Jefferson
County, or somewhere else?
|__| 1. CITY OF LOUISVILLE
|__| 2. JEFFERSON COUNTY BUT OUTSIDE OF LOUISVILLE
|__| 3. SOMEWHERE ELSE
|__| 4. DOES NOT REMEMBER
|__| 5. NO ANSWER/REFUSED
GOV02: Did you vote for the merger, against the merger, or did you not vote at all?
|__| 1. VOTED FOR MERGER
|__| 2. VOTED AGAINST MERGER
|__| 3. DID NOT VOTE
|__| 4. DOES NOT REMEMBER
|__| 5. NO ANSWER/REFUSED
GOV03: Regardless of whether you voted or how you voted, would you say that, overall,
the merger has made you better off or worse off, or are you about the same as you would
have been without the merger?
|__| 1. BETTER OFF
|__| 2. WORSE OFF
|__| 3. ABOUT THE SAME
|__| 4. DON’T KNOW
|__| 5. NO ANSWER/REFUSED
GOV04: How much of the time do you think you can trust the Louisville Metro
government to do what is right? Do you think...
|__| 1. Just about always
|__| 2. Most of the time
|__| 3. Only some of the time
|__| 4. Never
|__| 5. DOES NOT KNOW
|__| 6. NO ANSWER/REFUSED
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GOV05: Would you say the Louisville Metro government is pretty much run by a few
big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?
|__| 1. RUN BY A FEW BIG INTERESTS
|__| 2. RUN FOR BENEFIT OF ALL
|__| 3. DON’T KNOW
|__| 4. NO ANSWER/REFUSED
GOV06: Do you think people in the Louisville Metro government waste a lot of money
that we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste very much of it?
|__| 1. WASTE A LOT
|__| 2. WASTE SOME OF IT
|__| 3. DON’T WASTE VERY MUCH
|__| 4. DON’T KNOW
|__| 5. NO ANSWER/REFUSED
GOV07: Do you think that quite a few of the people running the Louisville Metro
government are dishonest, not very many are dishonest, or do you think hardly any of
them are dishonest?
|__| 1. QUITE A FEW
|__| 2. NOT VERY MANY
|__| 3. HARDLY ANY
|__| 4. DON’T KNOW
|__| 5. NO ANSWER/REFUSED
GOV08: Compared to five years ago, do you think race relations in Louisville are...
|__| 1. Much better
|__| 2. A little better
|__| 3. A little worse
|__| 4. Much worse
|__| 5. No change
|__| 6. DOES NOT KNOW
|__| 7. NO ANSWER/REFUSED
NAM01: Now I'm going to read a list of names; please tell me how you feel about each
of them. Do you feel very favorable, favorable, neutral, negative, or very negative?
George W. Bush
|__| 1. Very favorable
|__| 2. Favorable
|__| 3. Neutral
|__| 4. Negative
|__| 5. Very negative
|__| 6. DON'T KNOW/NOT SURE
|__| 7. NO ANSWER/REFUSED
NAM05: Jerry Abramson
|__| 1. Very favorable
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|__| 2. Favorable
|__| 3. Neutral
|__| 4. Negative
|__| 5. Very negative
|__| 6. DON'T KNOW/NOT SURE
|__| 7. NO ANSWER/REFUSED
LCM01: This next question refers to your political liberalness or conservativeness. We
hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Do you think of yourself as
a Liberal, a Conservative, or as middle-of-the-road?
|__| 1. LIBERAL
|__| 2. CONSERVATIVE
|__| 3. MIDDLE-OF-THE-ROAD
|__| 4. DON'T KNOW/NOT SURE
|__| 5. NO ANSWER/REFUSE
LCM02: Do you consider yourself a strong or not very strong [liberal or conservative]?
|__| 1. STRONG
|__| 2. NOT VERY STRONG
|__| 3. DON'T KNOW/NOT SURE
|__| 4. NO ANSWER/REFUSED
Religion and Morality Questions
COM01: Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements
about various community issues. Adult bookstores and strip clubs tend to create an
unsafe neighborhood. Do you…
|__| 1. Very much agree
|__| 2. Somewhat agree
|__| 3. Somewhat disagree
|__| 4. Very much disagree
|__| 5. No opinion
|__| 6. NO ANSWER/REFUSED
COM02: Communities that have adult bookstores and strip clubs are more likely to have
robberies. Do you…
|__| 1. Very much agree
|__| 2. Somewhat agree
|__| 3. Somewhat disagree
|__| 4. Very much disagree
|__| 5. No opinion
|__| 6. NO ANSWER/REFUSED
COM03: Adult bookstores and strip clubs hurt other businesses in the area. Do you…
|__| 1. Very much agree
|__| 2. Somewhat agree
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|__| 3. Somewhat disagree
|__| 4. Very much disagree
|__| 5. No opinion
|__| 6. NO ANSWER/REFUSED
COM04: The next set of questions asks about your views and behaviors regarding
religion. We hear a lot of talk these days about religion. How important is religion in
your life? Is it...
|__| 1. Not at all important
|__| 2. Slightly important
|__| 3. Important
|__| 4. Very important
|__| 5. NO ANSWER/REFUSED
COM05: Over the past 12 months, how often did you attend a religious gathering such as
a worship service, Sunday school, or Bible study? Did you attend...
|__| 1. Nearly every week
|__| 2. Every other week
|__| 3. About once a month
|__| 4. Every few months
|__| 5. Never
|__| 6. NO ANSWER/REFUSED
COM07: Do you believe in an afterlife?
|__| 1. YES
|__| 2. NO
|__| 3. NOT SURE
|__| 4. NO ANSWER/REFUSED
COM08: How often do you currently read a religious text such as the Bible, the Torah, or
the Koran? Would you say...
|__| 1. Daily
|__| 2. Several times per week
|__| 3. Several times per month
|__| 4. Every few months
|__| 5. Never
|__| 6. NO ANSWER/REFUSED
COM09: How close do you feel to God most of the time? Would you say...
|__| 1. Extremely close
|__| 2. Somewhat close
|__| 3. Not sure
|__| 4. Not very close
|__| 5. Not close at all
|__| 6. NO ANSWER/REFUSED
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COM12: Please tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statements. I would
like to be a more religious person. Do you...
|__| 1. Strongly agree
|__| 2. Agree
|__| 3. Not Sure
|__| 4. Disagree
|__| 5. Strongly disagree
|__| 6. NO ANSWER/REFUSED
COM15: Homosexuality is wrong. Do you…
|__| 1. Strongly agree
|__| 2. Agree
|__| 3. Not Sure
|__| 4. Disagree
|__| 5. Strongly disagree
|__| 6. NO ANSWER/REFUSED
COM16: What is your religious preference?
|__| 1. Baptist
|__| 2. Other Protestant denomination
|__| 3. Roman Catholic
|__| 4. A Christian religion not yet mentioned
|__| 5. A non-Christian religion
|__| 6. No religious preference
|__| 7. NO ANSWER/REFUSED
SXED01: Now I'd like to ask you some questions about sex education, a topic that is
often debated among communities and in schools. The Centers for Disease Control
reports that in 2003, just over 52% of teens surveyed in Kentucky claimed to have had
sexual intercourse at least once. How supportive are you of some form of sex education
being taught in public schools? Are you...
|__| 1. Very Supportive
|__| 2. Supportive
|__| 3. Not very supportive
|__| 4. Not at all supportive
|__| 5. NO ANSWER/REFUSED
SXED02: The term comprehensive sex education includes discussion on the following:
abstinence, prevention of sexually transmitted infections, pregnancy, contraception, and
reproductive anatomy and physiology. How supportive are you of comprehensive sex
education being taught in public schools?
|__| 1. Very Supportive
|__| 2. Supportive
|__| 3. Not very supportive
|__| 4. Not at all supportive
|__| 5. NO ANSWER/REFUSED

247

Socio-demographic Questions
DEM01: Which of the following best describes your marital status . . .
|__| 1. Married
|__| 2. Not currently married but living with a partner
|__| 3. Widow or Widower
|__| 4. Divorced
|__| 5. Separated, or
|__| 6. Never married
|__| 7. OTHER
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW/NOT SURE
|__| 9. NO ANSWER/REFUSED
DEM02: Do you live in a house, an apartment, a condominium, a mobile home or some
other type of dwelling?
|__| 1. HOUSE
|__| 2. APARTMENT
|__| 3. CONDOMINIUM
|__| 4. MOBILE HOME
|__| 5. OTHER
|__| 6. DON'T KNOW/NOT SURE
|__| 7. NO ANSWER/REFUSED
DEM04: What is your current age?
|__|__| Years
DEM05: Which of these categories best describes how much education you've
completed?
|__| 1. Eighth grade or less
|__| 2. Some high school, but no diploma (INCLUDES 9TH GRADE)
|__| 3. High school graduate/GED
|__| 4. Some college or technical school
|__| 5. Associate's degree
|__| 6. Bachelor's degree
|__| 7. Some graduate course(s) but no advanced degree
|__| 8. Advanced degree
|__| 9. DON'T KNOW/NOT SURE
|__| 10. NO ANSWER/REFUSED
DEM06: Please tell me which of the following best describes your job situation last
week...
|__| 1. Working full-time
|__| 2. Working part-time
|__| 3. Not at work because of temporary illness, vacation, or strike
|__| 4. Unemployed or laid off
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|__| 5. Student
|__| 6. Disabled
|__| 7. Retired
|__| 8. Homemaker
|__| 9. Other
|__| 10. NO ANSWER/REFUSED
DEM07: What race do you consider yourself?
|__| 1. White
|__| 2. African American
|__| 3. Hispanic/Latino
|__| 4. Asian/Pacific Islander
|__| 5. Mixed race
|__| 6. OTHER
|__| 7. DON'T KNOW/NOT SURE
|__| 8. NO ANSWER/REFUSED
DEM08: INTERVIEWER: RECORD SEX OF RESPONDENT
|__| 1. MALE
|__| 2. FEMALE
DEM09: I'm going to read some broad income categories. Please stop me when I get to
the one that includes your total household income for last year before taxes. Would you
say. . .
|__| 1. Less than $10,000
|__| 2. $10,000 to $19,999
|__| 3. $20,000 to $29,999
|__| 4. $30,000 to $39,999
|__| 5. $40,000 to $49,999
|__| 6. $50,000 to $59,999
|__| 7. $60,000 to $69,999
|__| 8. $70,000 to $79,999
|__| 9. $80,000 and above
|__| 10. DON'T KNOW/NOT SURE
|__| 11. NO ANSWER/REFUSED
DEM10: What is your zip code? (ENTER 99999 IF UNKNOWN)
|__|__|__|__|__|
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APPENDIX B
2006 GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY (GSS) QUESTIONS
Government and Politics Questions
VOTE04: In 2004, you remember that Kerry ran for President on the Democratic ticket
against Bush for the Republicans. Do you remember for sure whether or not you voted in
that election?
|__| 1. VOTED
|__| 2. DID NOT VT
|__| 3. INELIGIBLE
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW
|__| 9. NA
PRES04: IF VOTED: Did you vote for Kerry or Bush?
|__| 1. KERRY
|__| 2. BUSH
|__| 3. NADER
|__| 6. DIDN'T VOTE
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW
|__| 9. NA
IF04WHO: IF DID NOT VOTE OR INELIGIBLE: Who would you have voted for, for
President, if you had voted?
|__| 1. KERRY
|__| 2. BUSH
|__| 3. NADER
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW
|__| 9. NA
POLVIEWS: I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the political views that
people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where
would you place yourself on this scale?
|__| 1. EXT. LIB.
|__| 2. LIBERAL
|__| 3. LEAN LIB.
|__| 4. MODERATE
|__| 5. LEAN CON.
|__| 6. CONSERV.
|__| 7. EXT. CON.
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW

250

|__| 9. NO ANSWER
NATCITY: Spending on solving the problems of the big cities
|__| 1. TOO LITTLE
|__| 2. RIGHT
|__| 3. TOO MUCH
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW
NATCITYY: Spending on assistance to big cities
|__| 1. TOO LITTLE
|__| 2. RIGHT
|__| 3. TOO MUCH
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW
POLSFAIR: In your opinion, how often do public officials deal fairly with people like
you?
|__| 1. ALMOST ALWAYS
|__| 2. OFTEN
|__| 3. OCCASIONAL
|__| 4. SELDOM
|__| 5. ALMOST NEVER
|__| 8. CAN'T CHOOSE
|__| 9. NA
KNOWPOLS: Do you think that the treatment people get from public officials in
America depends on who they know?
|__| 1. DEFINITELY DOES
|__| 2. PROBABLY DOES
|__| 3. PROBABLY DOES NOT
|__| 4. DEFINITELY DOES NOT
|__| 8. CAN'T CHOOSE
|__| 9. NA
CORRUPT1: In your opinion, about how many politicians in America are involved in
corruption? Would you say:
|__| 1. ALMOST NONE
|__| 2. A FEW
|__| 3. SOME
|__| 4. QUITE A LOT
|__| 5. ALMOST ALL
|__| 8. CAN'T CHOOSE
|__| 9. NA
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CORRUPT2: And in your opinion, about how many government administrators in
America are involved in corruption?
|__| 1. ALMOST NONE
|__| 2. A FEW
|__| 3. SOME
|__| 4. QUITE A LOT
|__| 5. ALMOST ALL
|__| 8. CAN'T CHOOSE
|__| 9. NA
BRIBE: In the last five years, how often have you or a member of your immediate family
come across a public official who hinted they wanted, or asked for, a bribe or favor in
return for a service?
|__| 1. NEVER
|__| 2. SELDOM
|__| 3. OCCASIONAL
|__| 4. QUITE OFTEN
|__| 5. VERY OFTEN
|__| 8. CAN'T CHOOSE
|__| 9. NA
Religion and Morality Questions
RELIG: What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other
religion, or no religion?
|__| 1. PROTESTANT
|__| 2. CATHOLIC
|__| 3. JEWISH
|__| 4. NONE
|__| 5. OTHER
|__| 6. BUDDHISM
|__| 7. HINDUISM
|__| 8. OTH.EASTRN
|__| 9. ISLAM
|__| 10. ORTH-CHRST
|__| 11. CHRISTIAN
|__| 12. NAT.AMER.
|__| 13. NONDENOM
|__| 18. DON'T KNOW
|__| 19. NO ANSWER
DENOM: IF PROTESTANT: What specific denomination is that, if any?
(other responses deleted)
|__| 14. SO.BAPTIST
|__| 70. NO/NON DEN
|__| 98. DON'T KNOW
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|__| 99. NO ANSWER
ATTEND: How often do you attend religious services?
|__| 0. NEVER
|__| 1. < 1 A YEAR
|__| 2. 1 OR 2 YR.
|__| 3. SEV.A YEAR
|__| 4. 1 A MONTH
|__| 5. 2-3 MONTH
|__| 6. ABOUT WKLY
|__| 7. WEEKLY
|__| 8. SEV. A WK.
|__| 9. DK, NO ANS
RELITEN: Would you call yourself a strong (STATED RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE) or
a not very strong (STATED RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE)?
|__| 1. STRONG
|__| 2. NOT VERY
|__| 3. SOMEWHAT
|__| 4. NO RELIG
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW
|__| 9. NO ANSWER
POSTLIFE: Do you believe there is a life after death?
|__| 1. YES
|__| 2. NO
|__| 8. UNDECIDED
|__| 9. NO ANSWER
PRAY: About how often do you pray?
|__| 1. DAILY +
|__| 2. DAILY
|__| 3. SEV.A WK.
|__| 4. WEEKLY
|__| 5. - WEEKLY
|__| 6. NEVER
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW
|__| 9. NO ANSWER
RELACTIV: How often do you take part in the activities and organizations of a church or
place of worship other than attending services?
|__| 1. NEVER
|__| 2. <1 A YEAR
|__| 3. 1 OR 2 YR.
|__| 4. SEV.A YEAR
|__| 5. 1 A MONTH
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|__| 6. 2-3 MONTH
|__| 7. ABOUT WKLY
|__| 8. WEEKLY
|__| 9. SEV.A WEEK
|__| 10. 1 A DAY
|__| 11. SEV. A DAY
|__| 98. DON'T KNOW
|__| 99. NO ANSWER
RELPERSN: To what extent do you consider yourself a religious person? Are you...
|__| 1. VERY RELIG
|__| 2. MODERATE
|__| 3. SLIGHTLY
|__| 4. NOT AT ALL
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW
|__| 9. NO ANSWER
SPRTPRSN: To what extent do you consider yourself a spiritual person? Are you...
|__| 1. VERY SPIRT
|__| 2. MODERATE
|__| 3. SLIGHTLY
|__| 4. NOT AT ALL
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW
|__| 9. NO ANSWER
HOMOSEX: What about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex -- do you
think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at
all?
|__| 1. ALWAYS WRG
|__| 2. ALMOST AL.
|__| 3. SOMETIMES
|__| 4. NOT AT ALL
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW
|__| 9. NO ANSWER
SEXEDUC: Would you be for or against sex education in the public schools?
|__| 1. FOR
|__| 2. AGAINST
|__| 3. DEPENDS
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW
|__| 9. NO ANSWER
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Socio-demographic Questions
MARITAL: Are you currently -- married, widowed, divorced, separated, or have you
never been married?
|__| 1. MARRIED
|__| 2. WIDOWED
|__| 3. DIVORCED
|__| 4. SEPARATED
|__| 5. NEV.MARR.
|__| 9. NO ANSWER
DWELLING: Dwelling type
|__| 1. TRAILER
|__| 2. SING.FAM.
|__| 3. SIDE 2
|__| 4. UP 2
|__| 5. 3-4 UNIT
|__| 6. ROW HOUSE
|__| 7. 5+/3 STOR.
|__| 8. 5+/4 STOR+
|__| 9. COMMERCIAL
|__| 10. OTHER
|__| 98. DON'T KNOW
|__| 99. NO ANSWER
AGE: RESPONDENT'S AGE (AGE)
|__| 98. DON'T KNOW
|__| 99. NO ANSWER
EDUC: RESPONDENT'S EDUCATION: What is the highest grade in elementary school
or high school that you finished and got credit for?
|__| 0. NO SCHOOL.
|__| 1. 1ST GRADE
|__| 2. 2ND GRADE
|__| 3. 3RD GRADE
|__| 4. 4TH GRADE
|__| 5. 5TH GRADE
|__| 6. 6TH GRADE
|__| 7. 7TH GRADE
|__| 8. 8TH GRADE
|__| 9. 9TH GRADE
|__| 10. 10TH GRADE
|__| 11. 11TH GRADE
|__| 12. 12TH GRADE
|__| 13. COLL:1 YR
|__| 14. COLL:2 YR
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|__| 15. COLL:3 YR
|__| 16. COLL:4 YR
|__| 17. COLL:5 YR
|__| 18. COLL:6 YR
|__| 19. COLL:7 YR
|__| 20. COLL:8 YR
|__| 98. DON'T KNOW
|__| 99. NO ANSWER
DEGREE: Highest educational degree earned by respondent
|__| 0. NOT H.S.
|__| 1. HIGH SCH.
|__| 2. JR. COL.
|__| 3. B.A.
|__| 4. GRAD. DEG.
|__| 8. DON'T KNOW
|__| 9. NO ANSWER
WORKING: Last week were you working full time, part time, going to school, keeping
house, or what?
|__| 1. FULL TIME
|__| 2. PART TIME
|__| 3. ON LEAVE
|__| 4. UNEMPLOYED
|__| 5. RETIRED
|__| 6. IN SCHOOL
|__| 7. KEEP.HOUSE
|__| 8. OTHER
|__| 9. NO ANSWER
RACE: Respondent's race
|__| 1. WHITE
|__| 2. BLACK
|__| 3. OTHER
SEX: Respondent's sex
|__| 1. MALE
|__| 2. FEMALE
INCOME06: In which of these groups did your total family income, from all sources, fall
last year before taxes, that is?
|__| 1. < $1000
|__| 2. $1K -2999
|__| 3. $3K -3999
|__| 4. $4K -4999
|__| 5. $5K -5999
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|__| 6. $6K -6999
|__| 7. $7K -7999
|__| 8. $8K -9999
|__| 9. $10K-12.4K
|__| 10. 12.5K-14.9K
|__| 11. $15K-17.4K
|__| 12. 17.5K-19.9K
|__| 13. 20K -22.4K
|__| 14. 22.5K-24.9K
|__| 15. 25K-29.9K
|__| 16. 30K -34.9K
|__| 17. 35K -39.9K
|__| 18. 40K -49.9K
|__| 19. 50K -59.9K
|__| 20. 60K-74.9K
|__| 21. 75K -89.9K
|__| 22. 90K-109.9K
|__| 23. 110K-129.9K
|__| 24. 130K-149.9K
|__| 25. 150K +
|__| 26. REFUSED
|__| 98. DON'T KNOW
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